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ABSTRACT 
 
The effects that cellular (cell) phone conversation may have on pedestrian road-crossing 
performance is unknown. A series of experiments was conducted using a virtual reality road 
crossing simulator to examine this issue. The participants were primarily university students 
aged between 18 and 24 years old, although one study compared a group aged 18 to 24 to a 
group between 50 and 67 years old. Two experimental situations were used: a gap-choice 
situation, in which the participants had to choose a gap to cross through; and an infrequency 
situation, where vehicles were present on only 10% of the trials. Participants were impaired by 
a simulated phone conversation task when compared to no-conversation task, as evidenced by 
longer reaction times, slower walking speeds, poorer gap choices, and more cautious 
behaviours. Most importantly, conversation was related to a decrease in the mean margins of 
safety, and the participants were hit or nearly hit by vehicles more often when talking. The 
general performance of the older participants did not differ from that of the younger 
participants, and both groups were impaired to a similar extent by the conversation task. 
Participants were found to use irrelevant distance information to inform their gap-choice 
decisions, a strategy associated with a decrease in safety as the distance between the vehicles 
increased. It was also found that their use of time-to-arrival information was impaired when 
engaged in the conversation task. Overall, talking on a cell phone while crossing a road may 
represent an unnecessary increase in risk; therefore, care should be taken if these two acts are 
being conducted concurrently. 
 1 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 2005, 943 pedestrians were injured on New Zealand roads, with 32 pedestrians being killed 
(M.o.T, 2006). Most the accidents occurred on urban roads, with only 5% of the injury causing 
accidents and 22% of the fatal accidents occurring on rural roads. Although pedestrian fatalities 
and injuries make up only a small proportion of the road toll in New Zealand there is a need to 
understand how cellular (cell) phone use may affect pedestrian behaviours. Pedestrians can be 
distracted, and this can be a contributing factor in accident causation (Gordon, 2005), but very 
little information is available on the effects of a secondary, potentially distracting task on 
pedestrian behaviour. For instance, while a search of the Crash Analysis System (CAS; LTSA, 
2005a) found only six recorded crashes involving pedestrians with cell phones for the 10-year 
period between 1995 and 2005 (Craig Gordon, 2007, personal communication) it is possible 
that other crashes were not reported.    
 
Road crossing is a well practised behaviour, and so it is conceivable that a secondary task will 
not affect it (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Rumar (1990) notes that driving, compared to 
walking, occurs at speeds faster than we have had the time to adapt to. Also, as the speeds and 
masses involved are lower when walking, the consequences of a detection failure are not so 
great. This may be true in the general environments we walk in, such as around home or the 
office, but the potential negative consequences are greater when humans and vehicles coexist in 
the same environment. For instance, a pedestrian who does not notice a tree in their path may 
end up bruised. On the other hand, a pedestrian who steps in front of an oncoming car may end 
up dead. A pedestrian hit by a vehicle travelling at 40 km/h has approximately a 30% chance of 
being killed, whereas if they are hit by a vehicle travelling at 60 km/h this increases to around 
90% (A.C.C., 2000). The chance of being killed also increases with age, a 50 year-old having 
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twice the risk of being killed as a 20 year-old male for an equivalent collision (A.C.C., 2000). 
With the potential consequences of an attention lapse being severe, it is important to know how 
phone conversation affects pedestrians.  
 
The current experiments examine two aspects of pedestrian behaviour that may be affected by 
cell phone conversation; gap-choice behaviours and the direction of attention. The first study 
examines how simulated cell phone conversation affects gap-choice behaviours. The second 
study builds upon the first but also includes an investigation of potential age differences in how 
phone conversation impairs performance. The third study focuses on the direction of attention, 
using a simulated quiet road with vehicles present very infrequently. A forth experiment 
investigates an alternative explanation for a finding from Experiments 1 and 3.    
 
Until recently the main focus of study in the distraction literature to date has been driving 
behaviours, with good cause. Out of 16 listed factors that contributed to crashes, inattention or 
diversion of attention was third for open road crashes and fifth for urban crashes in terms of 
social cost1 (LTSA, 2005b). Only driving too fast for the conditions and alcohol involvement 
were consistently higher for both environments, but in urban situations failure to give way and  
not seeing other party were also higher (LTSA, 2005b). However, both of these can, in part, be 
considered in terms of attention or distraction: Why did the driver fail to give way, and why did 
they not see the other party? For instance, Rumar (1990) argues that late detection is the basic 
driving error, and part of this may come down to “internal” distractions such as worrying about 
a personal problem.  
 
A large number of people own cell phones, approximately 1.5 billion worldwide at the end of 
2004 (CellularOnline, 2006). In New Zealand, Vodafone claims a customer base of over 2 
                                                 
1 “Social cost calculations include loss of life or life quality, loss of output due to injuries, medical and 
rehabilitation costs, legal and court costs and property damage” (LTSA, 2005b p. 1) 
 3 
million customers and 53% of the market (Vodafone, 2006), while Telecom claims over 1.6 
million connections (Telecom, 2006). Given that the current population of New Zealand is 
estimated at approximately 4.1 million (Statistics New Zealand, 2006), this means around 88% 
of New Zealanders own a cell phone.  
 
Ownership is also on the rise. In the United Kingdom, ownership increased across all age 
groups between 2001 and 2003 (National Statistics, 2004). Older adults were less likely to own 
a cell phone overall, but had the greatest increase in ownership. For instance, while the increase 
for people between 15 and 54 was 5.5 percentage points on average, for adults older than 54 the 
increase was 11.33 percentage points (National Statistics, 2004). The greatest increase was for 
the 75+ age group; their usage almost doubling from 13% to 24% (National Statistics, 2004).  
(Note, however, that the lower base rate of ownership for older adults in respect to younger 
adults means any increase in ownership will result in a higher percentage increase for older 
adults than younger adults.)  Newer distractions are also being introduced into vehicles, such as 
navigation systems and cellular (cell) phones (Sheridan, 2004), making it more important to 
study the effect these new distractions will have on behaviours. 
 
A substantial number of drivers report using a cell phone while driving, such as 68% (Lamble, 
Rajalin, & Summala, 2002) to 81% (Pöysti, Rajalin, & Summala, 2005) for Finland and 47% of 
cell phone owners in England (White, Eiser, & Harris, 2004). Usage while driving is higher in 
specific subgroups; for instance, 86% of US college students (Seo & Torabi, 2004) and 99% of 
heavy vehicle drivers in Denmark (Troglauer, Hels, & Christens, 2006) reported using a cell 
phone while driving.    
 
Estimates for the number of drivers talking at any given time have also been made, although 
only for the use of hand-held phones. In Western Australia 1.5% of drivers were observed 
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talking on a phone (Horberry, Bubnicha, Hartley, & Lamblea, 2001), while the figure was 2.2% 
in New York just prior to the ban on driving while using hand-held phones (McCartt, Braver & 
Geary, 2003). In New York this value dropped to 1.1% following the ban, but whether this 
decrease was maintained was not certain (McCartt et al., 2003).    
 
A fairly large proportion of those who use phones while driving have experienced dangerous 
situations. For instance, 21% of students who reported having been in an accident, or near 
accident, situation also reported that a phone was being used by at least one of the drivers (Seo 
& Torabi, 2004). In one Finnish study 50% of phone users reported having experienced a 
dangerous situation related to using their phone while driving (Lamble et al., 2002), while in 
another study phone related hazardous situations had been experienced by 44% of respondents 
in the six months prior to being polled (Pöysti et al., 2005). For heavy vehicle drivers in 
Denmark, 0.5% reported that their phone use had caused an accident and 6% reported it had 
caused a dangerous situation, while 66% reported they had experienced a dangerous situation 
due to the phone use by other road users (Troglauer et al., 2006).  
 
Younger drivers seem more likely to talk on a phone while driving than older ones, males more 
than females, and people with higher annual kilometres driven more than those with less (Pöysti 
et al., 2005). Drivers who talk on a phone while driving may also be more likely tolerate other 
risks, since only 75.8% of the drivers observed talking on a phone were wearing a seatbelt 
compared to 82.8% of the non-phone users (Eby & Vivoda, 2003). White et al. (2004) 
examined risk perceptions in three groups of people: those who would use a cell phone while 
driving, those who would not do so, and those who could not do so (i.e. did not own a cellular 
phone, did not drive, or did not own a car). Group differences for risk perception were found for 
5 out of 16 activities. Four of these related to phone use; the group who were willing to use a 
phone while driving rated the act of making (or receiving) a phone call on a hand-held (or 
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hands-free) phone as being less risky than did the other two groups. The only other activity 
where this risk-perception trend was evident was for the use of seatbelts. Hands-free phones 
were also perceived as being less risky to use by all groups than hand-held phones (White et al., 
2004), a finding replicated in a New Zealand sample (Gordon, 2005). Phone use has been seen 
as being less risky and less prevalent than other potential accident causes, such as drinking and 
driving or driving too fast (Vanlaar & Yannis, 2006). The only potential accident cause which 
was seen as less risky than phone use was traffic congestion.   
 
In Chapter 2 the Ecological Approach (EA), the overall theoretical context for this research, 
will be discussed. Both the benefits and potential issues of virtual reality (VR) simulation will 
be examined in Chapter 3, while pedestrian road-crossing research will be detailed in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 will cover some of the relevant theoretical concepts related to dual-task performance, 
such as attention and situation awareness, as well as a review of research into dual-task 
performance. (The majority of the research reviewed focuses on how secondary tasks affect 
driving, but there is a small body of work examining how secondary tasks affect walking.) 
Chapters 6 through 9 will detail the experimental work, with a summary of the findings 
provided at the end of each chapter. Finally, Chapter 10 will contain an overall discussion 
spanning all of the experiments. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
The following research was conducted from an ecological approach to psychology. The term 
EA used without a qualifier is ambiguous, the general term applying to the seminal work of 
four different psychologists (James J. Gibson, Egon Brunswik, Roger Barker, and Urie 
Bronfenbrenner) Each had a different perspective (Heft, 2001), but all take the ecosystem – the 
person, task, and environmental support – as the unit of analysis for understanding cognition 
and behaviour. The author follows the Gibsonian approach, which will be outlined in this 
section to provide a theoretical context for the research. 
 
Introduction to the Ecological Approach 
 
In his 1979 book J. J. Gibson states “It is not true that ‘the laboratory can never be like life. The 
laboratory must be like life!” (p. 3, italics in original). This is a guiding principle of the 
approach, to ensure that the constraints of an experiment match as closely as possible the 
constraints of the world. The overall goal of the approach is “…nothing less than a complete 
understanding of the complex and everchanging relationship of person-as-knower to the 
environment-as-known” (Shaw & Bransford, 1977, p. 6).   
 
One of the central tenets of the EA is that the individual is an active perceiver (Michaels & 
Carello, 1981) – “…we must perceive in order to move, but we must also move in order to 
perceive” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 223). For example, studying perceptual errors using a 
distorted room by only allowing the participants one stationary vantage point and the use of 
only one eye, unusual constraints in the everyday situations, may well produce interesting 
findings. However, if the constraints are modified to be more realistic, perhaps by enlarging the 
eye-hole so two eyes can be used, the distorted room can be seen for what it is (J. J. Gibson, 
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1966/1983; Katz, 1987). Related to this is the view that perception is not a passive process. For 
instance, a movie set may be believed to be real by an observer, but if they are able to move 
closer or walk around it they will detect that it is fake (Shaw & Bransford, 1977).  
 
Direct Perception and Information 
 
Indirect theories of perception are based on the assumption that the information provided to the 
senses is impoverished. Information about the world, therefore, must be processed by the brain 
to make sense of it (Michaels & Carello, 1981). In other words, although there is a real world 
“…we have no direct, immediate access to the world, nor to any of its properties” (Neisser, 
1967, p. 3, italics in original). Following Koffka (1935), Neisser (1967) drew a distinction 
between distal and proximal stimuli. A distal stimulus is one in the environment, such as a tree 
in a field. However, the sensory input, assumed to be the basis of our perceptions, is taken to be 
the proximal stimulus. In the case of vision the proximal stimulus is the image on the retina, so 
we would not perceive the tree directly but indirectly via the image of the tree on the retina.  
 
In contrast, J. J. Gibson argued that perception is direct, with all the information needed for 
perception being available in the environment without a need for internal processing (J. J. 
Gibson, 1979/1986). According to this approach, information about the environment is not 
considered to be impoverished, but rather rich and accurate (Michaels & Carello, 1981). We 
perceive the world directly, not the retinal image of the world, a point J. J. Gibson made explicit 
in an article entitled The Information Contained in Light (J. J. Gibson, 1960). Reinforcing this 
point is the fact that many animals have compound eyes, which do not produce retinal images, 
but such animals are still able to operate in the environment (J. J. Gibson, 1960), and may use 
the same information humans do, as in the case of optical looming (J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986). 
This suggests that different biological systems can be sensitive to the same information. In 
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other words animals perceive structured energy in stimulation, rather than images on the retina, 
similar to how bats perceive using echolocation (Michaels & Carello, 1981).  
 
Information, as described within the EA, differs from the information processing approach’s 
definition of information (Mace, 1977). Within the information processing approach 
information is defined as the reduction of uncertainty (e.g. Proctor & Dutta, 1995). Within the 
EA information specifies the environment (J. J. Gibson, 1966/1983; Michaels & Carello, 1981). 
The information about the environment is contained in ambient arrays, such as the optic array 
(J. J. Gibson, 1960) which “is the light that surrounds an observer” (J. J. Gibson, 1966/1983, p. 
12). For instance, the absence of texture specifies open air, whereas texture specifies a solid or 
liquid surface (J. J. Gibson, 1960).  
 
The information we need to attend to specifies the invariant properties of the environment (J. J. 
Gibson, 1950, 1966/1983, 1979/1986). To rephrase an example given by J. J. Gibson (1950), 
the retinal image we have of our back garden is continually changing as we move. To receive 
the same image twice we would need to sit in the same place both times, and have our head in 
exactly the same position. As this is unlikely, it could be said that we will never have the same 
image of our back garden twice.  However, we always perceive that it is the same environment. 
This means there must be invariant properties that inform us this is our back garden rather than 
our neighbour’s. For another example, the absence of texture, which specifies open air, may 
also be viewed as an invariant (J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986)2.  
 
Following Gibson, Michaels and Carello (1981) state that the “useful dimensions of an animal’s 
sensitivity are to the structured energy that invariantly specifies properties of the environment 
                                                 
2 In the case of the visual cliff or a glass door the absence of texture does not specify open air. Visual perception 
may not be veridical if optical information is missing, in this case information specifying the presence of a sheet of 
glass.  
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of significance to that animal” (p. 156, italics added). (An example of an optical invariant that 
specifies time-to-arrival, tau, will be discussed shortly.) A question that could be asked then is: 
What is significant? This has to be taken in relation to the animal and its current task, as what is 
significant to a hungry fish may not be significant to a hungry bird. What is acquired by an 
individual is information about invariants specifying what behaviours are possible, what the 
environment affords the individual (J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986) This concept will be expanded in 
the following section. 
Affordance Theory 
 
Individuals have different capabilities. Cohen, Dearnaley, and Hansel (1955) note that  
 
…in a given situation, such as jumping a beam, if one raises the height of the beam, the task 
becomes more difficult to some extent for all subjects. But for each person there will be a 
particular height of the beam he will succeed in jumping, say, in 70 percent of his attempts. (p. 
120) 
 
A person who is taller is likely to be able to jump over a higher beam than a shorter person can. 
It makes sense, then, to consider a task such as the jumping of a beam in terms of an 
individual’s capabilities rather than in absolute terms. Although there will be absolute 
differences in the beam heights a shorter and a taller person can jump, these differences may 
disappear when the individuals’ heights or leg lengths are taken into account. These concepts 
will be expanded upon in the following section, and the relevance of affordance theory to road-
crossing research will be outlined on page 13.  
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The concept of an affordance has been around for over 50 years (E. J. Gibson, 2000). J. J. 
Gibson discussed his reasons for developing the concept and gave an elementary definition of 
the term in his 1966/1983 book: 
 
I have coined this word as a substitute for values, a term which carries an old burden of 
philosophical meaning. I mean simply what things furnish, for good or ill. What they afford the 
observer, after all, depends on their properties (p. 285, italics in original).  
 
An entire chapter was devoted to affordances in his last book, but the basic concept was the 
same. Simply: “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 127, italics in original). 
Affordances are always measured in relation to an individual (J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986). For 
instance, knowing a seat will hold 70 kg of weight does not tell us about the sitting on or 
standing on affordance of the object. Only when we combine this knowledge with the fact the 
person who wishes to sit weighs 50 kg can we say that the seat affords sitting on for that 
person. The seat does not afford sitting on for a person who weighs 90 kg, at least not for very 
long. 
 
An additional concept has been introduced into affordance theory by Shaw, Turvey, and Mace 
(1982), an effectivity. They describe a specific effectivity as being complimentary to a specific 
affordance, specifically that “an effectivity of an animal (or human) is a specific combination of 
the functions of its tissues and organs taken with reference to an environment” (p. 197, italics 
in original). Where an affordance can be seen as what an environment will allow a specific 
individual to achieve, an effectivity can be seen as what behavioural properties of a specific 
individual support achievement in that environment.   
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The concept of an affordance has been described as “one of the most important and 
revolutionary in ecological science; it is also intuitively clear and appealing” (Michaels, 2003, 
p. 135), but there are still issues regarding the exact characterisation of an affordance. Some 
examples of a number of these disagreements are provided by Chemero (2003) and Michaels 
(2003), and can also be seen in the discourse between various writers in the journal Ecological 
Psychology (e.g. Chemero, 2001; Kotchoubey, 2001; Michaels, 2000; Smeets & Brenner, 2001; 
or Chemero, Klein, & Cordeiro, 2003; Stoffregen, 2000a, 2000b, 2003). It is generally agreed 
that affordances are properties of the environment relative to properties of an individual 
(Chemero, 2003), and for the purposes of this work this definition will be sufficient.  
 
Affordance Research 
 
Affordance theory has been examined within and applied to a variety of experiments, most 
often investigating geometric properties and the perception thereof. An early study examined 
stair climbing in three samples of shorter and taller college students (Warren, 1984). Using a set 
of adjustable stairs and an adjustable stair-climber, both of which allowed the stair riser height 
to be adjusted, Warren conducted three experiments investigating: 1) the critical riser height at 
which participants felt they could no longer climb the stairs without using their hands; 2) the 
optimal riser height for energy use, and; 3) the participant’s perceptions of the optimal riser 
height. He determined that although there were absolute differences between the groups, when 
the ratio of riser height to leg length was substituted for riser height these differences 
disappeared. For example, although the critical riser height differed for the two groups (67.13 
cm for the shorter group and 81.33 cm for the taller group) the ratios were almost identical, 
(88% of leg length for the shorter group and 89% for the taller group). This value had been 
predicted a priori by examining maximum human leg flexion. In a similar fashion, optimal 
energy efficiency occurred for both groups at a ratio of 26% of leg length. This value was 
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similar to that found for the perception of the optimal riser height, a ratio of 25% for both 
groups.  
 
Warren’s (1984) experiments illustrate the point that affordances are perceivable, and not 
simply in a dichotomous does afford / does not afford way. Participants were able to perceive 
the maximum stair height they could climb as well as the optimal stair height to climb, two 
different points within the affordance of climbability. These experiments also illustrated the 
utility of a pi number, described by Warren (1984)) as “a dimensionless (i.e. unitless) number 
that uniquely expresses a particular individual-environment fit” (1984, p. 686). 
Pi numbers are created when an environmental property E, such as riser height, and an 
individual property A, such as leg length, are both measured in the same units (e.g., cm) and a 
ratio is taken of the two: (Warren, 1984).  
pi = E/A     (Eq.1) 
 
Pi numbers have also been investigated in relation to other tasks, such as walking through an 
aperture (Warren & Whang, 1987). Warren and Whang (1987) found that participants, whether 
broad- or narrow-shouldered or walking normally or quickly, turned sideways to pass through 
an aperture that was approximately 1.3 times wider than their shoulders. However, when asked 
to make judgements on passability, the ratio was only 1.16. This was possibly due to 
instructional differences. Participants in the first task were asked to move freely, while in the 
second experiment they were asked to judge if they could, rather than would, walk through the 
aperture without turning their shoulders (Warren & Whang, 1987). Given that a gap only needs 
to be slightly wider than a person’s shoulders to allow them to pass without turning, it seems 
the participants in the first study were allowing themselves a 30% margin of safety (Warren & 
Whang, 1987). This again suggests that not only are affordances perceivable, but that people 
can perceive what is possible and what is optimal.  
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As well as continued research on stair climbing (e.g. Cesari, Formenti, & Olivato, 2003; Mark, 
1987), further research has investigated the numbers of fingers or hands required to pick up 
different sized objects (Cesari & Newell, 2000), stepping or jumping over obstacles (Cornus, 
Montagne, & Laurent, 1999), sitting on (Hirose & Nishio, 2001; Mark, 1987), and stepping 
over objects (Hirose & Nishio, 2001).  
 
The study of affordances has not been limited to the physical properties of objects such as 
stairs. For example, research has been conducted into the affordances of smiles (Miles, 2005), a 
study of social affordances. More germane to the current research, temporal affordances have 
been studied in the context of road-crossing. Oudejans, Michaels, van Dort, and Frissen (1996) 
investigated how locomotion affected pedestrians’ critical gap choices. Using an observation 
method they compared the critical time gap, the size of the gap (in seconds) where people swap 
from crossing to not crossing, for pedestrians who initiated crossing from a stationary position 
or while walking. They found that while both groups of pedestrians took similar times to cross 
the road, 2.78 s and 2.6 s for stationary and walking respectively, the critical gap for the 
stationary group was over 1.5 times longer than the walking group, 4.63 s and 3.02 s 
respectively. The authors suggest that pedestrians may make more accurate judgements about 
when it is safe to cross when in they are in motion (Oudejans et al., 1996).  
 
Using a virtual reality (VR) road-crossing environment, Simpson and Owen (2002) examined 
the utility of a pi number for a temporal affordance. The number they used was termed the 
safety ratio, and was defined as the ratio of the available crossing time to the time taken to cross 
(see Eq. 2). 
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safety ratio = time-to-arrival / time-to-cross                                 (Eq. 2) 
 
A safety ratio greater than 1 implies a safe crossing, while 1 or less than 1 suggests an unsafe 
crossing. The safety ratio can be easily converted into a margin of safety using the following 
formula: 
 
                                    margin of safety (%) = (safety ratio – 1) * 100                            (Eq. 3) 
 
For example, if a person crossed in a gap that was 3 s long, and they took 2.5 s to do so, they 
would have a safety ratio of 1.2 and a margin of safety of 20%. They found that the margin of 
safety was a sensitive performance measure; mean margins of safety were lower when vehicles 
began further away, regardless of the time the vehicles would take to reach their position. This 
indicated that participants used distance information in part to make their crossing decisions, a 
finding consistent with other pedestrian studies (e.g. Connelly, Conaglen, Parsonson, & Isler, 
1998; Connelly, Isler, & Parsonson, 1996). Later road-crossing experiments have shown the 
margin of safety to be sensitive to mobility impairment (Murray, 2003) and to differences in 
safety between children with and without attention deficit / hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; 
Clancy, Rucklidge, & Owen, 2006). The observational data from Oudejans et al. (1996) can 
also be converted into margins of safety, and this point will be returned to in the more detailed 
review of road-crossing research in Chapter 4. 
 
Affordances are not static. What the environment affords an individual changes as the 
individual’s effectivities change, such as a pedestrian carrying a heavy load (Young & Lee, 
1987) or age-related changes in walking speed (Ketcham & Stelmach, 2001). For example, in 
Murray (2003) the participants’ walking speeds were reduced using a leg brace. As they could 
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no longer cross the road as quickly, gaps that would have previously afforded safe crossing 
became unsafe. Effectivities can also be enhanced as well as reduced, such as in Hirose and 
Nishio (2001). By having their participants wear geta, Japanese shoes that increased the 
wearer’s height by 10 cm, the participants were able to step over or sit on greater heights. 
Participants in both of these studies took some time before they adapted to their new 
capabilities, suggesting that adaptation in this case was a result of learning.    
 
Along with physical changes in effectivities there may also be cognitive ones. The argument 
can be made that cellular phone conversation may change a person’s capabilities, and if they 
can not identify that their capabilities have changed they may not modify their behaviour to 
take the change into account. The impact of phone conversation on a person’s abilities will be 
addressed further in Chapter 5.  
 
The Optical Specification of Time-to-Arrival 
 
Along with invariants specifying physical properties of the environment there are also 
invariants that specify temporal properties. Time-to-arrival3 (TA) is important information to 
detect for both pedestrians and drivers, and is specified by the optical invariant tau (see below). 
However, whether people detect and use tau information is disputed. This section contains an 
outline of tau and some of the evidence for and against it. It also includes a description of 
research which suggests alternate information that may be used by people for TA judgements. 
 
                                                 
3 The term time-to-arrival is sometimes used synonymously with time-to-contact or time-to-collision. Time-to-
arrival was chosen to indicate that in road-crossing the important information is when a vehicle arrives at the 
pedestrian’s position. Schiff and Oldak (1990) view time-to-contact events as a subset of TA events. For them TA 
describes “impending contact between self and object, two or more objects, or no contact at all, as in miss-path 
trajectories” (p. 304) 
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To mathematically calculate the time-to-arrival (TA) of a vehicle we can use two pieces of 
information, the distance of the vehicle from the observer and its velocity4. However, although 
there is evidence that we can estimate distance and velocity, individually or together, this may 
not be how humans estimate TA (McLeod & Ross, 1983). Lee (1976) proposed a theory for 
detecting TA, specifically for the purposes of braking, from a higher order optical invariant he 
named tau. He defined tau at time t using the following formula (Eq. 4; originally from Lee, 
1976, p 441): 
Tau (t) = (angular separation of any two image points of the obstacle)              (Eq. 4) 
(rate of separation of the image points) 
 
It is, then, the rate of change in the optical angle subtended by two points on an object that 
specifies TA, e.g. the angle subtended between the brake lights on a slowing vehicle. The 
direction of change is also important. If the angle is decreasing over time the object is receding, 
whereas if it is increasing the object is approaching. Tau applies specifically when there is a 
constant closing velocity (Lee & Reddish, 1981). Time-to-arrival, as described, can be 
perceived directly from tau, and therefore there is no need for the information to be processed.  
 
As tau only specifies TA for a given moment in time, which is of little use if we want to know 
what the TA will be in the future, or was in the past. Lee (1976) specified the time derivative of 
tau, tau-dot, which is the rate of increase of tau. Holding this value steady at approximately  
-0.5 (the negative indicating deceleration) when approaching a stationary object will mean that 
motion will stop at the object (Lee, 1976). If it is less than -0.5 then a collision will occur, 
whereas if it is greater than -0.5 no collision will occur (Andersen & Sauer, 2004). 
 
Since its conception tau has undergone much scrutiny (Cavallo & Laurent, 1988) and has 
inspired many researchers (Hecht & Savelsburgh, 2004). Lee and Reddish (1981) demonstrated 
                                                 
4 Velocity, rather than speed, is used here since velocity has an associated direction. Knowing the speed of a 
vehicle does not help if we do not know which way it is traveling. 
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that tau may be used by gannets when they are diving for food. Their data suggested that the 
gannets did not fold in their wings at a specific height, after a certain amount of diving time, nor 
at a specific TA value. It appeared that the gannets were preparing to enter the water at a certain 
tau margin (Lee & Reddish, 1981), although there is disagreement with their conclusion (Wann, 
1996).  
 
There has been additional support for the theory. The tau-dot hypothesis was tested in relation 
to driver braking by Yilmaz and Warren (1995), along with optical expansion and the 
computation of the necessary deceleration to avoid a collision from spatial variables. They 
found that the mean value of tau-dot was -0.51, very close to Lee’s (1976) value for ideal 
braking. McLeod and Ross (1983) found that viewing time did not affect the accuracy of TA 
judgements, suggesting that tau was being used rather than a cognitive method requiring 
computation from distance and velocity. (They presumed that if the cognitive method took 
more time to use performance should improve as viewing time increased.)  
 
However, others disagree with elements of the theory (e.g. Tresilian, 1991), or disagree with its 
utility (e.g. Wann, 1996). Smeets, Brenner, Trebuchet, and Mestre (1996) argued against tau 
and suggested that TA judgements are based on a ratio of the perceived distance and velocity. 
They also noted that since TA is based on the ratio of the actual distance and velocity any 
variables that describe this ratio will correlate with performance, so results that appear to 
support tau may be due to this relationship. This assumes, of course, that their hypothesis is 
true: If another variable, such as tau, is used for TA judgements it is likely that the ratio of 
distance and velocity would correlate with it, suggesting their findings may be due to the 
relationship.  
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Smith, Flach, Dittman, and Stanard (2001) examined the optical constraints on collision control.  
Their task was designed to meet Tresilian’s (1997) conditions for the successful use of the tau 
strategy:  
 
Condition A. The experimental task actually involves performance of a fast timing interceptive task with 
requirements for very precise timing. 
Condition B. The action is a natural interceptive action (such as a catch or a hit) or closely approximates 
a natural interceptive action, and the participant is a skilled performer. 
Condition C. The task constraints are such that the use of [TA] information is implied and the tau margin 
is an adequate source of such information. (Tresilian, 1997, p. 1274). 
 
In a simulated environment, participants were required to judge when to release a pendulum so 
that it hit a ball back along the ball’s path of travel. They manipulated the approach speed and 
the size of the ball, and also examined differences in performance for different approach speed 
ranges (slower speeds, between 4- and 16-m/s, and faster speeds, between 12- and 24- m/s). 
Participants for the last study (different approach speed ranges) were only tested in one 
condition (slower or faster), and for a final study Smith et al. examined the transfer of learning 
by retesting the same participants in the alternate condition.  
 
They found that the participants responded earlier to slower and larger balls, findings that 
would not be expected if a tau strategy was being used. These errors were reduced with 
practise, potentially indicating a greater use of the tau strategy, but even at the end of testing 
these tendencies remained. For the two differing approach speed studies they found that 
participants in the slower condition performed the task with greater accuracy than those in the 
faster condition, and these performance differences were maintained when the groups switched 
to the other speed condition. 
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Drawing on these findings they proposed that people use the optical angle (the numerator for 
the tau equation) and optical expansion (the denominator for the tau equation) independently to 
judge TA, rather than using tau by itself. They examined the information that was being used 
through a state space analysis, comparing the actual performance of the participants with what 
would be expected if the participants were using each form of information (optical angle, 
optical expansion, or tau; see Flach, Smith, Stanard, & Dittman, 2004 and Smith et al, 2001 for 
more details on their analyses).   
 
Flach and colleagues believe that this theory helps explain results troubling for tau theory, such 
as velocity (Andersen, Cisneros, Atchley, & Saidpour, 1999) and size (DeLucia & Warren, 
1994) affecting TA judgements, and can model both individual differences and skill gain (Flach 
et al, 2004). The theory is similar to distance / velocity theories, with optical variables being 
used to estimate distance (from the optical angle) and velocity (from optical expansion). 
However, the actual values for distance and velocity do not need to be known.  
 
Summary 
 
 
The EA proposes that information about an environmental event is directly acquired from the 
stimulation by an active perceiver without a need for internal processing. The information 
specifies invariant properties of the event that the individual may find significant. Hence, the 
information is about affordances, and specifies the actions an individual may perform in its 
environment. The concept of invariants is not limited to physical properties of the environment 
as there are invariants that may specify temporal events, tau being an example of a temporal 
invariant that specifies TA. However, tau may not actually be used by people when they 
estimate TA, with Flach and colleagues suggesting alternative optical information that may be 
used.  
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In terms of pedestrian research the EA provides an appropriate framework. The focus on 
ensuring that the experimental task closely matches the real-world task improves the 
generalisability of the experimental task to the real world. Within affordance theory the road-
crossing task can also be conceptualised as the detection of the crossability affordance of a gap, 
and cell phone conversation can be characterised as impairing the ability of a pedestrian to 
detect this affordance. The next chapter outlines VR experimentation, a way to more closely 
match the constraints of the experimental task to the real-world constraints of the task.    
 21 
CHAPTER 3: VIRTUAL REALITY AND VIRTUAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
The current experiments utilise VR to provide a high level of ecological validity for the task. 
This chapter provides a basic background into VR, including both the benefits and drawbacks 
of the method. It begins with a general overview of the area, and then provides a more in-depth 
examination of presence, an important but ill-defined topic for VR research. Finally, one of the 
potential side effects of VR use, simulation sickness (SS) will be discussed.  
 
General Overview 
 
The terms VR and Virtual Environment (VE) are both used to refer to the same concept, a 
simulated environment that is stored on and produced by a computer (Loomis, Blascovich, & 
Beall, 1999). For current purposes the term VR will be used to refer to the experimental 
method, while VE will be used when referring to the environment that is navigated. A VE can 
be presented in various ways. With one method, sometimes known as desktop VR, the 
environment is presented on a computer monitor (Loomis et al., 1999). An example of this is 
the first experiment presented in Simpson (2002), where participants, seated in front of a 
monitor, used a joystick to control the braking of a vehicle which was following a bus. 
Immersive systems can involve surrounding a participant with multiple screens and speakers or, 
more commonly, using a head-mounted display (HMD) combined with a motion tracking 
system (Loomis et al., 1999).  
 
Virtual reality simulations provide a number of benefits. Using them allows a participant to 
actively participate in the environment rather than to be a passive observer (Rose & Foreman, 
1999). They also allow potentially risky activities to be performed safely, such as training 
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(Wickens & Hollands, 2000) and experiments in driver distraction (Haigney & Westerman, 
2001). From an ecological perspective this is ideal as it enables the participants to be active 
information gatherers, as “the actions of the perceiver have a significant impact on what is 
perceived” (Zebrowitz, 2002, p. 143), and to make the laboratory more like life, which J. J. 
Gibson (1979/1986) deemed necessary.    
 
There have been numerous actual and proposed uses for VR. Some of the more common uses 
have been flight and driving simulators (Brooks, 1999), but it has also been used for research 
and training in other domains where the potential consequences of accidents are high. These 
include helicopter piloting (Owen, 1996), astronaut training (Brooks, 1999; Lamb, 2002), 
shipping (Brooks, 1999), and crossing roads (e.g. Clancy et al., 2006; Simpson, Johnston, & 
Richardson, 2003). Due to their flexibility, the use of VR for social psychology research has 
also been proposed (Blascovich et al., 2002). 
 
Virtual reality has also been used to treat phobias, including spider phobia (Carlin, Hoffman, & 
Weghorst, 1997; Garcia-Palacios, Hoffman, Carlin, Furness, & Botella, 2002) and  a fear of 
flying (Brooks, 1999). The suitability of VR for treating driving phobias has also been 
examined (Walshe, Lewis, O'Sullivan, & Kim, 2005). Walshe et al. (2005) questioned whether 
VR was realistic enough to be usable as a treatment for driving phobia, i.e. would the 
participants’ immersion in the simulation be sufficient to elicit behavioural changes. They 
measured immersion through the driving-phobic participants self-reports of the realism of the 
driving experience, as well as through self-reported distress ratings and heart-rate measures (an 
increase in heart rate indicating more distress). Most of the participants (10 out of 11) scored 
highly on all three measuring, suggesting their simulation was immersive. This concept of 
immersion is generally referred to as presence and will be discussed in the following section. 
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Presence 
 
 
Presence
5 is a complex concept, one that has nuances and implications that are difficult to 
capture (Floridi, 2005). In an early issue of the journal Presence presence was defined to be 
“experienced by a person when sensory information generated only by and within a computer 
and associated display technology compels a feeling of being present in an environment other 
than the one the person is actually in” (Sheridan, 1992, p. 274). Another author has argued that 
presence consists of three aspects, paraphrased as: (1) a sense of being in the generated 
environment; (2) the extent to which participants respond to events in the VE compared to the 
real world; and (3) whether the participants feel like they have visited a place compared to 
simply seeing computer generated images (Slater, 1999). Gilkey and Weisenberger (1995) 
provide a more detailed summary of some of the suggested design features that may be used to 
maximise presence.  
 
A number of alternatives for measuring presence have been suggested. For example, Witmer 
and Singer (1998) proposed a questionnaire measure consisting of seven-point Likert scales 
with questions such as “How much were you able to control events?” and “How quickly did 
you adjust to the virtual environment experience?” Another questionnaire consisted of lines 
anchored by two opposing statements, such as “completely there” and “not there at all” for the 
presence scale (Freeman, Avons, Meddis, Pearson, & Ijsselsteijn, 2000). Participants were 
required to place a mark on the line indicating where their experience lay in comparison to the 
two statements.  
  
                                                 
5 The term telepresence was coined in 1980 by Marvin Minsky to “emphasize the possibility that human operators 
could feel the sense of being physically transported to a remote work space via teleoperating systems (Lee, 2004, 
p. 29)”. Telepresence is “considered central to teleoperations and virtual reality endeavour (Zahorik & Jenison, 
1998, p. 78)”, with the general term presence being used to refer to both teleoperations and VR applications among 
other things (Lee, 2004).  
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The utility of questionnaires for measuring presence has been questioned. Slater (2004), in his 
criticism, used the example of a questionnaire measuring how colourful a particular day was. 
Although respondents attributed consistent meanings to the questions, and relationships were 
found with other behaviours, Slater argued that there is no evidence that the mental concept of a 
day being “colourful” existed during the day being asked about. The only way the respondents 
could describe their experiences was in terms of the colourful questions, so although they may 
look back on the day and view it as colourful after the fact they may not have viewed it that 
way at the time. This is the crux of the argument: We cannot judge whether people felt present 
in the simulation using these questionnaires as the questions only elicit specific responses. This 
was not meant to be a criticism of all questionnaires, and the example of “anxiety” 
questionnaires was used to illustrate the problem. Respondents to an anxiety scale will have 
past experiences that can be used for comparison purposes, and physiological measures can be 
taken to give an overall picture of the level of anxiety felt; “In other words, questionnaires can 
be useful in circumstances where there is a stock of experience against which to judge a given 
experience, and where comparisons can be made about a specific behavioral outcome (p. 487)”.  
Slater’s conclusion was that the only way for presence research to progress was to reduce the 
dependency on questionnaires as a way of measuring presence. Some alternatives to 
questionnaires will be outlined shortly.  
 
Self-report measures may have other issues. Stappers, Flach, and Voorhorst (1999) describe an 
anecdote regarding a participant in a VE who complained about a table in the environment. 
Although he said it looked nice, it did not look real. However, he tried to use the table for 
support when standing from a kneeling position and stumbled. Although he reported a lack of 
belief in the table, his actions implied something else. It is possible then, that what a person 
does in a VE may be a better indicator of the level of presence they feel?  
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A suggested objective measure like this is task performance, presence being measured by how 
well someone performs a specific task (Schloerb, 1995). An example of this given by Schloerb 
(1995) is of throwing a ball in a basket. If a person can throw a ball into a basket half of the 
time the person’s objective presence is given a rating of ½. However, looking at performance 
measures in this way overlooks actual-world performance. If the same person can only throw a 
ball into a basket half of the time in the actual environment simulated, meaning their actual and 
virtual performances are of a comparable level, is presence then rated as 1? Slater (1999) notes 
that even in the actual world people fail at tasks, for reasons such as poor design or lack of 
experience. A person being unable to fix a car engine in VR may not indicate a lack of presence 
if such a task is also beyond them in the actual environment (Mantovani & Riva, 1999). 
Expecting perfect performance in a simulation to indicate presence, when performance in the 
actual environment is not perfect, seems to be asking too much. 
 
 
An Ecological Approach to Presence 
 
Another way to look at presence is in terms of the actions the simulation supports, some authors 
concluding that “Presence is tantamount to successfully supported action in the environment” 
(Zahorik & Jenison, 1998, p. 87, italics in original). Successfully supported action, as described 
by the authors, is when a person in an environment acts and the environment reacts in the 
expected way. For instance, if the environment is simulated, and if the reaction from the 
environment matches what would be expected in the actual environment, our expectations have 
been met (Zahorik & Jenison, 1998).  
 
This is congruent with the EA’s view of the coupled nature of perception and action (Flach & 
Holden, 1998; Zahorik & Jenison, 1998). This view focuses on the functionality of the 
simulation rather than its appearance (Flach & Holden, 1998). Higher presence should be felt if 
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the dynamics of the simulation closely match the actual world (Mantovani & Riva, 1999; 
Zahorik & Jenison, 1998). This means that the actor should not only be able to complete tasks 
in the simulation that they can complete in the actual environment, but they should not be able 
to complete tasks that they cannot complete in the actual environment. An affordance-based 
design approach may facilitate this (Gross, Stanney, & Cohn, 2005). If the affordances of the 
simulation match those of the actual environment then participants will be able to perform tasks 
within the VE that they usually can outside of it, and only those tasks.  
 
Stappers et al. (1999) examined the use of pi ratios for measuring presence under this approach. 
Participants walked through apertures of various widths in the actual environment, with or 
without the VR equipment on, and in a VE6. In the first two conditions, in the actual 
environment, there was a definite initiation of shoulder rotation at 1.5 shoulder-widths, while in 
the VE participants always rotated their shoulders. They were sensitive to the size of the gaps, 
indicated by greater degrees of rotation as the gaps became smaller, but the lack of a critical 
ratio suggested they could not relate gap size to shoulder size. It could be argued, then, that 
there was information missing from the simulation that the participants would usually use to 
inform their decision of when to rotate.  
 
In a separate experiment regarding ball throwing under different simulated gravities, 
participants reported that a gravitational acceleration of 5 m/s /s felt most real, while the actual 
value for gravity (9.8 m/s /s) felt too fast (Stappers et al., 1999). Performance was also better at 
the lower value. Presence, they concluded, may not relate to how well the VE matches the 
actual environment, and even having high fidelity matches between the environments may not 
mean that the experiences are equivalent.   
                                                 
6 It seems likely that their experiment was been based on Warren and Whang (1987), regarding shoulder turning 
when walking through apertures, but this is not specifically stated.   
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If we want to measure how well a simulation represents the actual environment, comparing the 
actual behaviours of individuals in both environments makes sense. Using performance 
measures like these, rather than ones like those suggested by Schloerb (1995), may be a good 
way to proceed (Stappers et al., 1999). An example of a measure like this for the current 
research is outlined on page 37, with some of the participants (specifically one child and one 
adult) in previous road-crossing research indicating that their behaviour in the VE matched their 
real-world behaviour.   
Potential Issues for VR Research 
 
Simulation Sickness 
 
 
One of the problems that may occur with VR exposure is simulator sickness (SS). Simulator 
sickness is similar to motion sickness, but tends to occur less frequently and less severely than 
motion sickness (Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum, & Lilienthal, 1993).  Symptoms of SS include eye 
strain, sweating, disorientation, and vertigo (Ebenholtz, 1992), although these are not the only 
symptoms. Extreme symptoms, such as vomiting, are uncommon (DiZio & Lackner, 1992; 
Kennedy et al., 1993). A questionnaire developed by (Kennedy et al., 1993) measures three SS 
symptom clusters; oculomotor (e.g. eyestrain, headaches), disorientation (e.g. vertigo), and 
nausea (e.g. stomach awareness, burping). They provide norms based on research with the 
United States Navy personnel (Kennedy et al., 1993; Kennedy, Lane, Lilienthal, Berbaum, & 
Hettinger, 1992), but did not provide any other psychometric properties of their scales.  
 
Although occurring in a smaller proportion of the general population than motion sickness, 
there are other risks to sufferers. For example, disorientation may cause problems for a driver 
(McCauley & Sharkey, 1992; Pausch, Crea, & Conway, 1992). It is therefore desirable to 
minimise risk and to ensure participant safety by alerting them to the symptoms of SS and, if 
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necessary, allowing them time to recover. Other users may suffer from fatigue post-exposure 
(Pausch et al., 1992). There may also be issues related to training, with simulators being used 
sub-optimally, if sickness interferes with learning (Kennedy et al., 1992). Behaviours in the VE 
that are intended to reduce SS may also prove maladaptive to real world performance (Pausch 
et al., 1992).  
 
The specific causes of SS are unclear, although they are related to a functioning vestibular 
system since a person with a non-functioning vestibular system does not experience motion 
sickness (Ebenholtz, 1992). It may be due to intersensory conflict (Biocca, 1992), such as when 
the observer is not moving but there is optical motion in their visual field (Hettinger & Riccio, 
1992). This has been called neural mismatch, when the signals from the visual system and 
vestibular system conflict (Howarth & Finch, 1999). The technology itself may exacerbate 
problems with errors related to position tracking. The updating of body position may lag, the 
VE body position may not match the actual position of the body, or the image may vibrate 
(Biocca, 1992).  
 
Using an HMD may also cause problems. People viewing a game of chess they were playing 
through an HMD reported more SS symptoms than a group using a monitor (Howarth & 
Costello, 1997). This was thought to be due to the stable image presented to the participants; 
although their heads could move freely the image never changed, the opposite situation to the 
observer being still while the visual field is moving. This configuration was related to a greater 
increase in symptoms than a previous VR study, suggesting that technological problems such as 
tracker-lag are not required for SS (Howarth & Costello, 1997). The opposite situation, global 
optical motion in the visual field while the participant does not move, also seems to cause 
problems. In a comparison of a static versus dynamic (via treadmill) method of navigating in a 
virtual environment, higher levels of SS were found for the static simulator (Jaeger & Mourant, 
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2001). Both cases seem to be examples of neural mismatch, as mentioned before. Weight of the 
helmet may also exacerbate problems, both by causing muscle strain with prolonged use 
(Howarth & Costello, 1997) and by increasing the weight of the head. DiZio and Lackner 
(1992) mention previous studies where SS was made more severe by attaching weights to the 
participants’ heads, and suggest this is due to the change in inertia that the extra weight causes. 
 
In terms of who is more susceptible, it seems that males are at less risk than females (Jaeger & 
Mourant, 2001; Pausch et al., 1992; Stanney, Kennedy, Drexler, & Harm, 1999). Children and 
young adults (up to age 21) have the highest risk of developing SS, with susceptibility 
decreasing with age until it almost vanishes at 50 (Biocca, 1992; Pausch et al., 1992). Pre-
existing illnesses, such as colds and ear infections, may also increase the risk of developing SS 
(Pausch et al., 1992). 
Postural Stability 
 
 
Exposure to a VE does seem to cause subsequent problems for postural stability, but this 
impairment is only short-term, lasting for about 10 minutes after exposure (Cobb, 1999; Cobb, 
Nichols, Ramsey, & Wilson, 1999). Simulation sickness, then, appears to be the biggest issue 
relating to the use of VR. 
 
Summary 
 
 
Ecologically, VR provides a good framework for the current research. Virtual environments 
allow participants to be active explorers, and allow the constraints of the simulated task to more 
closely match the constraints of the actual task. It is also possible to examine behaviours and 
situations in VR that may be too dangerous to study in the actual environment, such as road 
crossing behaviours. The general level of presence supported by the VE may be measured by 
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comparing how people act in the VE with how they act in the actual environment, and also by 
how well the constraints of the simulation match those of the actual world. One potential 
problem stemming from the use of the VR, SS, may cause issues for research, but it seems that 
SS may be more detrimental for training situations. Overall, then, VR appears to be a good way 
to study how cell phone conversation affects pedestrian behaviours.  
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CHAPTER 4: PEDESTRIAN RESEARCH 
 
As the primary task for the current experiments involves road-crossing it is necessary to outline 
some of the previous research into pedestrian behaviour. This chapter will begin with a review 
of real-world experimental studies into pedestrian behaviours, followed by an outline of various 
types of laboratory research.  The last part of the chapter will detail observational studies, and 
how their findings compare to the real-world and laboratory studies. 
Real-World Studies 
 
The main focus of most road-crossing research has been children, given that they have a high 
risk of being killed or injured (Connelly et al., 1998; Connelly et al., 1996). This research has 
often been conducted using simulated crossing tasks in the real world, such as the pretend road 
(Demetre, Lee, Pitcairn, & Grieve, 1992; Lee, Young, & McLaughlin, 1984; Young & Lee, 
1987), in which the child is positioned on the footpath, one lane-width from the side of the road, 
and crosses this when they feel it is safe. A similar method is the two-step task (Demetre et al., 
1992), where the child begins 60 cm from the edge of the road, signaling their crossing decision 
by taking two steps forward when they feel they could cross the lane safely. Two other tasks 
that have been used are the shout task (Demetre et al., 1992) and the yes-no task (Connelly et 
al., 1998; Connelly et al., 1996). Both of these tasks require the participant to verbally indicate 
when they would cross, rather than to physically move. With the shout task the children said 
now when they felt they could cross safely, whereas for the yes-no task the children said yes as 
long as they felt it was safe to cross, switching to no when the gap was no longer perceived as 
safe.  
 
One of the more interesting findings from this research is that the participants’ decisions 
seemed to be influenced by the distance the vehicles were from the participants, with riskier 
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decisions being made when the vehicles were further away (Connelly et al., 1998; Connelly et 
al., 1996). Distance information is useful when all the vehicles are traveling at relatively similar 
speeds. When this is the case then greater distances will specify larger temporal gaps, given that 
if speed is constant distance must vary to determine TA. If vehicle speeds vary, however, 
attending to distance information becomes potentially dangerous. On urban Canterbury roads in 
2004 the average speed was 52.1 km/h, but 15% of vehicles were found traveling at 58 km/h or 
higher (M.o.T, 2004). If we take an initial distance of 50 m then a vehicle traveling at the 
average speed will reach an observer in 3.45 s, whereas a vehicle traveling at 58 km/h will 
reach an observer in 3.1 s. This may not be a large absolute difference, but depending on a 
pedestrian’s crossing speed it may be enough to turn a safe crossing into a potentially 
dangerous one. While it is unlikely that people would attend to distance information alone, 
especially given some of the additional experimental findings outlined below, the fact that it 
influences people’s decisions at all is concerning.   
 
There are some issues with these methods. The pretend road offers different optical information 
than the actual road as the participant views the cars from a different angle (Simpson et al., 
2003; Simpson & Owen, 2002; te Velde, van der Kamp, Barela, & Savelsbergh, 2005). 
Although the two-step task, the shout task, and the yes-no task do provide the same optical 
information as the real task, they are also limited as they do not require the participant to 
actually perform the task. There is evidence that there is a qualitative difference between verbal 
judgments of safety and actual task performance (te Velde et al., 2005). The participant is also 
unable to reassess their crossing decision partway through, perhaps to modify their speed if they 
are walking too slowly (Simpson & Owen, 2002). Two alternative tasks that do not suffer from 
these problems are laboratory and VR simulations.  
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Laboratory and Virtual Reality Simulation Studies 
 
Laboratory Simulations 
 
One form of laboratory simulation that has been used is a mock road and bicycle (te Velde, 
Savelsbergh, Barela, & van der Kamp, 2003; te Velde et al., 2005). In this simulation a bicycle, 
pulled by a cable along a track, represents a vehicle and can travel at any speed up to 1.8 m/s. 
Given that the bicycle could be stopped by the experimenters at any time, actual crossings could 
occur without any risk to the participants. As well as investigating differences between children 
with cerebral palsy and control children (te Velde et al., 2003), this simulation has also been 
used to compare verbal judgments of gap safety with the participant’s road-crossing 
performance (te Velde et al., 2005). Three age groups (5-7 years old, 10-12 years old, and 
adults), 4 initial distances, and 2 TA were used. The youngest participants tended to be more 
cautious, and the adults had more unsafe crossings, but these differences did not reach 
significance. Participants also appeared to use both distance and the velocity of the bicycle to 
inform their crossing decisions. Interestingly, they found that participants made more unsafe 
crossing choices when they were making verbal judgments than when they were actually 
crossing. This finding of interference has particular relevance to the issue of cell phone 
distraction, since it suggests that addition of a verbal task turns road crossing into a dual-task 
situation. This issue will be addressed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Oxley, Ihsen, Fildes, Charlton, and Day (2005) conducted an experiment using a task that 
closely followed the shout task. Using a simulated road, which was projected onto a screen, 
participants were asked to make two judgments about various traffic gaps; whether they would 
try crossing in the gap and how safe they thought it was. Three velocities (40, 60, and 80 km/h) 
and 5 TAs (1, 4, 7, 10, 13 s) were used, distance being varied to specify the gaps. There was an 
increase in the frequency of gap acceptance with an increase in the temporal length of the gaps, 
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but participants also seemed to use distance information. Within a specific temporal gap size 
there were more gap acceptances when the vehicle started further away (i.e. was traveling 
faster). There were some specific cases where a longer TA and a slower speed produced a 
shorter initial distance than a shorter TA and higher speed.  In these cases there were more yes 
responses for the longer TAs than for the longer distances, indicating that TA was also being 
used to inform the gap acceptance decisions. In a second experiment they determined that 
allowing more time for a decision did not change the trend noticed in the first experiment for 
the younger group, but did have an effect for the older participants. When given 5 s to make 
their judgments, distance had less of an effect on their decisions. When given 1 s, however, 
there was a greater use of distance information, with a longer distance and a shorter TA 
producing a higher proportion of gap acceptances than a shorter distance and a longer TA.  
 
Video simulation has been used in an attempt to train children to cross roads more safely 
(McKelvey, 1984). A variety of two-vehicle gap combinations were filmed, with TAs varying 
between 4 and 9 s, in 1-s increments, and speeds varying between 20 and 80 km/h, in 10-km/h 
increments, producing 42 different combinations. Distance between the two vehicles was varied 
to produce each gap. Performance improved with increase in age of the children, and 
performance was also better overall in the group that was given feedback on their gap decisions. 
However, one possible issue was that they chose 6 s as the border between an unsafe gap and a 
potentially unsafe gap, with gaps longer than 7 s being classified as safe. Crossing times for a 
different sample of children, gained by observing children crossing, varied between 3 and 6 s. 
This means that it is likely some children accepted gaps that would have afforded safe crossing 
for them but that would have been scored as unsafe.  
 
 
 
 35 
Virtual Reality Simulations 
 
Other experimenters have used VR simulations. Plumert, Kearney, and Cremer (2004) 
investigated gap choice in children and adults. Participants rode a stationary bicycle through a 
VE consisting of six intersections, the environment being projected onto three screens. At each 
intersection a continuous stream of cars approached in the near lane, with the cars traveling at a 
speed of either 25 mph (40.2 km/h) or 35 mph (56.3 km/h), and with temporal gaps between 
vehicles varying between 1.5 and 4 s in 0.5-s increments. As the speed of the cars was held 
constant the distance between vehicles was varied to create each temporal gap, as with Oxley et 
al. (2005). The speeds of the vehicles were counterbalanced, with half of the sample 
encountering 25-mph vehicles for the first three intersections and 35 mph for the last three, and 
vice versa for the second group. They found that the main difference between the children and 
adults was in how long the children waited before deciding to cross and in the time they took to 
get the bicycle moving. Both age groups chose the same sized temporal gaps. One interesting 
result was that although the waiting times for the 25-mph group steadily decreased across the 
experiment, the waiting times at the fourth intersection increased for the 35-mph group. This 
marked the change in vehicle speed from 35 mph to 25 mph, and hence a decrease in the 
distance between vehicles. The authors suggested this may have occurred because the change in 
distance was more salient than the change in velocities. 
 
A number of fully immersive VR studies have been conducted in the Department of Psychology 
at the University of Canterbury. These experiments have used an HMD to present the VE to the 
participants. The intent of the earliest of these was to investigate whether road-crossing 
behaviours could be examined in a VR simulation (Simpson et al., 2003). This experiment used 
a gap-choice paradigm, where participants were faced with various temporal gaps produced by 
a line of 10 vehicles and crossed when they though it was safe. Gaps varied between 4 and 10 s, 
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in 2-s intervals. Either the velocity of the vehicles or the initial distance7 between the vehicles 
was held constant, velocity at 40, 50, or 60 km/h and distance at 65, 75, or 85 m. In a constant-
speed trial distance was varied to produce the TAs of the vehicles, and vice versa. Fewer unsafe 
crossings were made in the constant-velocity trials, suggesting that distance information was 
being used to inform the participant’s gap choices, or was at least more salient to the 
participants.  
 
A later experiment (Simpson & Owen, 2002) used a forced-choice paradigm. Participants were 
faced with a single oncoming vehicle and had to choose how fast to cross, compared to 
choosing when to cross for the gap-choice design. In addition, rather than having set TAs that 
were consistent across participants, the TAs for this experiment were individuated. Walking 
speeds were sampled at the beginning of the experiment, with the participant walking across the 
virtual road at either a normal pace or as if rushing, with no vehicles present. These values were 
used to determine the TAs of the vans, so that if a participant, when rushing, crossed the road in 
2 s the shortest TA would be 2.5 s (2 s, plus 0.5 s to account for reaction times (RT)). Three van 
velocities were used, 30, 45, and 60 km/h, distance being varied. Shorter TAs, or slower 
velocities, would produce shorter distances. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this was the first 
experiment to use the safety ratio as a dependent variable. Although not studied explicitly, they 
commented that participants did seem to be using distance information in part to inform their 
decisions. 
 
Subsequent gap-choice experiments (Clancy et al., 2006; Lamb, 2004; Murray, 2003) have also 
been individuated using much the same method as Simpson and Owen (2002). These 
experiments have all used approximately the same design as Simpson et al. (2003), with a line 
of 10 vans approaching a participant’s position. However, as individuation was used, the gaps 
                                                 
7 The initial distance between vehicles was the distance between the back of a van as it passed the participants 
position and the front of the following van. 
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were unique to each participant. For these experiments the shortest TA was determined by the 
shortest road-crossing in the trials where no vehicles were present. The longer gaps were 
calculated by adding a certain percentage (15 or 17.5%) of the shortest gap’s TA to the 
preceding gap. For example, if the shortest gap was 2 s and 15% percent was being added, the 
next shortest gap would be 2.3 s, then 2.6 s and so on.  
 
Although these studies all investigated different road-crossing issues, namely mobility 
impairment (Murray, 2003), ADHD (Clancy et al., 2006), and attempting to train people to 
attend to optical variables (Lamb, 2004), they all found crossings were less safe when the 
distance between the vehicles was greater, This is, then, a consistent finding across a variety of 
participant groups and methods. Note, however, that an unpublished study, with the testing 
conducted by the author, found that the size of the vehicles also affected mean margins of 
safety, with larger vehicles producing safer crossings (see Table 1). This may indicate that the 
distance effect might in part be explained by the vehicles appearing larger when they are closer.  
 
Table 1. The mean margins of safety from an unpublished study which examined road-crossing behaviours in 
relation to the initial distance vehicles started in relation to the participants, and their apparent optical size. Note 
that the margins of safety increase as the optical size increases, and decrease as the initial distance increases. 
 
    Optical Size 
Initial Distance Small Medium Large 
Close 24.49 58.61 81.61 
Medium 16.43 45.54 60.32 
Far 12.73 29.55 55.11 
 
Another consistent finding was what has been termed a cautious crossing (Simpson et al., 
2003). A trial was defined as a cautious crossing if a participant waited for all of the vehicles to 
pass before attempting to cross the road. If a participant always crossed after all the vehicles 
had passed they were dubbed an extremely cautious crosser. All of the gap choice experiments 
mentioned above found that some participants had cautious crossings. Some participants also 
had to be excluded because most or all of their trials were cautious crossings (Clancy et al., 
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2006; Lamb, 2004; Murray, 2003; Simpson et al., 2003). For Simpson et al. (2003) it was noted 
that a 6-year-old participant who was an extremely cautious crosser, had been instructed by her 
parents to only cross when there was no traffic in sight. This suggests that the simulation 
provides a reasonable level of immersion (Simpson et al., 2003), which is supported by 
anecdotal evidence from the other experiments. For example, the extremely cautious adult 
crosser from the Murray (2003) study commented that she did not feel safe crossing, even 
though she knew that vans could not hurt her. 
 
Observational Studies 
 
As well as empirical studies, there have also been observational studies. One early study, Cohen 
et al. (1955), examined the gap sizes that were accepted by pedestrians. They determined that a 
critical gap size for their sample was 4.6 s, half of the sample not crossing if the gap was 
smaller than that. Females tended to be more cautious (i.e. chose longer gaps) than the males, 
although males and females aged between 31 and 45 years old chose similar gaps. No one 
crossed when the TA was 1.5 s or shorter. 
 
Oudejans et al. (1996), as touched upon earlier, investigated the effect of locomotion on road-
crossing, comparing the gaps that pedestrians chose when they were moving to those they chose 
when they had stopped before crossing. They filmed 311 crossings from a standstill and 499 
from a walk and looked for the TA values for the critical TA, the time when crossings occurred 
50% of the time. Although crossing times were almost identical in both situations (2.6 s from a 
walk and 2.78 s from standstill), the critical TA was 3.02 s when they were walking and 4.63 s 
when they were at a standstill. These equate to margins of safety of 16% from a walk and 66% 
from standstill.  The standstill number is similar to the mean values found for the VR gap-
choice experiments mentioned earlier: 63% for Clancy et al. (2006), 71% for Murray (2003; 
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first six and last six trials only), and 76% for Lamb (2004). The mean value for one experiment, 
Simpson and Owen (2002), was lower (approximately 41%), although this experiment used a 
forced-choice design. This design may have reduced the potential margins of safety as 
participants had to cross the road in front of the van during each trial rather than being able to 
choose when to cross. Also interesting is that the standstill gap for Oudejans et al. (1996) value 
is similar to the critical gap value of 4.6 s found by Cohen et al. (1955), although Cohen and 
colleagues did not report whether the pedestrians they observed crossed from a standstill.   
 
Another study compared the relative safety of younger and older pedestrians crossing on either 
one-way or two-way streets (Oxley, Fildes, Ihsen, Charlton, & Day, 1997). These authors found 
that for two-way streets older pedestrians chose much riskier gaps, especially those whose 
walking speeds were slower. A greater number of the older pedestrians had margins of safety 
close to the minimum safe margin, where their crossing time was equal to or greater than the TA 
of the vehicle. They also delayed at the curb for longer before crossing. However, on a one-way 
street many of these differences disappeared, with no differences in curb delays or in general 
crossing trends.  
 
Gap acceptance, and some of the factors moderating it, had also been explicitly studied. 
(Harrell & Bereska, 1992) examined the road crossings of 75 individuals and groups. They 
concluded that groups containing at least one infant chose more conservative gaps (defined as 
gaps longer than 5.6 s), while the estimated mean group age was related to the choice of risky 
gaps (defined as gaps under 2 s in length), such that the higher the mean age the less likely a 
risky gap would be chosen. They found no relationship between gaps chosen and the sex ratio 
of the group or the traffic volume at an intersection.  
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Summary 
 
 
One of the major findings is that people use irrelevant, and potentially dangerous, distance 
information in part when making their road-crossing decisions, consistent across a variety of 
real-world and simulation studies. Given that across New Zealand 15% of motorists travel at 55 
km/h or more (M.o.T, 2005), and given the exponential increase in likelihood of death as 
speeds increase (from 10% at 30 km/h to 70% at 50 km/h to almost 100% at 70km/h; A.C.C., 
2000), the consequences of misjudging a gap can be high. The distance between vehicles is not 
the only information used, with some studies finding participants’ judgments also being 
influenced by the TA or the size of the vehicles.  
 
The results from the studies conducted at the University of Canterbury are consistent with those 
from other studies, especially in relation to the use of distance information and possibly in 
relation to mean margins of safety. While the collision rates in the simulated experiments per 
participant were higher than actual collision rates (Simpson et al., 2003), these similarities 
suggest that the simulated task does match the real-world task, although not perfectly. It does 
seem that simulation is a valid way of assessing pedestrian behaviour, especially as participants 
are able to cross the road. Through the use of VR, the simulated task more closely matches the 
actual road-crossing task, and therefore meets J. J. Gibson’s (1979) imperative that the 
laboratory must be like life, thereby increasing the generalisability of the results.     
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CHAPTER 5: DUAL-TASK RESEARCH 
 
 
This chapter will outline some of the concepts related to dual-task performance. These include: 
attention (notable for the relationship between attention and dual-task performance; Wickens, 
2002); mental workload (included in part to provide a basic background to some of the 
experimental work reviewed); multiple resource theory, a theoretical model of dual-task 
performance; and situation awareness, a reasonably new and controversial concept. Note that 
the current experiments were not intended as tests of these concepts, and therefore these 
sections are included primarily to provide a background for the research area. The bulk of this 
chapter will consist of a review of dual-task performance studies: Much, but not all, of this 
research has been focused on how secondary tasks affect driving performance, with no 
experiments studying how secondary tasks affect pedestrian behaviours. Some of the methods 
used will be discussed first, both in terms of the primary and secondary tasks, and then the 
findings will be reviewed. Also included in this section are epidemiological studies which 
attempt to determine the actual risk to drivers caused by cell phone use.  
 
Attention 
 
About attention, William James (1891) claimed: “Everyone knows what attention is. It is the 
taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought” (p.403-404). Since then the concept of 
attention has remained fairly static. Some recent introductory textbooks have defined attention 
as “the process of directing and focusing certain psychological resources…to enhance 
perception, performance and mental experience” (Bernstein, Clark-Stewart, Roy, Srull, & 
Wickens, 1994, p. 204) and  “the process of focusing conscious awareness, providing 
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heightened sensitivity to a limited range of experience requiring more extensive information 
processing” (Westen, 1999, p. 395).  
 
Attention has been conceptualised in a number of ways. One famous conceptualisation is the 
spotlight metaphor (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). Another conceptualisation is that 
attentional resources8 are limited (Kahneman, 1973; Moray, 1967), dual-task impairment 
occurring as the limited pool of resources is expended. Finally, there is the bottleneck theory 
(Müller, Jennings, Redfern, & Furman, 2004),  where two stimuli are presented and one ‘wins’ 
the competition for processing resources (Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 2002). These will be 
discussed in slightly more detail below. However, as the current experiments were not designed 
to test these theories of attention they will not be discussed in depth. More thorough reviews 
can be found in Heuer (1996) and Neumann (1996). 
 
It needs to be noted first that fixated on does not mean attended to (Posner et al., 1980; Strayer, 
Drews, & Johnston, 2003). For example, if a person scanning the pages of a book begins 
thinking of something unrelated to the book they may stop perceiving the text (Gippenreiter & 
Romanov, 1974). Ceasing to acquire task-relevant information is potentially hazardous if it 
occurs during driving or road crossing. Having the eyes fixated on the road does not mean that 
attention is focused on the primary task.  
 
The Attentional Spotlight 
 
The original conception of the attentional spotlight seems to have been as a detection enhancer, 
events within the ‘beam’ being detected more efficiently than those outside it (Posner et al., 
1980). Conceptualising attention in this way poses the problem of determining how large an 
                                                 
8 Terms other than resources have been used to describe this concept, including effort, capacity, and attention 
(Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979).  
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area the spotlight covers (also known as the bandwidth) (Wijers, Mulder, Gunter, & Smid, 
1996). The original analogy has been reformulated, one such version being the zoom lens 
model (Eriksen & St James, 1986). Under this formulation the size of the spotlight can vary, 
like a zoom lens (Eriksen & St James, 1986; Wijers et al., 1996). Increasing the size of the 
spotlight reduces how densely spread the attentional resources are (Wijers et al., 1996).  
 
Posner et al. (1980) conducted an experiment examining whether the spotlight ‘beam’ could be 
split. Using a stimulus-response method they found that cuing the participants to the location of 
the second-most frequently occurring stimulus (occurring 25% of the time, compared to 65% 
for the most frequent) did not improve RTs to that stimulus unless it was located in an adjacent 
position to the most frequently occurring stimulus. This seems reasonable, given that it is an 
attempt to divide attention within a modality (i.e. vision). However, dividing attention between 
modalities complicates matters. For instance, someone who is driving should intend to attend to 
the driving situation. In a similar way, someone talking on a phone wishes to attend to the 
person they are conversing with. Under the basic conception of the spotlight (i.e. Posner et al., 
1980), determining how the tasks interact seems difficult. However, more recent research 
indicates that attention can be divided between objects, regardless of their spatial locations (e.g. 
Cepedia, Cave, Bichot, & Kim, 1998; Davis, Driver, Pavani, & Shepherda, 2000; Driver & 
Baylis, 1989; Zemel, Behrmann, Mozer, & Bavelier, 2002). Other research has indicated that 
visual processing can be affected by task-irrelevant auditory objects (Turatto, Mazza, & Umiltà, 
2005), so considering the two tasks in terms of objects, both visual and auditory, may be more 
productive. 
Limited Resource Theory 
 
Another theory proposes that dual-task impairment is due to both tasks attempting to draw upon 
a single pool of resources. On the surface the limited resources analogy seems reasonable given 
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that performance of two tasks performed concurrently is generally poorer than when the tasks 
are performed independently (Tombu & Jolicœur, 2005; Tsang, Shaner, & Vidulich, 1995).  
This could be explained by both tasks competing for the same limited pool of resources 
(Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 2002; Kahneman, 1973; Moray, 1967). However, results from 
dual-task studies have not always supported this. For instance, there may be no impairment 
when impairment would be predicted (Wickens, 1992). Different secondary tasks of a similar 
level of difficulty may also cause different levels of impairment on the same primary task 
(Wickens, 1992). Because of these discrepancies (Navon & Gopher, 1979) theorized that rather 
than there being only a single resource pool, there are multiple resource pools. Wickens 
developed this idea further, evolving what he called multiple resource theory (i.e. Wickens, 
1980; Wickens, 2002). As this model includes both attention and workload components it will 
be discussed after workload.  
 
The Bottleneck Theory 
 
According to bottleneck theory, two RT tasks cannot be performed concurrently (Kahneman, 
1973; Ruthruff, Johnston, Van Selst, Whitsell, & Remington, 2003; Wickens & Hollands, 
2000). A proposed reason for this is that certain processing stages cannot be occur concurrently, 
so the processing for one task must be complete before the second task can be processed, while 
another is based on the limited resource theory described above (Pashler, 1984). Using 
bottleneck theory to conceptualise how talking on a cell phone affects driving performance 
seems troublesome. One issue is that research suggests human attention is more flexible than 
would be expected assuming the theory is correct (Kahneman, 1973). The experimental tasks 
used to test the bottleneck pose another problem. Pashler (1984) describes the overlapping tasks 
paradigm, where two stimuli are presented and each is responded to in the order of occurrence. 
The presentation of the second stimulus is such that the response to the first stimulus will 
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generally not have occurred (Pashler, 1984). This time-difference in presentation will tend to be 
under 500 ms (Neumann, 1996). This generally results in both stimuli being responded to more 
slowly than when they are presented individually (Pashler, 1984).   
 
The difficulty comes when relating these experiments to how drivers may react when talking on 
cell phones. For instance, while it is fairly clear that braking in response to a leading vehicle 
braking is a RT task, it is less clear whether a phone conversation is also a RT task. It is 
possible to measure RTs in relation to a phone conversation, such as the time taken to respond 
to a question, but this does not seem to be the same sort of RT task as is used in bottleneck 
experiments. There is also no guarantee that the braking task and the phone task occur 
concurrently.  A driver may also be distracted simply by listening to a phone conversation, a 
situation that can not be explored in this experimental paradigm. It may be the case that if a RT 
task, such as braking, occurs concurrently with a verbal response task, there may be differences 
in levels of impairment depending on how close together the events occur. This could be 
expected given the finding that as the event-presentation separation increases, the RT 
impairment decreases (e.g. Heuer, 1996; Pashler, 1994). Overall, it seems as though the theory 
is too limited to explain how a cellular phone conversation may impair a driver or road crosser, 
although it might prove to be a useful conceptual model in some cases. 
  
An Ecological Approach to Attention 
 
J. J. Gibson (1979/1986) disagreed with the idea that attention was “strictly… narrowing-down 
and holding-still” (p. 246). Instead he proposed that the invariant information in an optic array 
was scanned widely. Ecologically, attention is seen as “the control of detection” (Michaels & 
Carello, 1981, p. 70), the individual choosing which information to focus on. 
 
 46 
The individual is also a knowing agent, one with intentions and goals, and it is these that 
constrain the information to which the individual attends (Michaels & Carello, 1981). 
Combining this with the concept that we detect information about affordances, our goals and 
intentions will determine which affordances we detect. For example, while a chair affords 
sitting on if we wish to sit, if we wish to reach an object on a high shelf it also affords standing 
on. Although both affordances are present concurrently, which one we attend to depends on our 
desired goal. However, misperception of an affordance is also possible (J. J. Gibson, 
1979/1986). Although there may appear to be a passable gap in our path of travel, our 
movement may be blocked by a glass door (J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986). It is possible that cell 
phone conversation may set the occasion for misperception and / or a lack of perception, neither 
of which is desirable for an individual. A gap between vehicles may be perceived to afford 
crossing through safely, but if it does not (for instance, if the pedestrian has attended to 
irrelevant distance information) an accident may occur. The same may be said if the vehicles 
are not detected at all. 
 
Mental Workload 
 
 
Workload is a complex concept, one that is difficult to define (Jex, 1988). However, there are 
some similarities among definitions. For instance, workload can be discussed in terms of an 
individual’s spare resources (Zeitlin, 1995). Maximum capacity can be seen as the highest level 
of workload that can be accepted before task performance decreases (Zeitlin, 1995). Jex (1988) 
defines workload in a similar way, but assumes that people know their spare capacity and can 
optimise performance. While discussing workload in relation to workplace demands, Wickens, 
Gordon, and Liu (1998) defined workload as a ratio of the time remaining to complete a task to 
the time available (also termed time pressure; Hendy, 1995). If this ratio exceeds 1 then it is 
likely that overload will occur (Wickens, 2002; Wickens et al., 1998). All of these conceptions 
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take into account both the task demands and the individual’s ability to cope with the demands. 
For instance, training designed to automate an activity should reduce the workload of that 
activity (Wickens et al., 1998). Also of note is that performance may be affected by underload, 
where there is too little arousal (Kahneman, 1973; Wildervanck, Mulder, & Michon, 1978), 
such as in the case of a vigilance task (Wickens et al., 1998).  
 
Various methods have been used to measure workload. The main ones are primary task 
measures, secondary task measures, physiological measures, and subjective measures (Verwey 
& Veltman, 1996; Wickens et al., 1998). Primary task measures, as the name suggests, examine 
performance of the primary task. Higher workload is assumed to impair performance, but this 
may not always be the case; depending on task complexity good primary task performance may 
only be obtained with high levels of workload (Wickens et al., 1998).  Secondary task measures 
examine the reserve capacity of an individual by having them perform a low priority task in 
conjunction with a high priority primary task (Verwey & Veltman, 1996; Wickens et al., 1998; 
Zeitlin, 1995). Physiological measures can include heart rate variability (Verwey & Veltman, 
1996; Wickens et al., 1998), visual scanning (Wickens et al., 1998), pupil dilation (Recarte & 
Nunes, 2003), and eye-blinks (Hancock, Wulf, Thom, & Fassnacht, 1990; Verwey & Veltman, 
1996). Finally, subjective measures involve a questionnaire being administered to the 
participants, such as the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (Reid & Nygren, 1988) 
and the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; Hart & Staveland, 1988).  
 
Differences between subjective and performance measures of workload may occur due to 
differences in task demands (Yeh & Wickens, 1988). If a task is not particularly resource 
intensive an increase in task demands may not affect performance, since the individual has 
more resources to invest, hence suggesting that a subjective measure may be most appropriate 
(Yeh & Wickens, 1988). Conversely, if a task is resource intensive, with subjective workload 
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already high, then the individual may not be able to counteract additional task demands by 
using more resources. Performance is likely to suffer due to the lack of resources but there will 
be no change in measured subjective workload as it is already at a maximum (Yeh & Wickens, 
1988). Meshkati and Loewenthal (1988) provide an in-depth critique of these workload 
methods, but as workload is not being studied specifically in the current research there is no 
need to examine the issues in more detail. 
 
Multiple Resource Theory 
 
According to Heuer (1996), there are two types of theory that postulate multiple resources; “a 
more formal version that has very little concern for the question of what types of resources do 
exist, and a less formal version that is mainly concerned with the identification of types of 
resources and neglects the formal requirements of this type of model (p. 134)”. Wickens’ 
multiple resource theory falls into the latter category.  
 
His theory is a four-dimensional model of attention and workload (Wickens, 2002).  These can 
be defined by “2 stage-defined resources (e.g. early versus late processing), 2 modality-defined 
resources (e.g. auditory versus visual encoding), and 2 resources defined by processing codes 
(e.g. spatial versus verbal)” (Wickens, 1992, p. 375), as well as an additional division in visual 
processing (focal and ambient processing; Wickens, 2002; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). 
According to this model there will be more interference between tasks if both draw upon the 
same resource pool, but less interference if the tasks draw on different pools. The basic 
dichotomy is between verbal and spatial resources, although they may also be described as 
auditory and visual, or vocal and manual (Wickens, 1992). Any task involving verbal 
components, such as listening to speech, doing mental arithmetic, or responding vocally, 
constitute parts of the verbal pool. Tasks involving spatial components, such as scanning the 
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road ahead, mental rotation, or typing a response, constitute parts of the spatial pool. This 
model helps to explain why some tasks, such as playing the piano or typing while shadowing 
speech, can be time-shared perfectly (Wickens et al., 1998).  
 
The theory does have some limitations, such as not accounting for all of the structures that may 
influence dual-task performance (Wickens, 1984); although in the same book he notes it was 
not designed to). It does not provide a full account of how the resources are allocated to each 
task, rather just a general framework of how they may be allocated (Wickens, 2002). He gives 
an example of how this may be a problem from Strayer and Johnston (2001). Some of their 
participants seemed to stop attending to a driving task in order to perform a conversation task, 
even though the two tasks would seem to utilise different resources. One other issue is that, if 
taken literally, the model would suggest that there should be no interference if the tasks use 
different resources (Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 2001; Wickens, 
1984). Research does not support this stance (see the second part of this chapter), with this 
situation perhaps better thought of as causing less, rather than no, interference (Lamble, 
Kauranen, Laakso, & Summala, 1999).  Limitations aside, multiple resource theory does seem 
to provide a good framework for considering how a phone task may affect a road-user’s 
performance (Haigney & Westerman, 2001; Lamble et al., 1999; Patten, Kircher, Östlund, & 
Nilsson, 2004).  
Situation Awareness 
 
Situation awareness (SA) appears to be an ill-defined construct (Gaba, Howard, & Small, 1995; 
Sarter & Woods, 1991; Uhlarik, 2002). Smith and Hancock (1995) defined it as “adaptive, 
externally directed consciousness” (p. 138), viewing it as the aspect of consciousness that is 
directed at the world in much the same way introspection is directed at the self. In contrast, it 
has also been defined as “knowledge relevant to the task being performed” (Gawron, 2000; p. 
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155). Although both of these definitions place SA in the individual, exactly how it is expressed 
differs; is it a searching strategy as per the first definition, or knowledge about a task? Others 
have disagreed with whether we should look for SA within the person at all, saying that we 
should focus more on the situation rather than the awareness (Flach, 1994). By this he means 
that we should develop a theory of situations, and from there attempt to understand humans as 
adaptive beings, not to discover why we may lose SA but rather how we maintain it when 
completing a task successfully.  
 
Endsley (1995) has proposed a three-stage model of SA. Level 1 SA is the perception of the 
elements in the environment, Level 2 is the comprehension of the current situation, and Level 3 
is the projection of future status (Endsley, 1995). The three stages can be summarised as 
follows: to be aware of the situation, to understand the situation, and to act in an informed 
anticipatory manner in the situation. For example, to have full SA a driver would need to know 
the location of the vehicles around them (Level 1), how the location of the vehicles relates to 
their goals (such as changing lanes or passing while avoiding an accident; Level 2), and to 
project the current situation forward in time (Level 3).  
 
This last point can be viewed in light of the field of safe travel defined as the field of possible 
paths which the car may take unimpeded (J. J. Gibson & Crooks, 1938, p. 454). The length of 
the field is limited by frontal obstacles (i.e. other vehicles), while the width is affected by 
obstacles present to the sides of the vehicle, such as parked cars or pedestrians . It should also 
be noted that the field exists optically regardless of whether it is perceived, given that it is the 
area in which movement can take place without impediment, and it changes continuously as the 
environment being travelled through changes. Level 3 SA could be characterised in part as 
knowledge of your personal field of safe travel. It would be difficult to know your field of safe 
travel if you were not aware of your current situation or did not comprehend elements of it, both 
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of which are required for Level 3 SA (Endsley, 1995). Also, as the field of safe travel helps 
specify movement outcomes (safe travel if movement occurs within it, a dangerous situation if 
it does not), then it can be seen as a projection of future status.    
  
It should be noted that under this characterisation a loss of SA does not necessarily mean a loss 
of action; losing SA does not affect your ability to act but rather to act appropriately. A driver 
who drives through a red light while tuning their radio has acted, albeit in a dangerous fashion. 
Similarly, loss of SA does not mean an accident will occur, but it can set the occasion for one to 
occur. Using the above example, if there are no other cars at the intersection then there is no 
risk of a crash, the vehicle’s movement occurring within the field of safe travel even if the field 
was not perceived.  
 
In addition to disagreements over the definition of SA, concern has been voiced about the 
distinction between SA and workload. Hendy (1995) compared the NASA-TLX subjective 
workload inventory to a SA measure, the Situation Awareness Rating Technique, and 
concluded that the SA measure seemed to be tapping into workload rather than a distinct 
construct. Flach (1994) has also expressed concern over the relationship between workload and 
SA, as well as the difficulty of trying to separate SA from skill or expertise. One of the major 
issues that Flach (1995) saw with SA is that it is used causally, such as saying that an accident 
was caused by loss of SA. The evidence that it was lost is that there was an accident, leading to 
circular reasoning (Flach, 1995). That said, SA may be useful when viewed as the description 
of a phenomenon rather than as something causal (Flach, 1995).  
 
Smith and Hancock’s (1995) characterisation of SA may inform a useful ecological method for 
measuring changes in SA. As described previously in this section, they defined SA as 
“adaptive, externally directed consciousness” (p. 138), but they also characterise it as the 
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invariant at the core of Neisser’s (1976) Perception-Action cycle in terms of supporting skilled 
performance. It is, then, a characteristic of both an individual and their environment, rather than 
an attribute of an individual alone. Under this characterisation performance changes can index 
reductions in SA. Specifically for the current experiments, changes in SA may be seen in the 
difference between the safety margins for a participant when they are engaged in the 
conversation task compared to when they are not. More directly, the third experiment examines 
whether a conversation task affects the likelihood of a pedestrian crossing the road without 
looking for traffic first: Failing to look for traffic will result in an obvious reduction in SA. 
Impairment in either of these two outcomes would appear to indicate that the participant was 
not as aware of their situation while engaged in the secondary task. As Flach (1995) notes, 
however, care must be taken not to enter into circular reasoning.      
 
Cellular Phone and Dual-Task Research 
 
 
As the experiments described in Chapters 6 to 9 did not use a driving simulator the overview of 
the simulations used is intentionally general. More specific details of the conversation tasks 
used and the findings are presented as these topics are of greater relevance for the current 
studies.  
 
Experimental Studies 
 
 
This review of experimental studies will begin by examining the driving tasks (simulated or 
real-world) that have been utilised. Following this will be an examination of some of the 
findings from these studies, organised into four categories: Pedestrian-relevant findings, for 
studies where the tasks are directly related to pedestrian behaviours; pedestrian-analogous 
findings, for results from driving studies that may have pedestrian analogues (e.g. RT and SA 
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results); driving-specific findings, which will outline other ways in which a secondary task has 
been found to affect driving performance; and comparison studies, for findings from studies 
comparing different impairment-causing behaviours (e.g. cell phone conversation compared to 
driving under the influence of alcohol).  
 
Driving Situations 
 
Research on the effects of cell phone conversation on task performance has dealt predominantly 
with driving tasks, although there have been some exceptions. These have included a video 
cassette recorder programming task (Monk, Boehm-Davis, & Trafton, 2004), responses to 
stimuli via a keyboard (García-Larrea, Perchet, Perrin, & Amenedo, 2001; Golden, Golden, & 
Schneider, 2003),  a visual scanning task (Pomplun, Reingold, & Shen, 2001), a physical 
pointing task (Lyda, Osborne, Coleman, & Rienzi, 2002), and a cursor tracking task (Strayer & 
Johnston, 2001). It may be difficult to relate findings from studies like these to the real world 
given the disparity between the studied task and the behaviour of interest (driving while using a 
cell phone). Consequently, most of the research uses some form of driving task. The driving 
tasks can be divided into four categories: Actual road driving, closed track driving, lower 
fidelity laboratory simulation, and higher fidelity laboratory simulation. The distinction 
between the last two categories will be made clear shortly. 
 
Actual road driving tasks have the highest ecological validity, the experiment being conducted 
in the same environment as the actual task. A variety of different situations have been 
examined, including car following (Brookhuis, de Waard, & Mulder, 1994; Lamble et al., 
1999); heavy and light traffic conditions (Brookhuis, de Vries, & de Waard, 1991); different 
width roads (Wikman, Nieminen, & Summala, 1998); city and non-city (open road) driving 
(Brookhuis et al., 1991; Törnros & Bolling, 2005); and general open road driving (Matthews, 
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Legg, & Charlton, 2003; Patten et al., 2004; Recarte & Nunes, 2002; Recarte & Nunes, 2003). 
There may be ethical issues involved, however, as there is generally an expectation of driving 
impairment. This means experimenters may be putting participants at risk (Gugerty, Rakauskas, 
& Brooks, 2004). Another issue is that while the participants may give informed consent other 
road users cannot (Haigney & Westerman, 2001). Experimenters may also be asking their 
participants to break the law if local laws forbid the use of a cell phone while driving, or if by 
using a phone the driver is not considered to be in full control of the vehicle (Haigney & 
Westerman, 2001).  
 
One method for reducing risk is to use a closed circuit track, although this does not appear to be 
a particularly common method. Brown, Tickner, and Simmonds (1969), probably the first 
experimenters to investigate the use of a telephone while driving (Brookhuis et al., 1991), used 
this method, as have a few others (Tashiro et al., 2005; Tijerina, Parmer, & Goodman, 2000; 
Treffner & Barrett, 2004). However, most experiments use some from of laboratory simulation. 
 
For current purposes, lower fidelity refers to simulations which do not reasonably match real-
world constraints in respect to information or control. For example, while McKnight and 
McKnight (1993) provided participants with vehicle controls and showed footage of actual 
driving situations, the participants had no actual control over the simulation. Moving the wheel 
would indicate that they had detected a hazard, but the vehicle would continue on its 
predetermined path. Other tasks have consisted of controlling a triangle representing a car on a 
curved line or blue strip representing a road (Briem & Hedman, 1995; Graham & Carter, 2001), 
having to respond to a red lamp (simulating a brake light) by releasing an accelerator and 
applying a brake (Consiglio, Driscoll, Witte, & Berg, 2003; Irwin, Fitzgerald, & Berg, 2000), a 
Playstation console game (Jenness, Lattanzio, O'Toole, Taylor, & Pax, 2002), and a change 
detection task (McCarley et al., 2001).  
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Higher fidelity, as used here, refers to simulations where there is a reasonable match between 
the simulation and the actual task, meaning the information provided and motion controls are 
similar. This includes simulations that may not be generally considered high fidelity, ranging 
from a desktop VR simulation (Beede & Kass, 2006; Gugerty et al., 2004), through to a full-
motion simulator with temperature and sound controls (Alm & Nilsson, 1994, 1995). Most 
higher fidelity VR studies simulate situations similar to those mentioned under actual road 
situations, including city driving (Hunton & Rose, 2005; Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003), 
motorway or open road driving (Charlton, 2004; Engström, Johansson, & Östlund, 2005; 
Haigney, Taylor, & Westerman, 2000), easy or difficult roads (Alm & Nilsson, 1994, 1995; 
Liu, 2003), a closed-circuit track (Rakauskas, Gugerty, & Ward, 2004), and car following on a 
motorway (Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2003).  Driving a truck at night has also been simulated 
(Drory, 1985), but no examples of this task being used in a real-world dual-task study were 
found at the time of this review.  
 
Secondary Tasks 
 
As well as a variety of driving tasks, numerous secondary tasks have been utilised. These can 
be loosely separated into three categories: visual/manual tasks, cognitive tasks, and 
conversation tasks. Although conversation can also be viewed as a sub-category of cognitive 
tasks, the distinction will be made clear in the following discussion. It is also important to note 
that tasks can overlap categories. For example, conversing on a hand-held cellular phone while 
crossing a road may involve tasks from all three categories. Finally, some of the tasks used for 
comparisons between manual and voice dialling, as well as for speech-recognition systems will 
be discussed. 
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Visual / Manual Tasks 
 
Visual/manual tasks involve having the participants complete some form of physical task, 
generally requiring attention to be focused on something inside the vehicle. They include tuning 
a radio or changing a cassette (McKnight & McKnight, 1993; Tijerina et al., 2000; Wikman et 
al., 1998) and the physical manipulation of the phone, such as manually dialling a number 
(Graham & Carter, 2001; Jenness et al., 2002; Lamble et al., 1999; Reed & Green, 1999; 
Salvucci, 2001; Tijerina et al., 2000; Wikman et al., 1998). Other in-vehicle systems, such as 
route-guidance systems, have been examined as they also require attention to be focused away 
from the road (Horberry, Anderson, Regan, Triggs, & Brown, 2006; Jahn, Oehme, Krems, & 
Gelau, 2005; Santos, Merat, Mouta, Brookhuis, & de Waard, 2005). In terms of ecological 
validity these tasks seem fairly sound as they reproduce actual tasks that may be performed 
while driving.  
 
Cognitive Tasks 
 
Cognitive tasks are often used to simulate conversation. One of the benefits of many of these 
tasks is that they can be scored, allowing secondary task performance to be measured, although 
this may be at the expense of ecological validity (Haigney & Westerman, 2001). One basic 
cognitive task has the participants simply listening to the radio or music, with no response 
required (Briem & Hedman, 1995; Consiglio et al., 2003). More intensive is a shadowing task 
(Charlton, 2004; Patten et al., 2004; Spence & Read, 2003), with participants repeating words 
or numbers they are given by an experimenter or from a pre-recorded source. Memory tasks, 
again for numbers or words, are also used (Engström et al., 2005; Pomplun et al., 2001; Recarte 
& Nunes, 2002; Recarte & Nunes, 2003), as are word-production (Charlton, 2004; Gugerty et 
al., 2004; Recarte & Nunes, 2002; Recarte & Nunes, 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 2001) and 
mathematical tasks (Lamble et al., 1999; McKnight & McKnight, 1993; Patten et al., 2004; 
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Tashiro et al., 2005). Other tasks have included odometer checking and a vigilance task (Drory, 
1985), word legibility (Matthews et al., 2003), a general knowledge test (Horberry et al., 2006), 
the answering of visuo-spatial questions (Beede & Kass, 2006), and information reduction 
(Treffner & Barrett, 2004).  
 
Specific tests have also been used, such as the paced serial addition task (Brookhuis et al., 
1991; Törnros & Bolling, 2005), a combined memory and addition task. The Baddeley 
grammatical reasoning task (Baddeley, 1968) has been used a number of times (Alm & Nilsson, 
1994, 1995; Brown et al., 1969; Haigney et al., 2000). The test involves a participant being 
given a statement such as “A follows B”, followed by the two letters, i.e. BA. If the statement is 
true given the order of the letters they respond ‘true’, otherwise they respond ‘false’. Modified 
versions of this test, such as using sentences rather than letters, have also been used (Briem & 
Hedman, 1995). 
 
As noted earlier, the biggest problem with these methods is their lack of ecological validity. 
While being easy to measure and score there is the risk that any impairment caused may not 
accurately represent the impairment that would be result from actual conversation.  
 
Conversation Tasks 
 
The main distinction between conversation tasks and other cognitive tasks is that most others 
are one-way. That is, the participants perform a specific type of task, such as answering 
mathematics questions, with no two-way interaction between the participant and the 
experimenter or confederate. Conversation tasks are intended to allow a dialogue, more 
accurately modelling actual conversation. The topics of conversation have varied, some being 
based more specifically on the participants and their interests (Consiglio et al., 2003; Hunton & 
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Rose, 2005; McCarley et al., 2001; McKnight & McKnight, 1993; Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 
2003; Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003; Tashiro et al., 2005). Others topics were more general, 
relating to participants’ opinions of various current events or controversial topics, as well as 
closed-style questions (Briem & Hedman, 1995; Irwin et al., 2000; Liu, 2003). One aspect 
investigated is the intensity of conversation. While many of the studies just mentioned may use 
more ecological forms of conversation for low-intensity conversations, there is a tendency to 
use cognitive-style tasks for more intense conversations (e.g. Briem & Hedman, 1995; Liu, 
2003; McKnight & McKnight, 1993). Rakauskas et al. (2004) attempted to avoid this by having 
various questions rated on difficulty, then using those questions rated least and most difficult 
for the two levels of conversational intensity 9.  However, some of the questions rated as 
difficult, such as asking the participants if they thought the world would be better or worse in 
100 years time, seem on the surface to be of a similar level of difficulty to rated as simple by 
Briem and Hedman (1995), such as discussing child prostitution in Thailand.  
 
Voice Dialling and Speech Recognition Tasks 
 
As well as investigating of the effects of manual dialling on driving, some experimenters have 
compared manual to voice dialling (Graham & Carter, 2001; Jenness et al., 2002; Salvucci, 
2001). Voice dialling could require the participant to speak each digit in the phone number 
individually or to say a name to call a number that was stored in the phone. Similar to these 
studies was one investigating how speech-based e-mail systems affected a driver’s attention 
(Lee, Caven, Haake, & Brown, 2001). The task in this experiment was more difficult than in the 
voice dialling experiments, given that the simplest system involved three menu levels, each 
                                                 
9 This method has been discussed here as there was some attempt to create a dialogue between the experimenter 
and the participant (i.e. “What is your major? Why do you find that interesting?”), although this technique was not 
as open-ended as the previously described conversation tasks. 
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with two options, while the complex system had four to seven options per level. These tasks 
seem reasonable to use given that they are modelling actual tasks that may be used by drivers.   
 
Pedestrian-Relevant Findings 
 
 
Very few dual-task studies have direct relevance for pedestrian behaviours. However, two 
behaviours have been studied that do have some relevance; obstacle avoidance and postural 
stability.  
 
Performing a secondary-task has been shown to affect obstacle avoidance while walking. Chen 
et al. (1996) found that participants were more likely to step on an obstacle, presented as a 
beam of light across their walking path, when they were verbally responding to the activation of 
a light. This impairment was more pronounced when the participants had less time to respond, 
and for older participants. A 10.8% increase in failure rates for obstacle avoidance was found 
under dual-task conditions by Weerdesteyn, Schillings, van Galen, and Duysens (2003), They 
also found that participants who lengthened, rather than shortened, their stride to avoid an 
obstacle took longer to bring their foot down while performing a secondary task.   
 
Secondary tasks have also increased age differences in postural stability. Maylor and Wing 
(1996) found group differences in stability between a group of 50-year-olds and a group in their 
70s and 80s. Notably, the performance of two cognitive tasks decreased stability to a greater 
extent for the older group than for the younger group (Maylor & Wing, 1996). Performing three 
other cognitive tasks also reduced stability, but did so to a similar extent for both groups.  
Interference was generated between an auditory RT task and a postural RT task, the second 
measure being how long participants took to regain their balance after the platform below them 
moved (Müller et al., 2004).  They found that for easy tasks the interference was short-lived, 
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and also found no difference in effects between their younger and older groups (in their 20s 
versus 70s to early 80s respectively).  
 
 
Pedestrian-Analogous Findings 
 
This section is devoted to studies where results may be analogous to findings related to 
pedestrian behaviours. For instance, RT and gap-choice behaviours may both be impaired for 
both drivers and pedestrians. However, behaviours such as lane maintenance and car following 
do not have analogous pedestrian behaviours and therefore will be discussed in the next section,  
 
 
Gap Judgements 
 
This section includes findings on judgement of both physical and temporal gaps. Brown et al. 
(1969) examined drivers’ judgements of which physical gaps they could drive a car through. 
Five different gaps were used. The smallest was 3-in smaller than the test car, and the gaps 
increased in 3-in steps up to 9 in wider than the car. When engaged in a secondary task 
participants attempted to drive though more gaps that were impossible (0-in clearance or less) 
and slightly fewer that were possible. Actual steering through the gaps did not seem to be 
impaired, although there was a tendency towards worse performance when the gap was only 3 
in.  
 
Temporal gap judgements were studied by Cooper and Zheng (2002). A left-turn situation 
(equivalent to a right-turn in New Zealand) was created by positioning the participants at the 
side of a closed track while eight vehicles drove past them in a continuous circle. They found 
that less risky gap acceptance was based upon longer gaps, lower speeds, shorter decision times 
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and the participant being younger. However when not distracted, participants also took into 
account the condition of the pavement (wet or dry), whereas they did not do so when distracted. 
Since a vehicle cannot decelerate as quickly in wet conditions as it can in dry conditions, this is 
an important finding (Cooper & Zheng, 2002). For Horswill and McKenna (1999) participants 
indicated when they would join a stream of traffic presented via video (the participants were not 
actually driving). Participants in the dual-task condition chose  smaller (i.e. riskier) gaps  than 
those in the single-task condition (Horswill & McKenna, 1999). 
 
 
Reaction Time 
 
 
Reaction time is a fairly common measure of a driver’s performance, although what the 
participants are reacting to can vary depending on the particular experimental method. For 
instance, RT in a visual search task was increased by an additional task, either a memory or 
auditory task (Pomplun et al., 2001). More relevant to driving is the RT to initiate vehicle 
braking, often studied via driving simulator or simulated brake light (e.g. a red lamp turning on; 
Irwin et al., 2000). Results from these studies indicate that RT is increased in dual-task 
conditions (Alm & Nilsson, 1995; Irwin et al., 2000; Lamble et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2001; Liu, 
2003; Strayer & Drews, 2004; Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2003; Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 
2003), although in some cases this is limited to more difficult driving tasks (Alm & Nilsson, 
1994). Studies comparing conversation to listening to a radio have found a greater impairment 
from the conversation task (Consiglio et al., 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Hazard detection 
RT has been impaired by conversation (Gugerty et al., 2004; Horswill & McKenna, 1999), as 
has RT while performing a peripheral detection task (Amado & Ulupinar, 2005; Patten et al., 
2004; Törnros & Bolling, 2005). For Tashiro et al. (2005) cell phone conversation slowed RTs, 
and also increased the RT impairment caused by using sedating antihistamines.  
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Not all studies show clear impairment. The effect on RT for peripheral signals varied for 
Shinar, Tractinsky, and Compton (2005) depending on the day of experimentation, RTs being 
shorter with a distraction task on the first three (of five) days, and shorter without the 
distraction task on the last two. Parkes and Hooijmeijer (2000) found a significant impairment 
for the first of three presented stimuli in a series, but not for the second or third. However, for 
all stimuli RTs were increased with the phone task, even if only slightly. Small improvements 
in RT have also been found in the presence of a phone task, but only when it was paired with a 
signal detection task (Beede & Kass, 2006). 
 
Speed  
 
 
Average speed and speed variability have generally been affected by a secondary task. 
Generally, average speeds decrease with a distracter task  (Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Engström et 
al., 2005; Haigney et al., 2000; Rakauskas et al., 2004; Törnros & Bolling, 2005), while at the 
same time there tends to be greater variability in speeds (Rakauskas et al., 2004; Reed & Green, 
1999). More specifically, variability may decrease for a simple conversation, but increase for a 
difficult conversation, when compared to listening to a radio (Briem & Hedman, 1995), and 
greater variance in longitudinal acceleration has been found in short compared to long 
conversations (Liu, 2003). For Horberry et al. (2006), both an in-vehicle entertainment system 
and conversation task increased variability around a posted speed limit, but only the 
entertainment system reduced average speeds. Strayer and Drews (2004) found small, 
statistically insignificant decreases in speed relating to conversation, but did find that time to 
regain lost speed increased significantly with a conversation task. This was consistent with an 
earlier finding (Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2003). Dialling has also reduced average speeds 
(Törnros & Bolling, 2005). 
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There are almost no incidents of speeds being higher in the dual-task condition, but there are 
some studies where this has happened. For a simulator study, greater curve approach speeds for 
less severe curves (i.e. suggested curve speeds of 65 or 85 km/h rather than a suggested speed 
of 45 km/h) were found when participants were engaged in a secondary task while driving 
compared to driving alone (Charlton, 2004). However, this could be explained as the secondary 
task impairing the drivers’ braking RTs for the curves. For the 65- and 85-km/h curve 
conditions the lowest speeds appeared to be at the middle of the curve for the distraction 
conditions, compared to the entry of the curve for the non-distracted condition.  In a car 
following task, driving speeds were higher for both math and conversation tasks compared to 
no secondary task (Shinar et al., 2005). In two other conditions of the same study which 
involved maintaining driving speed at 50 or 65 mph, no speed increases were found. Overall, 
then, it seems likely that a secondary task reduces driving speeds. 
 
Task Completion Time 
 
Task performance times have been found to increase with a secondary task. This has been 
found for a pointing task (Lyda et al., 2002), as well as for dialling while driving (Jenness et al., 
2002) and for driving times in a closed-circuit study (Brown et al., 1969). Given the evidence 
that a secondary task slows driving speeds and RTs, this is not an unexpected finding. 
 
Undesirable Driving Behaviours and Outcomes 
 
 
For driving behaviours, Beede and Kass (2006) found that phone conversation increased the 
number of traffic violations (speeding, failing to stop for stop signs and traffic lights, or 
movement outside the boundaries of the lane) and attentional lapses (not scanning at a stop 
sign, stopping when there is no stop sign or the traffic light is green, and entering an 
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intersection when the light is red). Drivers also took longer to begin driving after stopping at a 
stop sign or red light when conversing, although this delay was less when the phone task was 
paired with a signal detection task.  
 
Unsafe driving outcomes include crashes, unsafe incidents, and leaving the road. The findings 
seem split, with some studies finding no increase in unsafe outcomes (Briem & Hedman, 1995; 
Rakauskas et al., 2004; Shinar et al., 2005). Other studies have found that phone use increases 
the number of crashes in a tracking task, especially if the phone is hand-held (Graham & Carter, 
2001) and that hands-free phones resulted in no increase but that hand-held phones do (Haigney 
et al., 2000). Conversation, both with passengers and on a phone, has also been related to 
increases in both crashes and unsafe incidents, although phone conversation produced more 
such incidents  (Hunton & Rose, 2005). One interesting aspect of this last study was a 
comparison between pilots and non-pilots. Given that pilots are trained in radio communication 
(Hunton & Rose, 2005), it was hypothesised that conversation would have less impact on them, 
and this was the case. Pilots showed no increases in crashes or incidents when talking to 
passengers, and smaller increases compared to non-pilots when using a phone. They suggested 
that training may be a way to reduce the impairment from conversation (Hunton & Rose, 2005). 
 
Self-report data from students at five United States universities found that of the 64% of 
students who reported accidents or near accidents, 21% reported that at least one driver was 
using a cell phone (Seo & Torabi, 2004). There is also evidence that drivers may not be aware 
that their performance has been impaired, especially older females (Lesch & Hancock, 2004).  
 
Situation Awareness 
 
There has been evidence suggesting that SA is impaired by phone conversation. Gugerty et al. 
(2004) used moving scenes presented on a computer monitor, but the participants had no 
 65 
control over these scenes. Situation awareness was measured by asking the participants 
questions during a pause in the scene, after the scene, or by having the participants indicate how 
they would react to a specific situation using the arrow keys on a keyboard. They found 
impairment across most of their measured variables, but found no difference in hazard 
detection. They determined that for easy-to-detect hazards there was no effect of a secondary 
task, but if the hazard was more difficult to detect there was impairment. During a pause in the 
simulation Parkes and Hooijmeijer (2000) asked questions about the current position of other 
vehicles on the road, and found that participants gave more correct answers when not engaged 
in conversation.  
 
Gaze and Detection 
 
 
A radio-tuning task was found to increase glances away from the road more than a phone 
dialling task or audio-cassette changing task (Wikman et al., 1998). The phone task did produce 
a greater difference between experienced and novice drivers, the glances of the experienced 
drivers being of the optimal duration (described as 0.5 to 2 s) more often. Manual dialling has 
been found to be accompanied by more glances away from the driving scene than voice 
dialling, and both more so than no dialling (Jenness et al., 2002), but glances away were not 
related to the number of lane-keeping errors. A secondary task did not reduce mirror checking 
significantly for Brookhuis et al. (1991), but did interact with the road condition used (easy or 
difficult). Mirror checking was only reduced for the easy road, a minimum level of attention 
already being paid to the mirrors on the busier, hard road. Recarte and Nunes (2003) found 
general reductions in both glances at the mirrors, as well as glances at the speedometer, during 
dual-task performance. Glances at the speedometer were reduced 3-fold in the presence of a 
distracter task, and this effect was more pronounced when participants had to travel at a 
restricted speed compared to a free choice of speed (Recarte & Nunes, 2002). 
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Charlton (2004) found that the detection of symbols presented on road signs or the dash-board 
of the vehicle was impaired by two phone tasks, while there was only a slight impairment for 
symbols presented on the road for one of the phone tasks. For Recarte and Nunes (2003), fewer 
targets were detected when a secondary task was performed compared to a single task. Strayer, 
Drews, and Johnston (2003) examined memory for billboards, as well as glance fixations and 
duration. They found that not only was recall of billboards reduced by a secondary task, but that 
this could not be attributed to fixation. There was no significant difference between conditions 
for the probability of fixating on a billboard, nor for the duration of the fixation. As well, there 
was twice the probability of recalling a billboard if it had been fixated in the single-task 
compared to the dual-task condition. This suggests that a secondary task can impair the 
recognition of objects in the environment, even if they are fixated (inattention blindness; 
Strayer, Drews, Crouch, & Johnston, 2005).   
 
 
Workload 
 
There have been consistent findings of increased workload in dual task situations. These 
include subjective increases measured by the NASA-TLX (Alm & Nilsson, 1994, , 1995; 
Graham & Carter, 2001; Horberry et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2001; Matthews et al., 2003), the 
Rating Scale Mental Effort (Rakauskas et al., 2004; Törnros & Bolling, 2005), the AFFTC 
Revised Workload Estimate Scale (Charlton, 2004), as well as a general measures of effort 
(Brookhuis et al., 1991; Recarte & Nunes, 2003). An objective measure, heart rate, also 
indicated increased workload during a phone call (Haigney et al., 2000) and with conversations 
in different driving situations (Brookhuis et al., 1991). Pupil dilation has also increased with a 
secondary task, indicting higher workload (Recarte & Nunes, 2003).  
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Driving-Specific Findings 
 
This section is devoted to findings that have no analogous pedestrian behaviours. Although not 
directly relevant to pedestrian behaviours these findings illustrate other ways in which cellular 
phone conversation may affect task performance. 
 
Steering Deviations 
 
 
Evidence for the effect a secondary task may have on a driver’s steering is mixed. Overall 
increases in deviations have been found in relation to a secondary task (Reed & Green, 1999), 
and in relation to specific parts of a phone conversation (dialling or answering; Brookhuis et al., 
1991). However, others have found decreases in deviations (Shinar et al., 2005) or no change 
(Briem & Hedman, 1995).  
 
Lane Maintenance  
 
The findings for lane maintenance, and similar variables such as lateral position and lateral 
speed, are not consistent in regards to dual-task impairment. There is evidence that lane 
maintenance is impaired by a secondary task (Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Jenness et al., 2002; Reed 
& Green, 1999), that shorter conversations produce less variation than longer ones (Liu, 2003), 
that longer glances at an in-car task produce greater displacement (Wikman et al., 1998), and 
that there can also be impairment in tracking tasks (Briem & Hedman, 1995; Engström et al., 
2005; Graham & Carter, 2001). Other research has found no effect of a secondary task (Alm & 
Nilsson, 1995; Briem & Hedman, 1995; Engström et al., 2005; Graham & Carter, 2001; 
Rakauskas et al., 2004; Shinar et al., 2005), a decrease in variability for conversation but an 
increase for dialling (Törnros & Bolling, 2005), and less variability when driving on a quiet 
motorway (Brookhuis et al., 1991). Lane maintenance was also improved for (Beede & Kass, 
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2006), but this seemed to be due to participants intentionally changing lanes less often when 
conversing. Manual dialling seems to increase lateral deviations slightly over voice dialling and 
no dialling, while these last two did not differ (Salvucci, 2001). 
 
Following Distance 
 
 
Although some research has indicated that participants will increase their following distance 
when performing a secondary task (Strayer & Drews, 2004; Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2003; 
Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003), this is not always the case. Alm and Nilsson (1995) found 
that participants did not increase their following distance to compensate for their reduced RT. 
Other research has found that participants have a 600-msec delay in adapting to speed changes 
in a leading vehicle (Brookhuis et al., 1991). Horswill and McKenna (1999) found that 
participants performing a secondary task chose a riskier ‘normal’ following distance, as well as 
a riskier ‘close’ following distance, than those not performing the secondary task. It should be 
noted, however, that the participants were just indicating their preferences and were not actually 
driving. 
 
Comparison Studies 
 
This section includes the findings from studies where different potentially-impairing behaviours 
have been compared. For instance, studies have examined differences in impairment induced by 
hand-held versus hands-free and passenger conversations, and between cellular phone 
conversation and alcohol consumption. One study has also compared how different tasks, 
including a conversation task, may reduce fatigue-related impairment in truck drivers. 
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Comparisons between Hand-Held, Hands-Free, and Passenger Conversations 
 
 
When compared directly there are few differences in the impairment produced by hand-held or 
hands-free phones (Consiglio et al., 2003; Matthews et al., 2003; Patten et al., 2004; Strayer, 
Drews, & Crouch, 2003; Törnros & Bolling, 2005). Given that studies using only hands-free 
phones have also found impairment (e.g. Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Strayer & Drews, 2004) this is 
not a completely surprising finding. However, some studies have found little or no difference 
between passenger and cell-phone conversation (Consiglio et al., 2003; Golden et al., 2003; 
Strayer et al., 2005), suggesting that even talking to a passenger could be hazardous. Although 
this may be the case there is evidence that passengers may reduce risky driver behaviours 
(Vollrath, Meilinger, & Krueger, 2003) and relative accident risk (Laberge-Nadeau et al., 
2003), although this may depend on the particular driver / passenger combination (Baxter et al., 
1990). There may also be problems regarding the regulation of conversation over a cell phone 
which do not occur, or are less of a problem, with passenger conversation (Crundall, Bains, 
Chapman, & Underwood, 2005; McKnight & McKnight, 1993).  
 
The types of conversation held between drivers and passengers may also be of a different type 
than those that drivers hold over cell phones. Drews, Pasupathi, and Strayer (2004) found that 
50% of drivers missed their correct exit from a motorway when talking on a phone, compared 
to 12.5% who were talking to a passenger and 4% when driving alone. They attributed this 
better performance in part to shared SA between the driver and the passenger; although the 
topic of conversation was not about the driving conditions, these conditions were discussed. 
More references to the driving conditions were made in the passenger condition, and both the 
driver and their conversational partner had more turns talking in this condition.  
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Comparisons with Alcohol 
 
 
Hands-free phone conversation has been found to affect the peripheral visual system to a 
similar extent as a low dose of alcohol10 (Langer, Holzner, Magnet, & Kopp, 2005), 
approximately the legal limit. Strayer, Drews, and Crouch (2003) found that talking on a cell 
phone (hand-held or hands-free) caused similar levels of impairment to being legally 
intoxicated, although when drunk participants drove more aggressively and while conversing 
drove more sluggishly. 
 
A Comparison of Different Fatigue Reduction Techniques 
 
 
Secondary tasks may be beneficial in some situations. In an investigation of how secondary 
tasks and rest affect truck driver fatigue levels, it was found that a limited conversation task was 
more effective at countering fatigue-induced performance impairment than a vigilance task or 
providing the drivers with an extra rest period (Drory, 1985). However, the conversation task 
also produced higher levels of reported fatigue. This seems to be an example of the situation 
described by Wickens et al. (1998), where better performance occurred with higher workload, 
or perhaps an alerting effect similar to the one found by Brookhuis et al. (1991) on a quiet 
motorway. 
Non-Experimental Studies 
 
This section details two forms of non-experimental study: Epidemiological studies, which 
examine the accident risk associated with cell phone use while driving; and benefit-cost studies, 
                                                 
10 The authors defined a low dose as being a blood / alcohol level of about 4-5 g of alcohol per 100 ml blood. This 
seems too high to be described as a low dose, especially given that the legal limit in New Zealand is 80mg / 100 ml 
(LTSA, 2005a), 1 / 50th of the level described by the authors. The performance impairment produced by a dose this 
high would be far greater than that produced by using a cell phone while driving, given that the individual would 
be dead. (The median lethal dose of alcohol is between 400 and 500 mg / 100 ml (Medsafe, 2004), 1 / 10th of the 
supposed low dose.) 
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which weigh up the benefits of banning cell phone use while driving against the financial costs 
of a ban. These studies give some indication of the actual risk posed by cell phone use while 
driving as well as the feasibility of banning their use.   
 
Epidemiological Studies 
 
 
A number of epidemiological studies have been conducted to ascertain the actual risk of driving 
while using a cellular phone. Violanti and Marshall (1996) compared 60 people who had been 
involved in an accident to 77 people who had not. They found that 13% of the accident group 
reported that they used a cellular phone while driving, compared to 9% of the no accident group 
(seven people from each group). When analysing the data from these 14 people they found a 
5.59-fold increase in risk for those using their phone for more than 50 minutes a month (not 
necessarily while driving). 
  
Violanti (1997) compared the characteristics of accidents where a phone was present, or in use, 
with those where there was no phone present. The presence of a phone was associated with 
accidents where there were higher rates of unsafe speeds, inattention, driving on the wrong side 
of the road, striking a fixed object, vehicles overturning, swerving before the accident, entering 
the other lane, and running off the road. There was a 10.9-fold increase in the rate of fatalities 
when a phone was present at the accident and a 2.5-fold increase if it was in use. 
 
Phone presence and use were also associated with increased odds of an accident producing a 
fatality for Violanti (1998): 2.11-fold for presence and 9.29-fold for use.  The results suggested 
that phone use was twice as risky as speeding, three-times riskier than alcohol and drug use, and 
six-times riskier than inattention, but this did not consider event duration (Violanti, 1998). For 
 72 
example, while a phone call may only last minutes alcohol can stay in the blood for hours 
(Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997b).  
 
Using a case-crossover technique with 699 drivers, where each person is also their own control, 
Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997a) found a 4.3 times increase in the relative risk of accident if a 
telephone was in use 10 minutes before a collision compared to when they were not talking. 
This increase is comparable to driving at the legal blood alcohol limit. They also found no 
difference between hand-held and hands-free phone use, but they note that this was based on a 
small sample (only 21% of the sample reported using a hands-free phone), so this finding may 
be due to a lack of power. This small sample has been seen as a limitation of the study, 
especially for informing potential laws (Maclure & Mittleman, 1997). It should also be noted 
that this increase in risk is on top of other distracting in-car behaviours that the sample drivers 
may have engaged in, such as talking to passengers or listening to the radio, not compared to a 
no-distraction condition (Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 2001).  
 
Sagberg (2001) found that drivers responsible for accidents were 2.2 times more likely to have 
been using a cell phone when the accident occurred compared to innocent drivers. The total 
proportion of accidents that could be attributed to cell phone use, over and above general 
exposure, was 72% higher than expected and was significant when driver demographics were 
taken into account. Hand-held phones seemed to be associated with a greater increase in risk, 
but as with the Redelmeier and Tibshirani (1997a) study the sample size was too small to draw 
any definitive conclusions. In terms of the types of accidents that occurred, Sagberg (2001) 
found that the most frequent accident was a rear-end collision. One general caution he offers is 
that activities that occur more frequently, such as conversing with a passenger, may cause more 
accidents in total, even if the relative risk of the less frequent activities is higher (Sagberg, 
2001).  
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Small but statistically significant increases in risk for both male and female phone users were 
found by Laberge-Nadeau et al. (2003), relative risks of 1.1-fold for males and 1.21-fold for 
females.  They also found an association between number of calls made and relative accident 
risk, but no difference between phone types. This is similar to the association found by Violanti 
and Marshall (1996) regarding time spent talking, although the increases found by Laberge-
Nadeau et al. (2003) were not as pronounced as for Violanti and Marshall (1996).  Violanti and 
Marshall (1996) found that the relative risks were generally increased between 1.5-fold and 2.5-
fold times as the number of calls increased, with infrequent phone users having a similar level 
of risk those people without cell phones.   
 
Benefit / Cost Analyses of Restrictions 
 
 
A number of studies have examined whether the financial benefits produced by legally 
restricting the use of cellular phones while driving are greater than the costs produced by 
restricting use. The benefits are measured in the reduction of lives lost, injury costs, and 
property damage, while the costs are taken in relation to the phone users (for example, delays 
due to stopping to take a call) and to cell phone providers (Hahn, Tetlock, & Burnett, 2000). 
Two studies concluded that the benefit / cost ratio is close to zero (Cohen & Graham, 2003; 
Hahn et al., 2000), while a third has found that the cost for each quality-adjusted life year saved 
may vary widely, from US$50 000 to US$700 000 at the time of publication (Redelmeier & 
Weinstein, 1999). The authors concluded that a ban would appear to be an expensive way to 
save lives, and that education may be a better way to proceed.   
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Implications 
 
 
This body of evidence suggests that driving while engaged in a secondary task is potentially 
dangerous. Although there are some mixed findings concerning vehicle control (i.e. steering 
deviations, lane maintenance, following distance) the more consistent findings are troubling. 
For instance, the general impairment found for RT may cause more serious problems. In an 
examination of a variety of collision situations a 300-ms delay in braking was associated with a 
38.5% increase in collisions and an 80.7% increase in collision velocity, for vehicles travelling 
at 56.4 km/h (Lee et al., 2001).  
 
Also of concern are the findings for SA and for gaze and detection. J. J. Gibson (1961) states 
that “So long as the margin [of safety] is perceived and the behavior is controlled, one is safe” 
(p. 84, italics added). Secondary tasks may impair people’s ability to perceive their current 
situation, a Stage 1 SA error. Although failing to perceive your margin of safety does not mean 
there will be an accident, it does suggest that it may be more difficult to avoid one.  
 
As mentioned earlier, it has been argued that late detection is the basic driver error (Rumar, 
1990), and anything which increases the likelihood of this should be avoided if possible. These 
findings also suggest that cell phone conversation may increase the risk of errors11, defined by 
Reason et al. (1990) as “…the failure of planned actions to achieve their intended 
consequences” (p. 1315). Given that “(e)rrors may be understood in relation to the cognitive 
function of the individual” (Parker et al., 1995, p. 1036), anything interfering with this 
cognitive function may increase the chance of errors occurring, although as noted in the section 
on undesirable driving outcomes there are mixed results from the experimental work. However, 
                                                 
11 The other types of undesirable driving behaviour have been called violations (Parker, Reason, Manstead, & 
Stradling, 1995; Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, & et al., 1990). Violations, compared to errors, are 
deliberate risky behaviours (Parker et al., 1995).   
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the epidemiological evidence does suggest that interference may be the case, given the 
association between phone use and accident involvement.  
 
For pedestrians the findings that a phone conversation can cause inattention blindness (e.g. 
Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003) is a very important one. As described earlier, the 
consequences of not seeing an oncoming car are likely to be serious to a vulnerable pedestrian. 
Given that there is evidence that a secondary task can impair obstacle avoidance, and there is no 
reason to suspect that the attentional impairment is limited to driving tasks. As secondary tasks 
have impacted on non-driving tasks, this topic deserves further investigation.    
 
Overall Summary of the Pedestrian and Dual-Task Research  
 
 
This section will summarise the current state of knowledge in the pedestrian and dual-task 
research areas relevant to the current research. Each area will be addressed separately, and 
following each summary of the main research findings, some general predictions based on the 
findings will be made.  
 
 
Summary of the Pedestrian Research 
 
There are two main findings from the pedestrian literature that are relevant to the current 
research. The first is that pedestrians make riskier gap judgements when the distance between 
vehicles is greater, suggesting that people use inter-vehicle distance as a source of information 
for TA. This is not the only source of information used by pedestrians however, given the 
second finding that pedestrians are less likely to cross the road if the TA of a vehicle is too 
short, It appears, then, that pedestrians decisions will be influenced by how far away a vehicle 
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is, both in distance and in time, The cause of the distance effect is difficult to determine, as it is 
possible it is in part or mostly due to closer vehicles appearing larger.  
 
The findings of the pedestrian experiments enable two main predictions to be made. The first is 
that the further apart the vehicles are the riskier the participants’ gap-choice decisions will be. 
The second is that participants will be more likely to chose a gap if it has a longer TA.  
 
Summary of the Dual-Task Research 
 
 
The overall finding from the dual-task literature is that a secondary task affects task 
performance negatively. Directly relevant to the current research is that a secondary task affects 
obstacle avoidance and postural stability, indicating that walking may be impacted by a 
conversation task. Findings from studies which used driving tasks may also be relevant for 
pedestrian behaviours. Importantly, drivers’ gap judgements have been impaired in the presence 
of a secondary task. In one experiment (Horswill & McKenna, 1999) participants in the dual-
task condition accepted riskier gaps than participants in the control condition, while Cooper and 
Zheng (2002) found that participants took the condition of the road surface (dry or wet) into 
consideration when not distracted, but did not pick longer gaps when the road was wet while 
distracted. There has also been a generally consistent finding that there are more unsafe or 
undesirable outcomes in the presence of a secondary task compared to no secondary task. Both 
of these findings are important for the current research, as pedestrians crossing a road have to 
make gap judgements and the cost of an unsafe crossing can be very high.   
 
More generally, drivers’ RT and speeds have been slowed by a secondary task, while the 
primary task takes longer if a secondary task is present. There have been consistent findings 
that workload, measured subjectively or objectively, is increased by a secondary task. 
 77 
Participant SA has been affected by a secondary task, and participants have been generally 
found to have more glances away from the road and to examine their mirrors less often when 
engaged in a secondary task. In terms of glance fixation a secondary task has reduced the recall 
of billboards while not affecting the length of time participants fixated on the billboards, an 
example of looking but not seeing.  
 
What is not known at this stage is how a secondary task affects pedestrian behaviours. 
However, if the effect of a secondary task on pedestrian behaviours is similar to the effect on 
driving behaviours then a few general predictions can be made for the current experiments. 
Pedestrians’ gap choices should be negatively affected by a conversation task, which will most 
likely result in more unsafe crossing outcomes. If driving speeds are reduced as a way of 
compensating for the additional demands of a secondary task it is plausible that participants’ 
will reduce their walking speeds for the same reason. It is also possible that the secondary task 
will affect how the participants direct their attention, and may affect the information the 
participants use to inform their crossing decisions.  
 
The effects of the simulated conversation task on SA and workload is more difficult to predict. 
For the current experiments the main evidence for impairment in either SA or workload would 
be impairment in performance.  Since the main theories for why a secondary task impairs 
performance involve impairment in SA and/or an increase in workload this becomes circular 
reasoning (Flach, 1995). Therefore no predictions regarding SA or workload will be made for 
these experiments. 
 
The Current Experiments  
 
 
The following experiments address different aspects of the road-crossing task that may be 
affected by cell phone conversation. Experiments 1 and 2 examine the gap-choice decision that 
 78 
pedestrians make when crossing through traffic. For each trial participants are presented with a 
line of 10 vans and their task is to choose which gap to cross through. The vans have variable 
TAs and for half of the trials the participants are engaged in a simulated cell phone conversation. 
While the participants for Experiment 1 are only 18 to 24 years old, for Experiment 2 a younger 
group aged 18 to 24 years old are compared to and older group aged 50 to 67 years old. 
 
Experiment 3 examines how cell phone conversation affects the direction of attention. For this 
experiment participants are positioned on the edge of a road that was empty 90% of the time, 
vehicles being present on the remaining 10% of the trials (4 out of 40 trials). Their task is to 
look for vehicles and to cross the road if no vehicles are approaching.  
 
The final experiment is an examination of an alternative explanation for a specific effect found 
for most of the preceding experiments, a decrease in participant walking speed. This study does 
not involve any road crossing decisions. Instead participants simply have to walk 3 m (the 
width of half the simulated road) while engaged in simulated conversation or in silence, and in 
the actual environment or the VE.  
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Chapter 6: Experiment 1 
 
This experiment was designed as an initial exploration of the effects of the simulated cellular 
phone conversation on pedestrian behaviours.  
 
Hypotheses  
 
Simulated Cellular Phone Conversation 
 
Given the lack of previous research into the effects of cell phone conversation on pedestrian 
behaviours the hypotheses for this experiment are based on analogous findings from the driving 
studies reviewed in Chapter 5.    
 
1. Participant safety will be impaired when they are engaged in the simulated cell phone 
conversation. This will be demonstrated through a decrease in their margins of safety 
and an increase in near misses and collisions. 
2. The participants’ road crossing behaviours will be negatively affected by the simulated 
conversation, so they will pick smaller temporal gaps to cross in and will delay for 
longer before crossing in their chosen gap, They may also walk slower if the finding 
from the driving literature that people drive slower when engaged in a secondary task 
represents a coping mechanism for the increased task demands. 
3. The participants may become more cautious, as indicated by allowing all of the vehicles 
to pass before trying to cross more often, or allowing more potentially safe gaps to pass, 
when engaged in the conversation task. 
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Information Used to Inform Gap Choices 
 
1. Safety will reduce as the distance between the vans increases, with longer initial 
distances being associated with lower margins of safety and an increase in near misses 
and collisions. 
2. Participants will chose smaller gaps and use less of each gap as the distance between the 
vans increases; however, walking speeds will not vary across distances (Clancey et al, 
2006; Murray, 2003). 
3. Participants will be more cautious, allowing more safe gaps to pass and having more 
cautious crossings, when the initial distance between the vans is shorter. 
4. Participants will be more willing to cross in the gaps with the longer TAs than in the 
gaps with the shorter TAs.  
 
Method  
 
Participants  
 
Fifty-five participants were recruited for Experiment 1, 27 male and 28 female, aged between 
18 and 24 (mean age = 21.2 years, SD = 1.98). All participants were students at the University 
of Canterbury, predominantly from the Department of Psychology, and all reported having 
normal or corrected normal vision and hearing. Five participants were removed from all but one 
of the analyses due to absent or insufficient data, defined as fewer than 3 out of 5 usable trials 
for at least one of the six experimental cells, leaving 25 males and 25 females with a mean age 
of 21.24 years (SD = 1.94). The one exception will be detailed under the dependent variable 
section. Seven of the included participants, and one excluded participant, reported never having 
driven a car in a city, while one included participant had not driven a car but had driven a 
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motorcycle. As the bottom of the shelf holding the VR transmitter was 195 cm from the floor, 
and in the path of the participants, only participants under 190 cm in height were used (the 5 cm 
difference is accounted for by the height added by the HMD). There was one exception to this, 
a participant who was 201 cm tall. However, this participant commented that he had lived in a 
house with short doorways and had learned to walk in such a way as to avoid colliding with the 
doorways. As he walked the same way for both sets of trials this was not considered to cause 
any problems. Participants were given a $5 food voucher for their time. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
 
The Actual Environment 
 
The VR laboratory was 8.05 m wide by 8.17 m long, and was approximately 2.95 m high./ The 
VR laboratory was organised so that there were no obstacles in the path of the participants. 
 
The Virtual Environment 
 
Custom in-house software was used to generate the VE, which had a straight, two-lane section 
of road with traffic present in the near lane only. The centre line of the road consisted of a 
broken white line which divided the road into two 3-m lanes. There was a continuous white 
edge line along both sides of the road. A tree was located directly behind the participant’s 
starting position and a street light was located directly opposite. See Figure 1 for a bird’s eye 
view of the environment. The vans used to represent the traffic were 174 cm wide by 438 cm 
long.  
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Hardware 
 
The VE was generated on a 2.8 GHz Pentium 4 PC with 512-Mb of RAM and a 128-Mb 
GeForce4 TI 3D graphics accelerator card. The VE was viewed through a Virtual Research 
Systems V8 HMD containing two full-colour 3.3-cm 640-by-480-pixel active matrix liquid 
crystal displays with a refresh rate of 60 frames per second, presenting a 48-degree horizontal 
by 60-degree diagonal field of view to each eye. The virtual world was represented 
stereoscopically.  
 
 
Figure 1. A bird’s eye view of the central portion of the virtual environment. The participant is shown at the 
starting position at the side of the road with one vehicle just past and another approaching the intended crossing 
path.   
 
The system included a 6-degree-of-freedom head tracker (Ascension Technology Flock of 
Birds with extended range transmitter) with an orientation and position sample rate of 60 Hz. 
The position of the participant was recorded from a receiver on the top of the HMD. 
Movements of either the head or the entire body changed the camera viewpoint, i.e. what the 
participant saw. The camera viewpoint was used to determine whether a crossing was unsafe 
(i.e. resulted in a near miss or collision; see the dependent variables below).  
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A hands-free cellular phone was simulated using the headphones attached to the HMD and a 
microphone that the experimenter used to talk to the participant.  
 
The Simulated Cellular Phone Conversation 
 
Conversation consisted of the experimenter verbally administering the activity section of the 
Activity Risk Taking Questionnaire12 (ARTQ; see Appendix A) to the participant, the last page 
of the ARTQ being completed post-experiment. This ensured that the nature of the conversation 
did not vary between participants. Before starting the experiment the format of this section of 
the ARTQ was explained to the participants. During the experiment they were given the name 
of an activity and had to report the following information: whether they had done the activity 
before and if so how many times; whether they would not, may, or would do the activity; and 
how risky they considered the activity to be by rating it on a 10-point scale. For instance, if they 
were given the activity bungy jumping a participant may reply with; “once”, “would not do it 
again”, and “7” out of 10 for risk.  
 
It was stressed that their answers should be as accurate as possible, and the participants were 
given the opportunity to change their answers later if they wished. If they forgot what they 
needed to report they were prompted by the experimenter. Activities were presented to the 
participants continuously during the conversation trials to more accurately represent 
conversation. This also ensured that the simulated conversation was occurring at the beginning 
of the appropriate trials. No talking occurred during the no-conversation trials unless absolutely 
necessary (i.e. to prevent the participant from walking into an object or a wall). 
 
                                                 
12 The ARTQ was developed by Dean Owen and the author. The original intent of the questionnaire was to 
investigate whether there was a relationship between road-crossing behaviours and willingness to participate in 
risky activities. 
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This format was chosen to ensure that the participant would do the majority of the talking 
during the conversation trials, and that the focus of their attention would be on the conversation 
task. Task elements included recall for how many times they had done the activity, a judgement 
of how risky the activity was, and whether they would consider doing it. Under the previous 
characterisation (see page 55) this was a cognitive task, given that the same specific 
information was requested for each activity. However, some participants chose to go into 
greater detail than was asked for, but this was not common.  
 
The information collected by the ARTQ was not used in the following analyses as it would 
likely have added a needless level of complexity, especially given the limited findings from 
Murray (2003). The ARTQ scales correlated poorly with the dependent variables used in that 
experiment (these variables were similar to those described below), with the main finding being 
that participants who had at least one cautious crossing also reported having performed more of 
the activities in the past than those participants with no cautious crossings. As risk-taking is not 
a focus of this study it will not be discussed further. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables were Conversation condition (conversation or no-conversation) and 
the Initial Distance between Vehicles (the distance between the rear of a lead vehicle and the 
front of a following vehicle as the lead vehicle passes the participant’s position; 40-, 50-, or 60-
m). For a given trial only one initial distance between vehicles was used (i.e. within a trial vans 
could be 40 m apart, or 50 m apart, but not both).   
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Time-to-Arrival 
 
While some experiments have manipulated TA as an independent variable (e.g. Oxley et al, 
2005; Simpson et al, 2003), that was not directly possible for this experiment. While TA has 
been included as a dependent variable (the total time available to cross) there was no direct 
experimental control over TA. Each participant had their own specific TAs (e.g. one person’s 
shortest gap may be 1.5 s while it may have been 2 s for another), and the TAs gaps were 
randomly assigned within each trial. In terms of gap selection, it is possible for some 
participants to cross through all 10 TA gaps during the experiment, while others may not. For 
instance, if a participant only chose the five longer gaps there would be no data for the five 
shorter gaps. Also, if a certain gap only occurred later in a trial (for instance, if the longest 
temporal gap was always one of the last five gaps presented), and a participant always crossed 
within the first four gaps presented to them they would never encounter the longest gap. This 
lack of control over when the gaps were presented also means that there is no guarantee that all 
gaps would be used for both conversation conditions.  
 
Although these limitations mean TA cannot be treated as an independent variable it is still 
possible to examine the effect of TA on the participants’ willingness to cross the road. The 
following steps were performed on each participant’s experimental data to enable an analysis of 
the likelihood of a gap being selected in relation to the other gaps. Extremely cautious crossers 
were excluded from this analysis, as were any trials where a cautious crossing occurred. These 
steps were performed for the Conversation and No-conversation conditions separately. Table 2 
provides an example for steps 2 to 8 for one participant for the no-conversation condition only. 
1. The TA gaps were converted into their ordinal ranking, 1 being the shortest gap and 10 
being the longest. 
2. The total number of times each ordinal gap was available for the participant to cross in 
was calculated. This is equivalent to 15 minus the number of times the ordinal gap 
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occurred, within a trial, after the gap that was selected. For each ordinal gap this total 
could vary between 0 and 15. This value will be referred to as presented.  
3. The total number of gaps that were presented to the participants was calculated. This is 
simply the sum of the presented values for each ordinal gap. 
4. The total number of times each ordinal gap was selected was calculated. This could vary 
between 0 (the gap was never selected) to 15 (the gap in which the participant always 
crossed) for each ordinal gap, but was capped at the presented value for that specific gap 
(e.g. if Gap 3 was presented 10 times, by definition it could not be selected 11 times). 
This value is referred to as selected. 
5. The total number of gaps selected was calculated. This value was 15 minus the number 
of completely cautious crossings for that participant in the specific conversation 
condition. 
6. The proportion of times each ordinal gap was presented was calculated. 
7. The proportion of times each ordinal gap was selected was calculated. 
8. A ratio was taken of the percentage of times each ordinal gap was selected by the 
percentage of times each ordinal gap was presented. A value higher than 1 indicated that 
the ordinal gap was preferred, while a value less than 1 meant that it was avoided.  
 
Table 2. An example of the steps used to calculate the likelihood ratio of a gap being selected for one participant 
(no-conversation condition only) 
  Ordinal Gap Number 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Selected (total=15) 0 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 
Presented (total=62) 3 7 6 3 8 5 7 7 8 8 
           
Proportion Selected  0.00 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 
Proportion Presented  0.05 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 
           
Selected/Presented 0 1.77 1.38 1.38 0.52 1.65 1.18 0.59 1.03 0.52 
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Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables are presented in Table 3. Dependent variables for Experiment 1. While 
most of these variables are sufficiently explained under the description heading, three require 
more explanation. The percentage of the gap available to use indexes how much of the chosen 
gap was used by a participant. It was calculated using the following formula (Eq 5): 
                          TA of van when participant begins to cross 
Percentage of gap available to use = ----------------------------------------------------- * 100   (Eq. 5) 
                                          Total TA of the van 
 
The last two variables were included to examine the hypothesis that conversation may result in 
participants becoming more cautious, i.e. rejecting gaps that would have afforded safe crossing 
or not crossing at all. The number of safe gaps rejected was calculated by dividing the TAs of all 
the vans for a trial by the participant’s time to cross, less the time they waited before crossing. 
This created a list of safety ratios (see Equation 2; page 14) for each trial, which were converted 
into margins of safety (see Equation 3; page 14). A cut-off margin of safety was determined for 
each participant which was based on the lowest margin of safety obtained that did not result in a 
near miss or collision (see Table 3). The number of gaps before the chosen gap which had 
margin of safety greater than the cut-off score was calculated for each trial. For example, if a 
participant crossed in the 5th gap and only gaps 2 and 3 would have afforded safe crossing, this 
value would be 2. On the other hand, if Gap 5 was the first safe gap this value would be 0.  
 
A cautious crossing was said to have occurred when a participant waited for all of the vans to 
pass before crossing the road. These were the main cause of missing data for the other 
variables, with computer errors13 being a minor secondary cause. Given that it is possible that 
                                                 
13 Occasionally at the beginning of a trial the participant would be placed behind the tree, rather than next to the 
road. This seemed to occur when the participant was taller (over 180 cm tall) and was also standing too far behind 
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cell phone conversation may increase the likelihood of cautious crossing occurring, they were 
included as a dependent variable. Because data from those participants who were excluded from 
the other analyses for having too many cautious crossings may have been informative (i.e. for 
comparing if they had more cautious crossings in the Conversation condition than the No-
conversation condition) they were included for this analysis.  
 
Table 3. Dependent variables for Experiment 1. 
 
Variable Description Unit 
Safety Ratio 
 
 
Margin of Safety 
The available crossing time from when the participant 
moved 0.5 m from the starting point divided by the time 
taken to cross to the far edge of the van. 
The safety ratio expressed as a percentage  
(1 – safety ratio) * 100  
 
- 
Near Misses Crossings in which the participant was within 0.5 s of 
being hit by a van 
 
- 
Collisions Crossings in which the participant was hit by a van 
 
- 
Walking Speed The speed with which the participant crossed from  
0.5 m to the far edge of the lane. 
 
m/s 
Percentage of Gap 
Available to Use 
The percentage of the available gap used by the 
participant. (If the gap is 2 s long and the participant 
waited for .5 s before crossing, this value would be 75%.) 
 
- 
Total Time 
Available to Cross 
The time-to-arrival of the van that the participant crossed 
in front of. 
 
 
Number of safe 
gaps rejected 
The number of gaps that would have afforded safe 
crossing but that the participant rejected. 
 
- 
Cautious Crossings Whether or not the participant waited for all of the 
vehicles to pass before crossing the road. 
- 
 
These dependent variables can be divided into three categories. The first is the measures of 
safety, consisting of the margin of safety, near misses, and collisions. The margin of safety is a 
fine-grained measure of the safety of a crossing, whereas the other two are coarser measures. A 
                                                                                                                                                           
the red line on the floor (see Procedure). Other issues included vehicles being present but invisible, and on 
occasion a trial would end just after it commenced. These were all very infrequent. 
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decrease in the margin of safety always indicates a decrease in safety, but will not necessarily 
be associated with an increase in near misses or collisions.  
 
The second category is the potential components of safety. They are walking speed, the 
percentage of the gap available to use, and the total time available to cross. Each of these 
variables may be related to the safety of a crossing. For instance, a crossing where the 
participant’s walking speed is reduced, where they use less of a gap, and where they chose a 
smaller gap is likely to be less safe than if they walk faster, use more of the gap, and pick a 
larger gap to cross through.  
 
Finally, the third category consists of the measures of caution. These are the number of safe 
gaps left and cautious crossings. As the gaps are randomised within each trial there is no 
consistent benefit from waiting longer; the largest gap could be the first gap, the last gap, or 
anywhere in between. It is possible that the number of safe gaps left may relate to overall safety 
in a general way. If a participant leaves 5 safe gaps then, unless all of the gaps afford safe 
crossing, it is less likely that the gap they chose will be safe. However, it is likely that at least 
one of the remaining gaps will afford safe crossing given that the shortest gap is based on their 
individuated walking speed. A cautious crossing is a safe crossing: If a participant waits for all 
of the vehicles to pass before crossing then the crossing has to be safe. However, as a general 
crossing method, waiting for a clear road may not be desirable, especially in areas with high 
traffic flow. Although waiting ensures a safe crossing, it may also mean a long wait.  
  
Procedure 
 
The experiment consisted of two sessions held sequentially. Each session consisted of 38 trials. 
The first eight trials were referred to as individuation trials, and no traffic was present for these 
trials. For the first two individuation trials the participants walked with the HMD on their head 
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but not covering their eyes. For these trials they were asked to walk in the actual environment to 
the centre of where the road would appear in the virtual environment (marked with a line of 
white tape on the floor of the laboratory) at a normal or a rushing walking speed. The remaining 
six individuation trials were conducted in the VE, with three trials performed at a normal 
walking speed and three at a rushing walking speed. A trial ended when the participant reached 
the centre of the road. For the experimental trials (described shortly) all of the vehicles 
disappeared when a trial ended, so that the road was empty when the participant returned to the 
starting point. 
 
There were two purposes for the individuation trials. The first was to gain a measure of the 
participants’ normal and rushing walking speeds in the both the AE and the VE. This data was 
used for a later analysis (see the Results section). Second, each participant’s shortest crossing 
time was used to calibrate the TAs for the experiment. For instance, if a participant crossed to 
the centre of the road in 2 s the shortest TA for their vehicles would be 2 s. The remaining TAs 
were calculated by adding 17.5% of the first gap onto the following gaps. Unlike Simpson and 
Owen (2002) no additional time was added to the TAs of the vans. An example of the van 
velocities across the three initial distances and ten TAs this situation is given in Figure 2. The 
horizontal axis of Figure 2 indicates the range of TAs that would be produced. These gaps were 
randomly assigned within each trial, so the first gap presented to a participant could be the 
shortest gap, the longest gap, or one of the eight intervening gaps.  
 
All of the experimental trials were conducted in the VE. The first session was a familiarisation 
session and was intended to provide the participants with experience moving in the virtual 
world as well as with the road-crossing task. Previous research using the VR road-crossing 
simulation has found that participants’ walking speeds in the VE increase with continued 
exposure to the simulation (Murray, 2003; Simpson & Owen, 2002). As a participant’s initial  
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Figure 2. The vehicle velocities across the three initial distances given a shortest crossing time of 2 s and adding 
17.5%. of the first gap to each subsequent gap. 
 
walking speed in the VE was used to individuate the experiment, this means that the relative 
safety of the gaps between the vehicles would increase (e.g. the relative safety of a 2-s gap 
differs if it takes the participant 1.8 s to cross originally but only 1.5 s to cross by the end of the 
experiment).  
 
The 30 experimental trials in the second session were divided into 10 blocks of 3 trials. For half 
of the blocks the participant was engaged in conversation with the experimenter (described 
earlier), and for the other half there was no conversation. Conversation trials were 
counterbalanced (see Appendix B for the counterbalanced design). A summary the types of 
trials used, the instructions associated with each trial type, and the order the trials were 
presented in is given in  
 
Participants first read the information sheet and signed a consent form, then read the instruction 
sheet and filled in the pre-test SSQ (see Appendix C for the information sheet, instruction sheet,  
 
Table 4. 
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Participants first read the information sheet and signed a consent form, then read the instruction 
sheet and filled in the pre-test SSQ (see Appendix C for the information sheet, instruction sheet,  
 
Table 4. A summary of the types of trials used, the instructions given for the trials, and their order of presentation 
for Experiment 1. 
 
Trial Number(s) Description of the trial(s) 
 1    The participant was asked to cross the laboratory room at a normal walking 
speed (in the actual environment) 
 2    The participant was asked to cross the laboratory room as if they were in a rush 
(in the actual environment) 
3-5    The participant was asked to walk towards the street light at a normal walking 
speed in the first 3 virtual environment individuation trials 
6-8    The participant was asked to walk towards the street light as if they were in a 
rush in the second 3 virtual environment individuation trials 
9-38    In the remaining virtual environment familiarisation trials the participant was 
asked to cross the road when they felt it was safe. For the experimental trials the 
task was the same but a conversation distraction task was either present or absent 
for each trial.  
  
and consent form, and Appendix D for the SSQ). Before the individuation trials commenced the 
participants were positioned on a red strip of tape on the floor. This strip could be used by the 
participants to reposition themselves at the beginning of each trial14. They were instructed to 
walk towards the street light then turn around and return to the tree (see Figure 1). At the end of 
each trial a black screen with white text instructed them to prepare for the next trial. For each 
session they first completed the 8 individuation trials followed immediately by the 30 
experimental trials. After the first session was completed they were given the option of having a 
short break.  
 
                                                 
14 Although the participants were wearing the HMD there was generally a small gap through which they could see 
the ground. This was not considered to be a serious problem; to complete the task successfully the participants had 
to focus their attention on the VE which precluded attending to the floor while crossing.  
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As described earlier, for the second session the participants were engaged in the conversation 
task for half of the experimental trials. Most of the participants responded with the basic 
information (i.e. “I have done the activity 4 times, I would do it again, and I think it is 5 out of 
10 on the risk scale”), but a few went into greater details about their activities and willingness, 
or lack of willingness, to do the activity. In general only one activity was given per trial, but on 
occasions when participants crossed late in a trial two or three activities were used. Even less 
frequent was one activity being used for more than one trial, and this only occurred when the 
participant went into greater depth about the activity. Any activities not provided during the 
experiment were completed by the participant following the experimental trials, as was the 
general information section of the questionnaire (the demographics on the first page and general 
questions on the last page). 
 
Following the second session participants were asked to fill in the post-test SSQ and completed 
the ARTQ. 
Results 
 
As Session 1 was only intended to give the participants’ experience moving in the VE, data 
from that session was not analysed further. The only exception to this is the walking speed 
comparison between the individuation trials for Sessions 1 and 2. All post-hoc analyses were 
conducted using the Tukey Honest Significant Difference test (all reported differences post hoc 
were significant at p < .05).  
 
Before the analyses were conducted each participant’s data was averaged for each cell (e.g. no-
conversation, 40-m initial distance; or conversation, 60-m initial distance). Depending on the 
amount of missing data for each participant this meant that each individual’s cell means were 
based on an average of 3, 4, or 5 data points. This had the effect of replacing the missing data 
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with the each participant’s mean for that particular cell. Replacing missing data this way helped 
retain individual variability.  
ANALYSES 
 
 
Eight 2-way (2 conversation condition by 3 initial distance) repeated measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted. These analyses tested the hypotheses related to the effect 
of the simulated cellular phone conversation and the initial distance between the vehicles. There 
were no significant interactions across any of the variables. While the non-significant 
interactions are not reported in text, full ANOVA tables, including effect sizes15, have been 
provided in Appendix E. Means, standard deviations, and ranges are included in Appendix F. 
An additional ANOVA conducted for walking speed will be described in the walking speed 
section. Finally, to examine whether the participants’ gap choices were affected by the TA of the 
gaps, trend analyses were conducted on the ratio data for each conversation condition across the 
10 levels of TA (see page 92 for specific details on this ratio).  
 
Assumptions 
 
The assumptions for the ANOVAs generally held. As the experiment used a completely within-
participant design there was no need to test the homogeneity of variance assumption, as this 
only applies to between-groups analyses. The assumption of sphericity was not always met, but 
none of the significant results became non-significant after correcting for the increase in Type 1 
error by using degrees of freedom adjustments (e.g. Greenhouse-Geisser or Huynh-Feldt 
corrections).  
 
                                                 
15 The effect size used was Cohen’s f (Cohen, 1988) and was calculated using the formula f = (F/N)0.5.  
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The assumption of normality held for the margin of safety, walking speed, the percentage of 
gap available to use, and total time available to cross. However, there were violations of this 
assumption for near misses, collisions, safe gaps left, and cautious crossings. This is most likely 
due to the nature of these variables; with the exception of safe gaps left they indexed infrequent 
events, while for safe gaps left there was a general ceiling effect (i.e. on average participants 
crossed in the second or third gap, meaning that there could only be one or two safe gaps before 
the one chosen).  
 
There are two reasons why these violations are not seen as problematic. The first is that 
ANOVAs are robust to violations of the normality assumption when sample sizes are equal. 
The second is that the patterns of the violations were consistent across cells, so there were no 
cases where the data was positively skewed for some cells and negatively skewed for others. 
Overall, then, the data seems suitable for the following analyses.   
 
Margin of Safety 
 
The margin of safety was higher in the no-conversation condition than in the conversation 
condition (means of 73.54% and 64.45% respectively), F (1, 49) = 12.11, p < .01. This suggests 
that conversation had an overall negative impact on participants’ road crossing safety. There 
was also a main effect of distance, F (2, 98) = 43.90, p <.001. Post-hoc analyses indicated that 
all 3 distances differed significantly, suggesting that as the initial distance increased the safety 
of the crossing decreased (see Figure 3). Possible reasons for these decreases in safety will be 
discussed shortly. 
 
Near Misses 
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Near misses were more prevalent when participants were engaged in conversation compared to 
when they were not (means of 25.19% and 20.23% respectively), F (1, 49) = 4.36, p < .05. 
Greater initial distances were also associated with more near misses, F (2, 98) = 4.26, p < .05 
(see Figure 4), consistent with the findings for the margin of safety. The only difference post-
hoc was between the 40- and 60-m distances. 
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Figure 3. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the margin of safety. The interaction effect was not 
significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 97 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
40 50 60
Distance (m)
M
e
a
n
 N
e
a
r 
M
is
s
e
s
 (
%
)
No Conversation
Conversation
 
Figure 4. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean frequency of near misses. The interaction 
effect was not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Collisions 
 
Along with decreased margins of safety and an increased rate of near misses, there were more 
collisions when participants were talking (8.4% compared to 5.73% when not talking). This 
difference, however, only approached significance16, F (1, 49) = 3.92, p = .053. This finding, 
combined with the finding for near misses, indicates that the gaps selected by the participants 
when conversing were less likely to afford safe crossing. Distance had a greater effect, F (2, 98) 
= 15.21, p < .001, with the percentage of collisions increasing as the initial distance increased 
(see Figure 5).  There was no difference between the 50- and 60-m distances, but the 40-m 
distance differed significantly from both. 
 
                                                 
16 See (Hauer, 1983) for a description of the issues relating to the assumption that a non-significant result is 
equivalent to no effect, and (Pollard, 1993) for a treatment of why it may be advisable to treat the .05 significance 
level as a soft, rather than hard, cut-off.  
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Walking Speed 
 
There was a small but statistically significant decrease of 0.04 m/s in walking speed when the 
participants were engaged in conversation (1.97 m/s compared to 2.01 m/s in the no-
conversation condition; F (1, 49) = 6.66, p < .05; see Figure 6). This is equates to the 3 m 
crossing taking an extra .03 s, which seems to be only a small increase. This may still contribute 
to the overall decrease in safety, especially when considered along side the following findings 
for the time available to cross and the percentage of gap available to use. The main effect of 
distance was not significant, F (2, 98) = 2.7, p = .10, although there was a tendency for longer 
initial distances to be associated with slower walking speeds.  
 
As well as the main analysis, walking speeds were also compared between the individuation 
trials for Sessions 1 and 2 (the normal speed and rushing trials in both environments), and to the 
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Figure 5. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean frequency of collisions. The interaction 
effect was not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 99 
 
1.85
1.9
1.95
2
2.05
2.1
2.15
40 50 60
Distance (m)
M
e
a
n
 W
a
lk
in
g
 S
p
e
e
d
 (
m
/s
)
No Conversation
Conversation
 
Figure 6. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on mean walking speeds. The interaction effect was not 
significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
maximum speed attained in the vehicle trials for each session. This was tested using a 2-way (2 
sessions * 5 walking speed conditions) repeated-measures ANOVA. As predicted, participants 
walked faster in the second session, F (1, 49) = 96.46, p < .001, walking on average at 1.77 m/s 
across the 5 conditions for Session 1 and 2.01 m/s across the 5 conditions for Session 2. There 
was also a main effect of condition, F (4, 196) = 227.83, p <.001, as well as an interaction 
between the two, F (4, 196) = 3.78, P < .01 (see Figure 7). Post-hoc analyses indicated that the 
means for each condition differed between the sessions. Within each session there were 
differences between means for all of the conditions, with three exceptions: between actual walk 
and virtual walk for both Session 1 and Session 2, and between actual rush and virtual rush for 
Session 2.  
 
 100 
 
Figure 7. The main effects of Walking Condition and Session, and the interaction between the two, on mean 
walking speeds. The first four conditions refer to the individuation trials while the fifth (Maximum Virtual) is 
based on the maximum speed reached by each participant in the experimental trials. The bars around the means 
represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Total Time Available to Cross 
 
There was a significant difference between conversation conditions for the temporal size of the 
gaps the participants chose, F (1, 49) = 8.16, p < .01, with participants choosing shorter gaps 
when they were talking (2.33 s, compared to 2.43 when not talking). Shorter gaps were also 
chosen when the distance between vans increased, F (2, 98) = 3.75, p < .05 (see Figure 8), 
although the only post-hoc difference was between the 40- and 60-m distances. 
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Figure 8. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean total time available to cross. The interaction 
effect was not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Percentage of Gap Available to Use 
 
There was a small difference in the percentage of gap available to use between conditions, F (1, 
49) = 5.27, p < .05, with participants using 73.7% of the gap when talking and 75.1% when not. 
This is only a small decrease, but this finding, combined with the reduced walking speeds and 
shorter gaps chosen, would seem to account for the overall reduction in safety. Distance was 
again significant, F (2, 98) = 88.08, p<.001, with less of the gap being used as distance 
increased (see Figure 9). All of the distances differed significantly. 
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Figure 9. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean percentage of gap available to use. The 
interaction was not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Safe Gaps Left 
 
Conversation also affected how many safe gaps were left, with an average of 1.48 safe gaps 
being left in the conversation condition compared to 1.13 safe gaps in the no-conversation  
condition, F (1, 49) = 14.69, p < .001. Fewer safe gaps were left when the initial distance was 
larger, F (2, 96) = 39.89, p < .001, again suggesting that the participants perceived that an 
increased distance between the vans represented an increase in safety (see Figure 10). All of the 
distances were significantly different from each other. 
Cautious Crossings 
 
Cell phone conversation did not appear to affect the number of cautious crossings that occurred, 
F (1, 54) = 0.0003, p = .99, with approximately 6% of the trials in each conversation condition 
being cautious crossings. Distance, however, did affect cautious crossings, F (2, 108) = 8.76, p 
< .001 (see Figure 11). Cautious crossings were more frequent at short initial distances. Post-  
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Figure 10. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean number of safe gaps left. The interaction 
effect was not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 11. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean frequency of cautious crossings. The main 
effect of conversation and the interaction were not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
hoc testing indicated that while the 40-m initial distance differed from both the 50- and 60-m 
distances, the latter two did not differ. 
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Across the experiment 41 participants did not have any cautious crossings for any condition, 
meaning that only 9 of the retained participants did. To examine if those participants who had at 
least one cautious crossing performed differently to those that had none a series of t- 
tests were conducted. The data for the other dependent variables were averaged across distances 
within each conversation condition, meaning that 14 tests were conducted. Of these, only two 
were significant, both for the number of safe gaps left. Participants who had at least one 
cautious crossing let more safe gaps pass in both the no-conversation condition, t (48) = 4.66, p 
< .001, and in the conversation condition, t (48) = 3.75, p < .001. This was not surprising, as 
this is the other measure of caution. Overall, though, the two groups did not differ and hence 
can be considered equivalent for the majority of the analyses. 
 
 Time-to-Arrival 
 
A visual examination of Figure 12 indicates that the participants were tending to prefer the 
longer gaps over the shorter gaps, but only in the no-conversation condition (compare the top 
and bottom panels of the figure). The linear contrast was not significant for the no-conversation 
condition, F(1, 49) = 2.31, p = .14, or for the conversation condition, F(1, 49) = .14, p=.71 (see 
the straight lines in Figure 12), which may indicate that participants were not favouring the 
longer gaps in either condition. However, the cubic contrast was significant for the no-
conversation condition, F(1, 49) = 4.54, p < .05. Only the 5th order contrast was significant for 
the conversation condition, F(1, 49) = 8.25, p < .01. Examining Figure 12 it can be determined 
that the four longest gaps all had likelihoods over 1 for the no-conversation condition, while the 
remaining six gaps all had likelihoods less than 1. In contrast, for the conversation condition 
two of the first five gaps had likelihoods over 1 and three of the second five had likelihoods 
under five. There is, then, a definite trend towards longer gaps being favoured in the no-
conversation condition but not in the conversation condition. 
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Figure 12. The effect of ordinal gap size on the likelihood that a gap is selected for the no-conversation condition 
and the conversation condition. The straight lines are a linear fit to the data, while the smoothed curved lines are 
the lines of best fit for each condition. Values above 1 indicate that the gap is picked more often than would be 
expected, and values less than 1 indicate the gap is picked less often than would be expected. 
 
Summary 
Overall the results suggest that the participant’s road-crossing ability was impaired by the 
conversation task. Safety, as measured by the margin of safety, was reduced by conversation. 
 
Collisions and near misses, two coarser but more critical measures of safety, occurred more 
frequently when the participants were engaged in the conversation task. Gap selection, then, 
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was poorer in the conversation condition as the gaps selected were less likely to afford a safe 
crossing. This decrease in safety may be related to decreases in walking speeds, smaller 
temporal gaps being chosen, and less of the gap being used for each crossing in the presence of 
the conversation task.  
 
Participants allowed more safe gaps to pass when they were talking, indicating a general level 
of distraction. However, there was no increase in cautious crossings. This suggests that 
participants, although exhibiting impaired performance while talking, were generally still  
willing to cross the road rather than to wait for all the vans to pass. 
 
The initial distance between the vehicles affected participant behaviours. As the initial distance 
between the vehicles increased there was a decrease in safety, indicated by a reduction in the 
margin of safety and more frequent collisions and near misses. Participants chose smaller 
temporal gaps at longer initial distances, and used a smaller percentage of the gap they chose. 
Fewer safe gaps were left and fewer cautious crossings were made when the vans were further 
away. Participants tended to walk slower as the initial distance increased, but this was not 
statistically significant. Participants favoured the longer gaps in the no-conversation condition, 
and did not in the conversation condition, suggesting that the conversation task also impaired 
their ability to use TA to inform their crossing decisions.     
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CHAPTER 7: EXPERIMENT 2  
 
Introduction 
 
Amongst the older population cell phone use is becoming more common (Pöysti et al., 2005). A 
question that needs to be examined, then, is whether dual-task impairment is greater for older 
people compared to younger. This section outlines some of the age-based changes relevant to 
road-crossing and cell phone use. Following this is a brief review of some of the literature 
relevant to the above question.  
Age-Related Changes in Task Performance 
 
For road-crossing, one important change related to aging is that older adults tend to walk slower 
(Ketcham & Stelmach, 2001). This means they need to select temporally larger gaps to ensure 
safe road-crossings. Other motor control decrements noted in older adults are reduced RTs, and 
longer movement times in tasks such as grasping and pointing (Ketcham & Stelmach, 2001).  
 
For the current research, it is important to note that older adults perform worse in postural 
stability tasks than younger adults when given no visual feedback, and maintaining balance 
requires greater attentional resources (Ketcham & Stelmach, 2001). Older adults are also at a 
greater risk of loss of balance if they are required to divide their attention (Ketcham & 
Stelmach, 2001), another finding pertinent to this research. Given that the participants are 
unable to see themselves in the VE, and two tasks must be performed in addition to walking 
(choosing a gap to cross in and the conversation task), this may be a problem. Walking has also 
increased RTs to various stimuli for older adults compared to younger adults, suggesting that 
walking required a greater level of attentional resources for the older group (Sparrow, 
Bradshaw, Lamoureux, & Tirosh, 2002).  
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An observational study examining whether the road-crossing behaviours of older differed from 
those of younger pedestrians found that older pedestrians tended to wait longer before crossing, 
to delay for longer at the curb, to take longer to cross the road, and to make more head 
movements before and while crossing (Wilson & Grayson, 1980). The tendency for older 
people to wait for longer at the curb has been noted elsewhere (Oxley et al., 1997), but in this 
case the differences were quite small, suggesting that older pedestrians did not form a distinct 
sub-group within the general pedestrian population (Wilson & Grayson, 1980). 
 
In a review of the visual function literature, Johnson and Choy (1987) determined that visual 
function remains fairly constant up until around the age of 50 when it begins to decline, 
although the actual age of decline may vary between 45 and 60 years of age. Older adults may 
be impaired in their ability to detect impending collisions (Andersen, Cisneros, Saidpour, & 
Atchley, 2000). They also exhibit different tendencies to younger adults when it comes to 
estimating velocities; they overestimate velocity at lowers speeds, and underestimate it at 
higher speeds (Scialfa, Guzy, Leibowitz, Garvey, & Tyrrell, 1991). For Schiff, Oldak, and Shah 
(1992) older women made the most conservative (i.e. underestimated) judgments of TA, 
although all participants tended to be conservative in their judgments.  
 
There may also be an increase in performance variability for older people. This has been noted 
in general movement control, such as movement velocity and duration (Ketcham & Stelmach, 
2001), performance on a tracking task (Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Guez, & Kreuger, 2005), as 
well as in driving behaviours such as speed variability (Shinar et al., 2005). In relation to 
variability in choice RTs, Alm and Nilsson (1995) note that even if RTs for people over 60 tend 
to be slower than RTs for younger adults, they will not necessarily be slower for a given older 
individual. 
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Divided Attention and Aging 
 
 
Whether older adults are more impaired by dividing their attention than younger adults is 
unclear. Although some research supports this hypothesis (Brouwer, Waterink, Van Wolffelaar, 
& Rothengatter, 1991; McDowd, 1986; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Monk et al., 2004; Naveh-
Benjamin et al., 2005), this is not the only finding. Other studies have found no difference 
between older and younger in terms of magnitude of impairment (Fernandes & Moscovitch, 
2003; Salthouse, Fristoe, Lineweaver, & Coon, 1995), or that older adults adopt different 
strategies to cope with the additional attentional demands (Kemper, Herman, & Lian, 2003). 
(Also see McDowd and Birren (1990) for a short review of this area, mentioning this 
uncertainty, and Verhaeghen and Cerella (2002) for a review of meta-analyses suggesting that 
older adults are more affected by dual-task distraction.)  
 
These mixed findings are repeated for cell phone conversation studies. In an epidemiological 
study, Lam (2002) found no increased relative risk for injuries or deaths related to hand-held 
cell phone use except for the 25-29 year-old age group. Most age groups also had similar 
relative risks for death or injury in regards to general in-car distractions, although those above 
70 had an increased risk and those between 40 and 49 had a decreased risk. A number of other 
studies have found age-related differences indicating worse performance in older adults, but 
with no interactions with the distracter variables, for various driving tasks (Alm & Nilsson, 
1995; Horberry et al., 2006; Strayer & Drews, 2004) and a visual scanning task (McCarley et 
al., 2001). This indicates that, for these experiments, while the older participants had worse 
overall task performance they were not more impaired by the distraction task than the younger 
participants. In other studies the interaction has also been significant, such as for responding to 
driving situations (McKnight & McKnight, 1993), people over 60 being more impaired by a 
driving task than those between 20 and 30 (Reed & Green, 1999), and older women being less 
aware that their driving has been impaired by a conversation task (Lesch & Hancock, 2004).  
 110 
 
The age ranges used for the older groups have varied quite considerably, the youngest starting 
point being 50 years old (McKnight & McKnight, 1993), while others have only used people 
over 70 years old (Kemper et al., 2003). For the other studies the initial age for the older group 
tends to fall between these values, with the mean age generally being between 60 and 70 (e.g. 
Horberry et al., 2006; McCarley et al., 2001; Monk et al., 2004). Most of the participants in the 
younger groups tend to be in their 20s, although there are some studies where some participants 
are in their 30s (Reed & Green, 1999; Sparrow et al., 2002), or where the mean age is around 
30 (Lesch & Hancock, 2004).  In terms of comparisons, the most extreme age difference was 
for Strayer and Drews (2004), with mean ages of approximately 20 years for the young group 
and 70 years for the older. The smallest difference was for Alm and Nilsson (1995), who 
divided their participants into 2 groups; those above and those below 60 years of age.       
 
Hypotheses 
Cellular Phone Conversation 
 
1. Crossing safety will be reduced by the simulated cell phone conversation, with a 
decrease in the margin of safety and an increase in near misses and collisions when the 
participants are engaged in conversation. 
2. Participant performance will be impaired by conversation, with walking speeds being 
reduced, smaller gaps being chosen, and less of each gap being used when compared to 
no-conversation 
3. Participants will become more cautious when conversing, with the participants allowing 
more potentially safe gaps to pass when conversing compared to no-conversation. 
 
Age Differences 
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Compared to younger participants, older participants; 
1. will have lower margins of safety, and more near misses and collisions; 
2. will walk slower, chose smaller gaps, and use less of each gap; 
3. will be more cautious, exhibited by allowing more safe gaps to pass on each trial and 
having more cautious crossings. 
4. will have greater variability in their performance 
5. may also be more impaired than the younger participants by the conversation task, and 
if so this will be shown in the interaction term. 
 
Information Used to Inform Gap Choices 
 
1. Safety will reduce as the distance between the vans increases, with longer initial 
distances being associated with lower margins of safety and an increase in near misses 
and collisions. 
2. Participants will chose smaller gaps and use less of each gap as the distance between the 
vans increases; however, walking speed will not be affected by distance. 
3. Participants will be more cautious, allowing more safe gaps to pass and having more 
cautious crossings, when the initial distance between the vans is shorter. 
4. Participants may be more likely to select larger gaps to cross in, but only when not 
engaged in the simulated conversation task. 
 
Postural Stability 
 
1. Postural stability may be negatively affected by VE exposure 
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2. If postural stability is negatively affected by VE exposure the effect will be greater for 
the older participants  
 
 
Method  
 
Participants 
 
Forty participants were tested, 20 younger and 20 older adults. There were 13 younger and 12 
older females, and 6 younger and 8 older males. The younger adults’ ages ranged between 18 
and 27 (a mean of 21.58 years, SD = 2.22), while the older adults’ ages ranged from 50 to 67 (a 
mean of 55.45 years, SD = 5.13). One of the younger participants did not record their sex or 
age. All of the younger participants were students at the University of Canterbury. The older 
participants consisted of students or staff from the Department of Psychology at the University 
of Canterbury, or were friends of the experimenter. None of the participants had any mobility 
issues, and all but one of the participants reported having normal or corrected normal vision. 
One of the older participants was blind in one eye, but this was not seen as a problem as this 
was how they interacted with the world in general. While most of the participants reported no 
hearing impairments there was one exception. An older participant reported that they were deaf 
in one ear, but as this was not the ear to which sounds were presented this was not a cause for 
concern. Three of the participants (two younger and one older) reported never having driven a 
car or a motorbike.  
 
 As with Experiment 1 some participants needed to be excluded due to insufficient data. The 
criterion was loosened for this experiment as retaining the criterion used for Experiment 1 
would have resulted in the loss of too many participants. Participants were excluded if they 
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were missing data from more than 2 trials per cell (i.e. only 1 or 2 usable trials), but only if this 
was the case for two or more cells. One cell could have only 2 usable trials, but the remainder 
had to have 3 or more. After excluding those who did not meet this criterion 19 younger adults 
(12 female, 6 male, and 1 unknown) and 16 older adults (11 female and 5 male) remained. The 
age range for the younger sample remained unchanged (a new mean of 21.5, SD = 2.26) while 
the range for the older sample changed to 50-64 (a new mean of 54.5, SD = 4.16). The full 
sample was used for the analysis of cautious crossings. Participants were given a $10 petrol 
voucher for their participation. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
 
These were essentially identical to Experiment 1. The only changes were that the pre-recorded 
instructions were recorded in the experimenter’s voice and the initial instruction was changed to 
“Please get ready to cross”. These changes were made due to an issue that was discovered with 
the pilot study for Experiment 3 and are explained fully on page 135. The end-of-trial 
instruction was the same as Experiment 1, “Turn to your right and walk back to the tree”, but 
was also recorded in the experimenter’s voice. 
 
The Simulated Cellular Phone Conversation 
 
The simulated conversation was identical to Experiment 1 
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Independent Variables  
 
The within-group variables of conversation condition and initial distance were used (see 
Experiment 1, page 84), as was the between-group variable age group (younger and older).  
 
Dependent Variables  
 
The dependent variables were identical to Experiment 1 (see Table 3. Dependent variables for 
Experiment 1.on page 37), with one addition. Postural stability was added for this experiment. 
This was measured twice, once before the experiment commenced and once immediately after 
the last experimental trial. Measurements were taken using the HMD in the left-right, up-down, 
and forwards-backwards axes. Standard deviations were taken over the first 1.4 s17 of 
measurement for each axis, and were pooled18 across the three trials. This was to obtain a 
measure of the variability in postural stability. It should be noted, however, that this is not a 
standard way to measure postural stability, and was chosen as it was a convenient method that 
could be easily used before and after the experimental trials.   
 
Procedure 
 
Rather than using a two-session design as per Experiment 1, the practice and experimental trials 
were conducted as one session. Preceding the individuation trials were 3 postural stability trials. 
The initial 8 individuation trials, used to configure the van TAs, were identical to Experiment 1. 
Following these trials were 45 experimental trials. The first 15 of these were familiarisation 
                                                 
17 The original intent was to use the first 2 s of each trial, but unfortunately the data for some participants did not 
allow this. In some cases the recording of the data began up to .7 seconds after the trial was started, meaning 2 s 
worth of data was not collected. It was decided to keep the length of measurement and the period of measurement 
(i.e. the beginning of each stability trial) as consistent as possible across participants, 1.4 s being the minimum 
usable amount of data collected.  
18 The SDs were converted to variances before pooling, and then converted back to SDs for analysis. 
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trials, comparable to the first block of 30 trials from Experiment 1 (see below for an 
explanation of why 15, rather than 30, practice trials were used). The remaining 30 trials were 
experimental, and followed the same format as the experimental trials from Experiment 1. A 
summary of the types of trials, and the instructions to the participants, is given in Table 5. A 
summary of the types of trials used, the instructions given for the trials, and their order of 
presentation for Experiment 2. 
 
The design was modified for a few reasons that related to the older sample. There was the 
potential risk that older participants would be more cautious than their younger counterparts. 
This assumption was tentatively supported by a small pilot study consisting of a 67–year-old 
female and a 69-year-old male. Given that there was a reasonable rate of cautious crossings in 
the Experiment 1, and as time and resources were limited, it was decided that the difficulty 
level of the experiment should be reduced to ensure fewer cautious participants (younger and 
older). One way of doing this was to remove the re-individuation of the experiment after the 
practice trials. As noted in the design for Experiment 1, participant’s walking speeds in the VE 
tend to increase throughout the experiment, resulting in a change in the relative safety of each 
gap. This was also supported by the second walking speed analysis (see page 98). By not 
recalibrating the experiment to the participant’s walking speed partway through, the 
experimental gaps would be effectively safer overall than the practice gaps.  
 
The reduction in trial numbers was to reduce the total time of the experiment. As older people 
tend to walk slower (Ketcham & Stelmach, 2001) it was thought that there would be a risk of 
the total time of the experiment exceeding an hour. An examination of the data for the first 
session of Experiment 1 indicated that mean walking speeds seemed to asymptote after about 
15 trials, so this was chosen as the number of practice trials. The number of experimental trials 
was not changed. 
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Table 5. A summary of the types of trials used, the instructions given for the trials, and their order of presentation 
for Experiment 2. 
 
Trial Number(s) Description of the trial(s) 
1-3 For the 3 pre-experiment stability trials, the participant was asked to stand as 
still as possible with the HMD covering their eyes. 
4 The participant was asked to cross the laboratory room at a normal walking 
speed (in the actual environment), 
5 The participant was asked to cross the laboratory room as if they were in a 
rush (in the actual environment), 
6-8 The participant was asked to walk towards the street light at a normal walking 
speed in the first 3 virtual environment individuation trials, 
9-11 The participant was asked to walk towards the street light as if they were in a 
rush in the last 3 virtual environment individuation trials, 
12-26 For the familiarisation trials, the participant was asked to cross the road when 
they thought it was safe. 
27-56 In the remaining virtual environment experimental trials, the participant was 
asked to cross the road when they felt it was safe. Conversation was either 
present or absent for each trial. 
57-59 For the 3 post-experiment stability trials, the participant was asked to stand as 
still as possible with the HMD covering their eyes. 
 
 
After reading the instruction sheet (see Appendix G) and the individuation trials, but before 
beginning the familiarisation trials, the participants were informed that there would be at least 1 
or 2 safe gaps each trial. The reason for this was to attempt to reduce the number of cautious 
crossings that occurred for both groups, hopefully without seriously affecting the participants’ 
road crossing behaviours. After the 15 familiarisation trials participants were asked if they 
would like a short break. The 30 experimental trials were then conducted in an identical manner 
to Experiment 1 (see page 91). Following the post-experiment postural stability measurement 
the participants completed the ARTQ and the SSQ, as per Experiment 1. 
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Results 
 
The hypothesis that there would be greater variability of performance in the older group was 
tested using the Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance. This hypothesis will be addressed 
following the ANOVAs. Post-hoc analyses were conducted as per Experiment 1 (see page 93). 
The results from the postural stability study will conclude the main results section.  
 
ANOVAs 
 
Eight 3–way (2 age group by 2 conversation condition by 3 initial distance) ANOVAs, with 
repeated measures on the last two factors, were conducted. These analyses tested the 
hypotheses for age-related differences in performance and impairment, the effect of the 
simulated conversation task on performance, and the effect on performance of the initial 
distance between vehicles. Only one of the interactions, for near misses, was significant and 
this is the only interaction reported in text. Full ANOVA tables, including effect sizes, are 
included in Appendix E. Means, standard deviations, and ranges are included in Appendix H. 
An additional walking speed analysis was also conducted, which will be detailed in the walking 
speed section.  The examination of the participants’ gap choices in relation to the temporal size 
of the gaps was conducted as per Experiment 1 (see page 85).  
 
Assumptions  
 
 
The same comments that were made about assumptions for Experiment 1 apply to this 
experiment. The only additional assumption is that of homogeneity of variance. This 
assumption was not always met, but as predictions were made regarding this assumption the 
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violations will be discussed in a later section. Overall, however, the assumption was generally 
met and therefore the described analyses are deemed to be appropriate for the data. 
 
Margin of Safety  
 
There were only two statistically significant effects for the margin of safety, the main effects of 
condition and distance. Mean margins of safety were smaller when participants were 
conversing (65.80%) than when they were not (74.00%), F (1, 33) = 8.2, p < .01. These values 
are quite similar to those found in Experiment 1 (64.45% and 73.54% for conversing and not 
conversing respectively) suggesting that this is a robust effect. Greater initial distances 
generally produced smaller safety margins, F (2, 66) = 28.92, p < .001 (see Figure 13).  Post-
hoc testing indicated that the 40-m distance differed from the 50- and 60-m distances. However, 
the two greater initial distances were not significantly different. There was no significant 
difference between the age groups, F (1, 33) = 0.95, p = .34.  
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Figure 13. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean margins of safety. The main effect of Age 
Group and the interaction effect were not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Near Misses 
 
There were no significant main effects found for near misses, although the main effect of 
conversation did tend towards significance, F (1, 33) = 3.69, p = .063. The number of near 
misses increased from 15.03% when conversation was not present to 19.01% when it was 
present. Unlike Experiment 1 the main effect of distance was not significant, F (2, 66) = 2.12, p 
= .12, although the effect size found for this experiment (f = .25) was of a similar magnitude to 
that for Experiment 1 (f = .29).  The groups did not differ significantly in the frequency of near 
misses, F (1, 33) = 0.79, p = .38. The 3-way interaction was significant, F (2, 66) = 3.82, p < .05 
(see Figure 14). Examining the graph it appears that near misses did not increase for either age 
group at the 40-m initial distance. However, they did increase for the older group when the 
initial distance was 50-m and for the younger group when the initial distance is 60-m. The 
results for the younger group partially match those found for Experiment 1. There was little 
effect of conversation on the frequency of near misses at the 50-m distance, but a greater effect 
at the 60-m distance, much like the present experiment. However, conversation was associated 
with an increase in near misses at the 40-m distance for Experiment 1, a finding which was not 
replicated here. Overall, however, the interaction appears to be uninterpretable.     
 
Collisions 
 
Both phone conversation and the initial distance between the vehicles had a significant effect on 
the mean percentage of collisions. While the mean percentage of collisions was 6.43% when 
there was no conversation, this increased to 10.43% when conversation was present, F (1, 33) = 
6.14, p < .05. No group difference was found, F (1, 33) = 1.19, p = .28, but the main effect of 
distance was significant, F (2, 66) = 9.72, p < .001 (see Figure 15). Post-hoc testing indicated 
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Figure 14. The significant 3-way interaction between Age Group, Conversation, and Distance for the mean 
frequency of near misses. None of the main effects or lower-level interactions were significant. The bars around 
the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 15. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean frequency of collisions. The main effect of 
Age Group and the interaction effect were not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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that while the 50- and 60-m initial distances did not differ significantly the 40-m initial distance 
differed from both.  
 
Walking Speed 
 
Unlike Experiment 1, walking speeds were not affected by the simulated phone conversation, F 
(1, 33) = 0.017, p = .90. In contrast to Experiment 1, walking speeds were affected by the initial 
distance between the vehicles, F (2, 66) = 6.68, p < .01, with a slight slowing in speed occurring 
as the distance increased (see Figure 16). However, the only post-hoc differences were between 
the 40-m initial distance and the two longer distances. One other unpredicted result occurred for 
age group. There was a significant difference between the two groups, F (1, 33) = 5.33, p < .05, 
but it was not in the hypothesised direction. The older group walked faster on average than the 
younger group (mean speeds of 1.93 m/s and 1.72 m/s respectively), which meant the younger 
group took, on average, 0.19 s longer to cross to the centre of the road. The mean walking speed 
for the older group was close to the walking speed found for Experiment 1 (approximately 2 
m/s), which means it is possible that the younger group was walking slower than expected and 
not that the older group walking faster. 
 
As with Experiment 1 (see page 55), an additional walking speed analysis was conducted. A 2-
way (2 age group by 5 walking speed conditions) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last 
factor was conducted. Both main effects were significant, F (1, 33) = 4.31, p < .05 for age 
group and F (4, 132) = 178.38, p < .001 for walking speed condition. As can be seen in Figure 
17 the older group walked consistently faster than the younger group (1.58 m / s and 1.45 m / s 
respectively, averaged across the five conditions). The largest difference was for the maximum 
speed attained in the VE, a difference of 0.32 m / s. The other differences were between one 
sixth and one third of this value. Post-hoc testing did not indicate any significant age  
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Figure 16. The main effects of Age Group and Distance on mean walking speeds. The main effect of Conversation 
Condition and the interaction effect were not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Figure 17. The main effects of Walking Condition and Age Group on mean walking speed. The first four 
conditions refer to the individuation trials while the fifth (Maximum Virtual) was based on the maximum speed 
reached by each participant in the experimental trials. The interaction was not significant. The bars around the 
means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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differences; however, the p value for the maximum virtual condition was half the size of the 
others (approximate p of .5 compared to a p of .99 for the other 4 conditions). The general trend 
across conditions replicated Experiment 1, although unlike Experiment 1 not all of the means 
differed significantly from each other. Participants walked (rushed) at about the same speed in 
the AE and in the VE. This was consistent within each group, as was the finding that the 
maximum virtual condition differed from all of the other conditions. The interaction was not 
significant, F (4, 132) = 2.06, p = .089. 
 
Total Time Available to Cross 
 
Participants chose shorter gaps when engaged in the conversation task, F (1, 33) = 9.36, p < .01, 
the average length decreasing from 2.95 s when not talking to 2.8 s when talking (see Figure 
18). The main effect of distance was not significant, F (2, 66) = 2.6, p = .081, and as can be 
seen in Figure 18 the trend does not even appear to be the same as was found in Experiment 1 
(compare Figure 18 to Figure 8). The two age groups did not differ significantly, F (1, 33) = 
1.41, p = .24. 
 
Percentage of Gap Available to Use 
 
The results for the percentage of gap available to use were consistent with Experiment 1. Less 
of the gap was used when participants were talking, F (1, 33) = 6.48, p < .05. Participants used 
71.5% of the gap when not talking compared to 69.90% of the gap while talking, and this was 
consistent across both age groups, F (1, 33) = 0.02, p = .89. Distance was also significant, F (1, 
33) = 48.59, p < .001. Less of the gap was used as the initial distance between vehicles  
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Figure 18. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean total time available to cross. The main 
effect of Distance and the interaction effect were not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
increased (see Figure 19), post-hoc testing indicating that all of the distances differed from each 
other.    
Safe Gaps Left 
 
Unlike Experiment 1 the simulated phone conversation did not have a significant effect on the 
mean number of safe gaps left, F (1, 33) = 1.66, p = .21, although distance was significant, F (2, 
66) = 26.77, p < .001. Participants left fewer safe gaps as the initial distance increased, all of the 
distances differing significantly from each other (see Figure 20). Participants in the older group 
tended to leave fewer safe gaps (a mean of 1.29) than those in the younger group (a mean of 
1.99), although this did not quite reach significance, F (1, 33) = 4.02, p = .053. 
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Figure 19. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean percentage of gap available to use. The 
interaction is not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 20. The main effects of Age Group and Distance on the mean number of safe gaps left. The main effect of 
Age Group and the interaction effect were not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Cautious Crossings  
 
Unlike Experiment 1 the simulated phone conversation did appear to have an effect on cautious 
crossings, F (1, 38) = 6.33, p < .05. More cautious crossings occurred when participants were 
engaged in the conversation task (14.17%) compared to no conversation (9.83%). The main 
effect of distance was again significant, F (2, 76) = 8.37, p < .001, reproducing the findings 
from Experiment 1. Post-hoc testing indicated that more cautious crossings occurred at the 40-
m initial distance than the other two distances (see Figure 21), the two longer distances not 
differing significantly. The frequencies of cautious crossing did not differ between the age 
groups, F (1, 33) = 2.21, p = 1.44. As well, cautious crossers were fairly evenly distributed 
across age groups, with half of the older group and eight of the younger group having had at 
least one cautious crossing. 
 
As with Experiment 1, t-tests were conducted to compare those participants with at least one 
cautious crossing to those with no cautious crossings. The findings were the same as 
Experiment 1, with the only significant differences between the groups occurring for the 
number of safe gaps left, for both the conversation trials, t (33) = 2.22, p < .05, and the no-
conversation trials, t (33) = 3.51, p < .01. Again this suggests that, in general, the two cautious 
crossing groups do not differ in any substantive way. 
 
Time-to-Arrival 
 
The same visual trend that was evident for Experiment 1 was repeated here, with participants 
preferring the longer gaps when not engaged in the conversation task (see Figure 22). Unlike 
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Figure 21. The main effects of Conversation and Distance on the mean frequency of cautious crossings. The 
interaction effect was not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Experiment 1 the linear contrast for the no-conversation condition was significant, F(1, 33) = 
9.16, p < .01, although the cubic trend was again significant, F(1, 33) = 8.05, p < .01. The linear 
contrast for the conversation condition remained non-significant, F(1, 33) = 1.13, p = .30, 
although two other trends were significant for this experiment; the quadratic trend, F(1, 33) = 
8.05, p < .01, and the 8th order trend, F (1, 33) = 5.00, p < .05.  The four largest gaps were again 
preferred by the participants when they were not conversing, but as was found for Experiment 1 
the participants showed no consistent preference for the longer gaps when conversing. These 
analyses were also conducted for each age group independently, and as the results were 
consistent with the pooled data only the overall analysis was reported.  
 
Age-Based Differences in Variability  
 
The hypothesis that there would be greater variability in the older group than in the younger 
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Figure 22. The effect of ordinal gap size on the likelihood that a gap is selected for the no-conversation condition  
and the conversation condition. The straight lines are a linear fit to the data, while the smoothed curved lines are 
the lines of best fit for each condition. Values above 1 indicate that the gap is picked more often than would be 
expected, and values less than 1 indicate the gap is picked less often than would be expected. 
 
 
group was largely unsupported. Of the 48 Levene’s tests that were conducted (6 conditions by 8 
dependent variables) only 11 were significant (see Table 6. Conditions in which the Levene's 
test was significant.for specific details). In nine of the cases the difference was in the 
hypothesised direction. However, a general examination of the group variances indicated that 
the older group had the larger variance just over half the time (26 instances, compared to 22 
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instances of the younger group having the larger variance).  When only looking at which group 
had the greater variance, and not considering whether the  
 
Table 6. Conditions in which the Levene's test was significant. 
 
Dependent Variable Phone Initial Hypothesis 
  Conversation Distance (m) Supported? 
Margin of Safety No 40 Yes 
 Yes 50 Yes 
Collisions No 40 Yes 
 No 50 Yes 
Walking Speed No 40 No 
 No 50 No 
Percentage of Gap Used No 50 Yes 
Cautious Crossings No 40 Yes 
 No 50 Yes 
 No 60 Yes 
  Yes 50 Yes 
 
 
difference was statistically significant, some general trends can be noted. For instance, the older 
group exhibited greater variability for all conditions for the margin of safety and cautious 
crossings, for five out of six conditions for the percentage of the gap used, and for four out of 
six for collisions and the number of safe gaps left. However, for walking speed and the time 
available to cross the younger group always exhibited greater variability, and for five out of six 
conditions for near misses.  
 
It was possible that, in general, the group with the higher (or lower) mean may consistently 
have had the higher variance. In most cases where the older group had the higher variance they 
also had the higher mean score on that variable, with the exception of the number of safe gaps 
left. This was generally the case for the younger sample too, although for walking speeds they 
had greater variance but the lower mean. It is possible, then, that in general the higher the mean 
the greater the variance. This makes intuitive sense as the potential scores around a lower mean 
are more constrained than the scores around a higher mean (assuming, of course, that there is a 
minimum score, which is the case for all of the dependent variables for this experiment). 
Nothing definitive can be said about age differences in variance based on these results. 
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Postural Stability 
 
As mentioned earlier, postural stability was measured pre- and post-exposure to the VE.  
Three 2-way (2 age group * 2 pre- and post-exposure) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the 
last factor were conducted. Data from all participants was used for this analysis as there was no 
missing data.    
 
Stability was not affected as predicted. Across the three axes, there were no significant 
differences between the age groups and no interactions with exposure to the VE. There was one 
significant main effect of exposure, for the up-down axis, F (1, 38) = 5.77, p < .05. But rather 
than increasing, stability decreased. This was indicated by the mean variability decreasing 
which can be seen in the reduction of the 95% confidence intervals (see Figure 23). This figure 
shows the age groups separately to indicate that this change was consistent between the two 
groups. Slight, non-significant, decreases in variability were also found for the other two axes.   
 
 
Summary 
 
 
This experiment generally supports the findings from Experiment 1. Participant safety was 
reduced, with more collisions and near misses occurring when the participants were engaged in 
the conversation task. Conversation also produced lower margins of safety, a decrease which 
was of a similar magnitude to that found in Experiment 1 (Cohen’s fs of approximately 0.49 for 
each experiment). Participants chose smaller gaps, and used less of the gap that they did choose, 
again consistent with Experiment 1. However, unlike Experiment 1 conversation did not  
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Figure 23. The main effect of VE exposure on mean postural stability scores in the Y-axis. The main effect of age 
group and the interaction effect were not significant. The bars around the means represent the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
 
significantly increase the number of safe gaps that were left. Walking speeds, which were 
slowed by conversation for Experiment 1, were almost unchanged for this experiment. Phone 
conversation affected the frequency of cautious crossings for this experiment, more occurring 
when conversation was present, whereas there was no effect of conversation for Experiment 1. 
Overall this suggests that the finding of reduced safety is robust, and indicates that the reduction 
in walking speed that was found for Experiment 1 may not have had a major effect on 
participant safety.  
 
The hypotheses for age differences were not supported. Older participants had slight, non-
significant, increases in collisions and cautious crossings compared to the younger group, but 
otherwise performed as well as or better than the younger group. This was most notable for 
walking speed. While it was predicted that older participants would walk slower than the 
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younger participants, the opposite was found. The results of the additional walking speed 
analysis supports this, with the older participants walking significantly faster in all of the 
walking speed conditions than the younger group.  Potential reasons for this finding will be 
discussed in Chapter 10. The performance variability analysis was inconclusive. The increase in 
variation could be explained in part by which group had the higher overall mean for the cell 
rather than by which age group they were in.  
 
The results for the postural stability analysis were also inconclusive, both groups exhibiting 
similar stability levels. A curious finding was a decrease in the variability of the participants’ 
postural stability in the post-exposure test. It is plausible that the unfamiliar weight of the HMD 
was the reason for the greater variation in stability pre-exposure. The participants may have 
adapted to the weight by the end of the experiment, hence the apparent improvement in their 
stability. 
 
The initial distance between the vehicles again affected the behaviour of the participants. The 
participants were less safe, walked slower, and used less of the gap at longer initial distances. 
When the vans started further away, greater distances were also associated with a decrease in 
cautious behaviours, the participants allowing fewer safe gaps to pass, and having fewer 
cautious crossings. While smaller gaps were chosen at longer distances this effect did not reach 
significance. The trend for this variable also differed from the one found for Experiment 1, the 
smallest gaps being chosen at the 50-m initial distance. As well, the findings regarding the 
participants’ preference for longer gaps was replicated, with a definite preference for the longer 
gaps revealed only when they were not engaged in the conversation task.    
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It should be noted that the small group sizes are a limitation of this study. The pattern of means 
would stabilise with a larger sample size and hence be more interpretable, while the increase in 
power may have resulted in significant group differences.  
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CHAPTER 8: EXPERIMENTS 3 
 
 
This experiment was designed to examine the effect of conversation on the direction of 
attention, specifically whether conversation would make it less likely for participants to look for 
oncoming traffic. As participants always looked before crossing in Experiments 1 and 2, for this 
experiment it was decided that the vehicle events should be less frequent, simulating a quiet 
road. Out of a total of 40 trials vehicles were present for four of them, two trials with vehicles 
in each conversation condition (conversation / no-conversation).  
 
A previous study using 50 participants did not find any effect of conversation on whether 
participants looked before crossing. This was thought to be due to an instruction given to the 
participants before the experiment began (“Please look to your right, and if no vehicles are 
coming please cross the road”). These instructions were changed to “Please treat the road as an 
actual road” for this experiment. The findings from the pilot experiment, in relation to walking 
speeds and reaction times (see below), were nearly identical to the findings of this experiment, 
both for mean differences and standard deviations; therefore the pilot study has not been 
reported in full.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Conversation 
1. Conversation will reduce the likelihood that participants will turn to look for oncoming 
traffic. 
2. Conversation will reduce the participants’ walking speeds. 
3. Conversation will reduce the participants’ reaction times. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
The participants consisted of 11 females and 9 males between the ages of 18 and 24 (mean age 
20.8 years; SD = 2.14). They were students from the University of Canterbury, primarily from 
the Department of Psychology. All participants reporting normal or corrected normal vision and 
hearing, and none had any form of mobility impairment. They were given a $10 petrol voucher 
for their participation. No information was collected on whether they were drivers. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
 
These were identical to Experiment 2 with two exceptions. The positions of the tree and the 
street light in the virtual environment were swapped, i.e. in the starting position the street light 
was behind the participant, while the tree was opposite them. The reason for the difference 
between the VE is related to the original program that was modified for this experiment. The 
VE had not been standardized for the preceding research (e.g. Simpson et al, 2003; Owen, 
2002) and so the positions of the tree and street light were not consistent. The objects were 
simply reversed for this experiment compared to Experiments 1 and 2, with no underlying 
theoretical reason for the change.  
 
Second, the initial instruction was changed from “Turn to your left and get ready to cross” to 
“Please get ready to cross”. During the pilot study it was noted that some participants looked to 
the left, rather than the right, before crossing the road. As it was likely that this instruction was 
causing the confusion it was changed. The new message was recorded in the experimenter’s 
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voice, and the end message, “Turn to your right and walk back to the tree”, was rerecorded in 
the experimenter’s voice for consistency.  
 
Simulated Cellular Phone Conversation 
 
The cellular phone conversation was the same as Experiment 1. 
 
Independent Variable 
 
The independent variable was conversation condition (conversation or no-conversation).  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables are presented in Table 7. Note that looking to the right was based on 
whether a participant turned far enough to see the first of the line of vans, as was measured by 
computer via the position of the HMD. 
  
Table 7. Dependent variables for Experiment 3. 
 
Variable Description 
 
Unit 
Direction of 
Attention 
Whether the participants looked to the right before 
initiating a crossing 
 
- 
Walking Speed The speed with which the participant crosses from  
0.5 m from the starting point to the far edge of the lane 
 
m/s 
Reaction Time The time from initiation of a trial to the participant 
initiating their crossing 
s 
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Procedure 
 
The experiment consisted of 40 trials, in 4 of which vehicles approached a participant’s starting 
position from the right. Participants were asked to treat the road as an actual road. This 
instruction was not repeated during the course of the experiment. The first vehicle began 15 m 
from the participant’s position and had a TA of 1.5 s (with a velocity of 36 km/h). The 
remaining vehicles were spaced 20 m apart and had TAs of 1.3 s (with velocities of 55.38 
km/h). These values were chosen to reduce the likelihood of a participant crossing if they were 
attending to the approaching vehicles as none of the gaps were likely to be safe to cross in.  
 
The conversation trials were arranged using a Latin square design (see Appendix I) to avoid 
order effects. The vehicle trials were randomly assigned within each set of 10 trials using 
Microsoft Excel, with two provisions: there had to be vehicles in 2 of the conversation trials 
and in 2 of the no-conversation trials, and the vehicle trials had to be separated by at least 4 no-
vehicle trials, so that vehicle trials did not occur too close to each other. A list of the trials in 
which vehicles were present is given in Appendix J. 
 
The pre-trial procedure was the same as Experiment 1 regarding instructions and questionnaires 
(see page 92; the instructions for Experiment 3 are in Appendix K), although there were no 
individuation trials before the experiment. Participants were instructed to treat the road as if it 
were an actual road.  If vehicles were present participants were instructed to wait until the 
vehicles had passed before crossing. A message that was recorded in the experimenter’s voice 
was presented at the beginning of each trial (“Please get ready to cross”). At the end of each 
trial there was a black screen with white text instructing them to prepare for the next trial. When 
this screen appeared they were instructed to look to the front.  
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In general only one activity from the ARTQ was given per trial, although occasionally one 
activity would be used for more than one crossing. The nature of this experiment, in contrast to 
Experiment 1, made it unlikely for more than one activity to be used for a given trial. As the 
decision for this experiment was cross/don’t cross there was less time spent waiting before 
crossing for each trial, as compared to the gap-choice used in Experiments 1 and 2. The only 
trials where multiple activities per trial were used were those where vehicles were present, 
although not in all instances. 
 
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to fill in the post-test SSQ and complete 
the reduced version of the ARTQ which excluded the items used for the conversation task (see 
Appendix L).  
 
Results 
 
Three t-tests were conducted, one for each dependent variable. Since the predictions were 
directional 1-tailed tests were used. 
 
Assumptions 
 
 
While the assumption of normality did not hold for this data t-tests are robust to normality 
violations when the sample sizes are equal. As this is a completely within-participants design, 
and the repeated-measures factor only has two-levels, there were no possible violations of the 
other assumptions.  
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T-Tests 
 
Direction of Attention 
 
 
Participants tended to look less often during the simulated conversation (93% of the time, SD = 
13) compared to no conversation (97% of the time, SD = 5.7), t (19) = -1.76, p < .05, Cohen’s d 
= 0.43. This effect was mostly limited to the first 10 trials. Across the first 10 trials there were 
35 instances of not looking compared to only 3 instances across the remaining 30 trials. The 
majority of these instances also came from three participants who accounted for 26 of the 38 
trials where a participant did not look before crossing.  
 
Walking Speed 
 
Simulated conversation again impaired the participants’ walking speeds, t (19) = -3.51, p < .01, 
Cohen’s d = 0.50 with participants walking 0.075 m/s slower when engaged in conversation (a 
mean speed of 0.98 m/s, SD= 0.17) compared to no conversation (a mean speed of 1.06 m/s, SD 
= 0.13). This impairment is very similar to the one found in the pilot study (0.08 m/s). 
 
Reaction Time 
 
 
Consistent with the pilot study, RTs were slowed by 0.49 s during simulated conversation 
compared to no conversation, t (19) = 2.45, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 0.49. Mean reaction times 
were 3.26 s (sd = 1.1) during conversation trials and 2.77 (sd = 0.9) during no-conversation 
trials.  
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Summary 
 
 
Participants were less likely to look for traffic when conversing, but this was limited mostly to 
the first 10 trials and to 3 participants. Conversation, then, may affect some people’s tendency 
to look, but it did not appear to be a consistent effect across participants. However, the increase 
in RT and decrease in walking speed were consistent with the results for the pilot study, 
suggesting that they are robust effects. 
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CHAPTER 9: OTHER FINDINGS 
 
This chapter includes findings that are relevant for more than one of the studies or compare 
across studies. It is divided into three sections: (1) Experiment 4, an experiment designed to test 
an alternate explanation for the general finding that walking speeds were impaired by 
conversation; (2) an examination of the internal consistency of the dependent variables across 
Experiments 1 and 2, and; (3) the results from the SSQ for the reported experiments. 
 
 
Experiment 4 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Participants walked slower when conversing for two of the three reported studies, as well as the 
pilot study for Experiment 3. Although this could be solely attributable to the added distraction 
of the conversation task there was another possibility. The decrease in walking speeds was 
potentially due to a combination of the conversation task and the visibility differences between 
the VE and the AE. Given that the participants had no visible virtual body (i.e. they could not 
see their own bodies in the VE), there may have been an increased fear of tripping in the VE. 
When there was no secondary task participants may have had sufficient cognitive resources to 
cope with walking while being unable to see their bodies. However, the increased demand on 
resources that was produced by the secondary task may have resulted in the reduced walking 
speeds as a way of coping with this increase. If this was the case there would be no walking 
speed decrease in the AE. This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that it was the 
conversation, and not an interaction between the conversation and the reduced visibility in the 
VE, that caused walking speed to be impaired.  
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Hypotheses 
 
1. Simulated conversation will reduce the participants’ walking speeds regardless of the 
environment (VE or AE) that they are in 
2. Participants will walk slower in VE than in the AE 
Method  
 
Participants 
 
The sample for this experiment consisted of 7 females and 5 males aged between 20 and 41 
years old (mean = 25.2 years, sd = 5.98). All but two were post-graduate students in the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Canterbury. The remaining two were friends of 
the experimenter. All of the participants reported having normal or corrected normal vision and 
hearing, and none had any form of mobility impairment. No information was collected on 
whether they were drivers.  
 
Materials and Apparatus   
 
These were identical to Experiment 2, with one exception. As with Experiment 3 the position of 
the tree and the lamp post were transposed, the lamp post being behind the starting position and 
the tree opposite it.  
 
Variables 
 
There were two independent variables: environment and conversation condition. The first refers 
to the environment the participants were walking in, the virtual or actual environment, while the 
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conversation conditions have been described previously (see page Error! Bookmark not 
defined.). The dependent variable was walking speed.  
 
Procedure  
  
The experiment consisted of 20 trials. Half of these were in the AE, with the HMD positioned 
on the head of the participant but not covering their eyes, and half were in the virtual 
environment.  For each environment there were 5 trials with conversation and 5 trials without. 
These were counterbalanced to ensure that each combination of environment and conversation 
occurred 3 times in each of the four possible blocks (see Appendix M). The road-crossing task 
for this experiment was simply walking to the centre of the road and back. In the actual 
environment the approximate centre was marked with a strip of white tape.    
 
Participants first read the information sheet (see Appendix N) and signed the consent form. The 
design of the experiment, as outlined above, was then explained verbally. In the VE trials 
participants were instructed to begin walking when the trial started. In the AE conversation 
trials participants were instructed to begin walking once the activity name had been given, 
while in the no-conversation trials they began walking after the experimenter said “go”.  
 
Results 
 
Assumptions 
 
As this was a completely within-participant design, and neither of the repeated-measures had 
more than two-levels, there were no issues with the assumptions for this experiment.  
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ANOVA 
 
The results were analysed using a 2-way (2 conversation by 2 environment) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of condition, F (1, 11) = 27.95, p < .001, Cohen’s 
f = 1.53, participants walking 0.17 m/s slower when engaged in the phone task (means of 1.02 
m /s and 0.85 m /s for not conversing and conversing respectively). This meant, on average, that 
participants took 0.59 s longer to cross to the centre of the road. The main effect of environment 
was also significant, F (1, 11) = 4.84, p = .05, Cohen’s f = 0.64. Participants walked slower in 
the VE (0.88 m/s) than in the AE (0.99 m/s). The interaction was not significant, F(1, 11) = 
4.21, p = .065, Cohen’s f = 0.59 (see Figure 24). Overall these findings suggest that it is 
primarily the conversation task that reduces walking speeds. 
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Figure 24. The main effects of Conversation and Environment on walking speeds. The interaction was not 
significant. 
 
Consistency of Performance for Experiments 1 and 2 
 
To examine the consistency of the participants’ performance across the different conditions for 
Experiments 1 and 2 Chronbach’s alphas were calculated for each of the dependent variables 
(see Table 8 for full alpha tables). Most of the alphas were high (generally over .8), indicating 
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that the participants’ performance was consistent across conversation conditions and initial 
distances. The only variables where the alphas were generally low were near misses and 
collisions. As noted earlier these two variables are gross measures of safety. This means that 
participants who have a near miss or collisions in one condition may not have them in the other 
conditions. It is therefore not surprising that the alphas are lower for these variables.  
 
 
 
Table 8. Chronbach's alphas for each dependent variable. Alphas are provided for Experiments 1 and 2, and for the 
younger and older groups from Experiment 2 separately. 
 
  Experiment 1   Experiment 2 
     All Younger  Older 
Near Misses 0.36  0.48 0.61 0.22 
Collisions 0.52  0.73 0.67 0.76 
Margin of Safety 0.82  0.92 0.84 0.94 
Total Time Available to Cross 0.87  0.95 0.95 0.94 
Safe Gaps Left 0.89  0.85 0.74 0.91 
Percentage of Gap Available to Use 0.92  0.88 0.83 0.92 
Cautious Crossing 0.97  0.93 0.81 0.95 
Walking Speed 0.98   0.98 0.99 0.93 
 
 
 
Simulation Sickness 
 
 
The SSQ results for pre- and post-VE exposure for Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are presented in 
Table 9. Also included in this table are the means and SDs from Kennedy et al. (1993) for 
comparison. As can be seen in the table the post-exposure means are higher than those found by 
Kennedy et al. (1993), and remain so even if the pre-scores are taken into account.  It can also 
be seen that the total score increases as the length of exposure to the simulation increases. 
Experiment 1, with 60 trials, produced the highest overall score, followed by Experiment 2 (45 
trials) and Experiment 3 (40 trials). Length of exposure, then, did seem to have an effect on 
reported SS symptoms. Note, however, that this is a purely visual analysis which does not take 
into account variability. While there appear to be differences these may merely be artefacts of 
the data. 
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It is possible that the specific simulation used for these experiments may produce higher levels 
of SS than is desirable, which may confound experimental findings. Another possibility is that 
the samples used for this experiment differ in some way to the samples used for the norms. The 
samples used by Kennedy et al. (1993) were naval personnel, people who may have less 
susceptibility to motion or simulation sickness than the general population.  
 
Table 9. Simulation Sickness Questionnaire means and standard deviations for pre- and post-VE exposure for 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3, and for post-exposure for Kennedy et al (1993).  
 
    Pre-exposure   Post-exposure 
    N O D TS   N O D TS 
Mean 10.93 8.54 13.16 12.04  29.31 25.63 39.48 34.75 Experiment 1 
SD 17.65 12.72 21.83 17.87  27.41 25.54 39.89 32.07 
Mean 7.63 6.25 10.09 9.35  18.60 14.59 24.01 25.06 
Experiment 2 
SD 12.82 10.28 18.38 14.12  26.19 19.07 30.88 23.84 
Mean 13.36 9.10 16.01 14.03  16.70 17.81 24.36 21.88 
Experiment 3 
SD 17.89 9.07 25.66 17.24  21.19 15.99 28.16 21.24 
Mean      7.70 10.60 6.40 9.80 
Kennedy et al (1993) 
SD           15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 
Note. N = Nausea, O = Oculomotor, D = Disorientation, TS = Total Score.  
 
The counterbalanced design for the experiments should have spread any potential performance 
detriment induced by SS evenly throughout the data, but the loss of some participants for 
Experiments 1 and 2 may have affected the counterbalanced design for these experiments.  As 
can be seen in Table 10, following the removal of the extremely cautious crossers the 
experiments were no longer fully counterbalanced. This is not surprising for Experiment 3, as 
the uneven number of participants meant it was not possible to have an equal number of 
participants in each conversation condition for each block. The counterbalancing could have 
held for Experiment 1, but this was not the case for any block except the first. For the remaining 
blocks there was either a 24 to 26, or a 23 to 27 participant split across conversation conditions. 
However, there was no systematic bias in the spread of these unbalanced blocks, although 
slightly more of the conversation blocks occurred within the first five blocks (127 blocks of 
conversation trials, compared to 123 blocks of conversation trials for the last five blocks of the 
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experiment). Given this spread, any impairment produced by SS would have reduced the 
differences between the conversation conditions. Therefore it can be concluded that the findings 
for these two experiments were not due to an unbalanced design.     
 
Table 10. The counterbalanced designs of Experiments 1 and 3 after the extremely cautious crossers were 
removed. The numbers indicate how many participants had each type of trial for each 3-trial block. 
 
 Block 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Experiment 1           
Conversation 25 23 27 26 26 24 23 23 27 26 
No Conversation 25 27 23 24 24 26 27 27 23 24 
           
Experiment 3           
Conversation 18 17 17 18 18 17 17 18 18 17 
No Conversation 17 18 18 17 17 18 18 17 17 18 
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 CHAPTER 10: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The Effects of the Phone Conversation Task 
 
The cell phone conversation task affected participant performance across all of the experiments. 
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 (the gap-choice experiments) will be summarised first, 
followed by a summary of Experiments 3 (the infrequent vehicle experiment). The implications 
of the findings will be discussed following the summaries.  
 
Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Although initially it seems more reasonable to compare the younger participants’ data from 
Experiment 2 with the Experiment 1 data, an examination of the graphs for the older and 
younger participants, as well as the general lack of significant age-related main and interaction 
effects, suggests that the groups were fairly consistent. Therefore, for simplicity, Experiment 1 
will be discussed in relation to the combined data from Experiment 2. 
  
The phone task had an impact on participant safety. Conversation reduced the margin of safety 
by approximately 8.5 percentage points for both Experiments 1 and 2. Near misses and 
collisions increased for both experiments when the participants were engaged in the phone task. 
However, near misses for Experiment 2 and collisions for Experiment 1 only neared 
significance. For Experiment 1 near misses increased by 5%, while collisions increased by 
about 2.7%. Both near misses and collisions increased by about 4% for Experiment 2. 
Combined, these findings indicate that the conversation task reduced the safety of the 
participants’ road crossings for both experiments.  
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Three behavioural variables were measured that may have related to the safety of a crossing. 
These were the participants’ walking speeds, the temporal size of the gap the participants’ 
crossed in, and how much of each gap they used. Walking speeds were slightly, but 
significantly, reduced (0.04 m/s) by phone conversation for Experiment 1, but were not 
significantly reduced for Experiment 2. This finding for Experiment 2 was unexpected, given 
that walking speeds were affected by the conversation task for all of the other experiments. This 
discrepancy will be addressed shortly.  
 
Participants also chose significantly smaller gaps to cross in while talking for both experiments. 
This impairment was smaller for Experiment 1 (0.1 s) than for Experiment 2 (0.29 s). One other 
difference between the two experiments was that participants in Experiment 1 chose smaller 
gaps in general (a mean of 2.38 s versus about 2.88 s for Experiment 219). The likely cause of 
this was way the experimental trials were set up for each experiment. For Experiment 1 the 
vehicle trials were recalibrated, using the individuation trials, after the practice trials. This was 
not done for Experiment 2. This meant that the available gaps were shorter for Experiment 1 
than for Experiment 2. This explains why smaller gaps were chosen for Experiment 1 overall, 
and may help explain why the secondary-task impairment for Experiment 2 was larger than for 
Experiment 1.  
 
Significantly less of the chosen gap was used across both experiments. The decrease was only 
small, about 1.5% for both experiments. However, considering this result in light of the finding 
that participants chose smaller gaps to cross in seems to explain the reduction in safety. 
Although the reduction in walking speed would also be expected to reduce safety this did not 
seem to be the case: Walking speeds were not significantly reduced by conversation in 
                                                 
19 This difference was statistically significant, t(81) = 4.91, p < .001.  
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Experiment 2 but safety was still affected. It seems likely, then, that the reduction in safety was 
due to the size of the gap chosen and the amount of the gap used rather than the participants 
walking slower while talking.  
 
Two general measures of impairment were also recorded; the number of potentially safe gaps 
left prior to the one chosen, and the number of cautious crossings. Significantly more safe gaps 
were left when participants were conversing for Experiment 1 (a mean of 0.36 more safe gaps 
left), although there was no difference for Experiment 2. Conversely, phone conversation was 
associated with more cautious crossings for Experiment 2 but not Experiment 1. Approximately 
6% of the trials for Experiment 1 were cautious crossings, consistent across both phone 
conditions. For Experiment 2 cautious crossings increased from 9.8% for no conversation to 
14.2% for phone conversation. Taken together these findings suggest that participants tended to 
become more cautious when engaged in the conversation task. However, how this caution was 
exhibited differed between the two experiments.  
 
Finally, no significant interactions were observed between the phone task and the distance 
between the vans. This indicates that the secondary task does not affect the participants’ use of 
distance information to inform their road-crossing decisions. However, the participants’ use of 
TA information was affected by the simulated conversation. While participants tended to favour 
the larger temporal gaps when not conversing they did not do so when engaged in the 
conversation task. The effect the simulated conversation has on the information people use 
when deciding when to cross a road could be further examined using the kind of state space 
analysis used by Flach and colleagues. While this analysis will be conducted for any future 
publications, for present purposes the finding that people’s attention to TA information is 
impaired while engaged in the conversation task is sufficient. 
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Experiment 3 
 
As with Experiment 1 walking speeds were affected by the simulated conversation for 
Experiment 3, participants walking 0.075 m/s slower when engaged in the conversation task 
compared to no conversation. Reaction times were also affected, with the participants reacting 
.5 s slower when engaged in conversation. The degree of impairment was almost identical to 
the pilot study, suggesting that these were robust findings.  
 
Experiment 3 was designed to fix a flaw in a pilot experiment. For the pilot study the 
participants were given the instruction to turn to the right before crossing. This may have 
overridden the effect of the simulated conversation on the participants’ direction of attention, as 
no conversation-related difference was found for the participants’ tendency to look for traffic. 
For Experiment 3 the instruction was changed to “Please treat the road as an actual road”. With 
this instruction participants did tend to look less often when engaged in conversation, looking 
for traffic on 97% of the no-conversation trials but only 93% of the conversation trials. A closer 
examination of the data indicated that this effect was due to a small number of the participants, 
most of the no-looking events coming from three participants. The no looking trials were 
predominantly found early in the experiment, 35 of the 38 occurrences being recorded in the 
first 10 trials. Combined, these findings indicated that the simulated conversation also 
negatively affected the participant’s crossing behaviours for this crossing situation. 
 
 
Implications 
 
It should be noted that these are possibly the first experiments to examine the effect of cell 
phone conversation on pedestrian behaviour. The majority of the research into cellular-phone 
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related impairment has involved driving behaviours. This means that the results of the current 
experiments are not directly comparable to the previous body of research. However, some of 
the findings from these studies may be seen as analogous to the findings from the driving 
studies and will be discussed as such.  
 
Combined, the results from these experiments indicate that the cell phone conversation task had 
a negative impact on participant performance. In terms of safety, participants had smaller safety 
margins and more unsafe crossings when engaged in the conversation task. This is consistent 
with the studies that suggest there is an increase in unsafe outcomes (e.g. Graham & Carter, 
2001; Haigney et al., 2000; Hunton & Rose, 2005). This is also the most important finding. If 
people’s road-crossing behaviours in the VE are related to their behaviours in the actual 
environment then talking on a phone while walking may place them at risk. As noted earlier, 
the potential consequences of a lapse of attention for pedestrians are severe; being hit by a 
vehicle incurs a high chance of serious injury or death, especially given the general speed of 
vehicles on New Zealand roads, even urban roads. The main conclusion that can be drawn from 
this research, then, is that a secondary task negatively affects road-crossing behaviours. It 
would be recommended, then, that pedestrians should exercise extra caution if they are 
attempting to cross a road while using their cell phone, or preferably they should avoid 
conversing at all while crossing a road. 
 
Participants were also slightly more likely to fail to look before crossing the road for 
Experiment 3. This could be characterised as impairing the attainment of Level 1 SA (Endsley, 
1995), the participants failing to be aware of their environment and the situation. However, 
given the nature of this specific finding no firm conclusions can be drawn about how the 
conversation affected the participants’ tendency to look for traffic.  
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Gap choice was poorer in the conversation condition, demonstrated by participants choosing 
smaller temporal gaps. This seems to replicate the finding of Horswill and McKenna (1999), 
who found that riskier gaps were selected by participants in a dual-task condition, albeit with a 
different task (road-crossing for the current research, merging with traffic for Horswill and 
McKenna). Cooper and Zheng (2002) also found that participants’ gap-choices were impaired, 
but in a more specific way than was found in the current research. Participants in the dual-task 
condition when the road surface was wet failed to take the road surface into account, choosing 
gaps when the road surface was wet that were equivalent to those that were selected when the 
surface was dry. This is similar to the finding from Experiments 1 and 2 regarding the 
participants’ use of TA information for informing their gap choice decisions, with the 
participants preferring the larger gaps only when not conversing. This point will be addressed 
again in the next section, as well as in the design extensions section.  
 
As well as choosing smaller gaps while conversing, the participants also used less of the gap 
they did choose. This may indicate that not only was their choice of gap poorer while engaged 
in the conversation task but that their decision process was also impaired; a greater proportion 
of the gap passed before their decision to cross was made. However, it is also possible that the 
two findings are related in a more straight-forward way. Given that the chosen gaps were 
smaller, taking the same amount of time to make the decision to cross in the gap would produce 
a similar effect. For instance, if a person took 0.5 s to decide to cross in a specific gap and the 
gap they chose was 2 s long, their fraction of gap used would be 75%. With the same decision 
time and a smaller gap, say 1.8 s, this value would be 72.2%, a smaller value with no increase 
in decision time. An examination of the correlations20 between these two variables suggests 
that, although this explanation may account for some of the apparent impairment it probably 
                                                 
20 The correlations, within each cell, for both experiments varied from weak (r = .07, from Experiment 1) to quite 
strong (r = .51, from Experiment 2), but tended to 
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does not account for all of it. Overall it seems fairly safe to say that participants’ gap choice 
judgements were impaired by the conversation task. 
 
Walking speed was the only variable measured across all of the experiments, and showed clear 
conversation-related impairment for all but one of the experiments. For Experiment 2 there was 
no difference in walking speeds between the two phone conditions. The exact reason for why 
Experiment 2 was different is unclear. A closer examination of the data indicated that for the 
older group walking speeds decreased by 0.026 m/s for the phone task, whereas there was a 
0.021 m/s increase for the younger group while they were engaged in the conversation task. 
This may explain in part why no effect was found, given that the increase and decrease nearly 
cancel each other out. There does not seem to be an obvious answer for why only the older 
group slowed down, nor why the younger group walked faster, when talking. The age 
difference will be discussed in more detail shortly, but currently this finding appears to be 
inexplicable.    
 
While the effect of the phone task on walking speeds for the remaining three experiments 
seemed clear, another possibility was considered. The impairment may not have been due 
solely to the phone conversation but rather could have been due to an interaction between the 
phone task and VR exposure. The additional demands of the phone task, combined with the 
limited visibility of the VE, may have reduced the participants walking speeds if the 
participants were worried about tripping. The results from Experiment 4 indicated that the 
walking speed impairment was primarily due to the conversation task as participants’ walking 
speeds were also reduced when they were not immersed in the VE.  
 
Walking is a well practised task and mostly automatic task (Wickens & Hollands, 2000), and 
therefore it is plausible that it would not be affected by a secondary task. It does not seem 
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unreasonable to assume that most people will have practised walking to a greater degree than 
they have practised driving. While caution is required when extrapolating the results from these 
experiments to driving tasks, it is feasible that a less well-practised task, such as driving, may 
be more affected by a secondary task. Also related to this point is that, evolution-wise, humans 
have had much longer to adapt to the demands of walking then we have to the demands of 
driving (Rumar, 1990). These findings, though, do not give any indication of the magnitude or 
type of impairment that could be produced.  
 
Participants probably reduced their walking speeds as a way of compensating for the increased 
task demands induced by the phone task, possibly analogous to the speed reductions that have 
been found in driving studies (e.g. Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Engström et al., 2005; Haigney et al., 
2000; Rakauskas et al., 2004). Walking slower, as with driving slower, reduces the 
consequences of a mistake, any potential impact with a moving or stationary being lessened. 
Alternatively, the type of conversation may affect how walking speeds are affected. For 
instance, a conversation that requires more intense concentration may slow walking speeds. A 
conversation that the participants are enthusiastic about may increase walking speeds. For 
instance, Brodsky (2002) found that people drove faster in a simulator when listening to fast-
paced music, so it is possible that other activities that increase arousal may also increase speeds. 
Using two different forms of conversation in future studies would assist in determining if this is 
the case. 
 
The Information Used to Inform Gap Choices 
 
This section details Experiments 1 and 2 only. The potential information used by the 
participants to inform their crossings was not studied for Experiments 3 and 4. 
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Consistent with previous experiments (Clancy et al., 2006; Connelly et al., 1998; Connelly et 
al., 1996; Lamb, 2004; Murray, 2003; Owen, Simpson, & Murray, 2002; Oxley et al., 2005; 
Plumert et al., 2004; Simpson & Owen, 2002) participants seemed to use irrelevant distance 
information when making their road-crossing judgements. In terms of the measures of safety, 
road-crossings were safest at the 40-m initial distances for both experiments, with the longer 
initial distances producing lower margins of safety.  For near misses there was no significant 
distance effect for Experiment 2, although there was a trend towards more near misses 
occurring at longer distances and the effect sizes were similar between  Experiments 1 and 3 
(Cohen’s fs of 0.29 and 0.25 respectively). This effect was significant for Experiment 1. The 
same trend was evident for the percentage of collisions for both experiments.  
 
There was a tendency for walking speeds to be slower at longer initial distances for Experiment 
1, although the effect did not reach significance. This effect was significant for Experiment 2, 
with walking speeds being faster at the 40-m distance than at either the 50- or 60-m distances. 
This is congruent with the findings for the margin of safety, faster walking speeds most likely 
producing safer crossings. However, as noted earlier correlations between the margin of safety 
and walking speeds for each distance / conversation combination were not consistently strong. 
This would suggest that other factors were more instrumental in the decrease in safety.  
 
Participants tended to choose smaller gaps when the initial distance between the vehicles was 
longer. This effect only tended towards significance for Experiment 2, but both experiments 
had a similar magnitude for the effect (Cohen’s f ≈ .27). Although this suggests the effect was 
reasonably robust, it should be reiterated that although there was a consistent trend for smaller 
gaps to be chosen as the distance increased for Experiment 1, for Experiment 2 the 50-m initial 
distance was associated with the smallest gaps selected. Further, less of the gap was used for 
both experiments as the distance between the vehicles increased. Both of these variables 
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correlated consistently well with the margin of safety, suggesting that changes in the size of the 
gap selected and how much of that gap is used determine the safety of a crossing.  
 
The effect of distance was also evident in the two measures not related to safety. Fewer safe 
gaps were left, and fewer cautious crossings occurred, at longer initial distances. This was 
consistent across both experiments. These findings indicate that participants used information 
about the distance between the vehicles to judge the safety of a gap; participants were more 
willing to cross when the vans were further apart.  
 
However, as noted earlier (page 37), it is possible that any effect of distance is confounded with 
the apparent size of the vehicle, closer vehicles appearing larger. What seems clearer is that the 
participants did attend to TA information when making their crossing decisions, and that their 
attention to this information was reduced or eliminated when they were conversing. Further 
analyses are required to gain a deeper understanding of the information people attend to when 
crossing, and as previously mentioned these can take the form of state space analyses.   
 
Implications 
 
The finding that participants use distance information to inform crossing indicates that the 
greater the variability of speeds on a road the less safe the road is likely to be to cross. Within 
the EA learning is characterised as the education of attention (J. J. Gibson, 1966/1983). Using 
the heuristic that the further away the vehicle is the safer the crossing will be is likely to be 
appropriate in situations where vehicle speeds have little variability. For instance, 85% of the 
vehicles on urban roads in Canterbury were travelling at less than 58 km / h (M.o.T., 2005). 
With some knowledge of this, and having a conception of how long it will take to cross the 
road, a pedestrian would probably be able to make safe road-crossing judgements using only 
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distance information. However, the participants also attended to TA information, but only when 
they were not distracted. In contrast, the effects found for the initial distance between the 
vehicles were not affected by the simulated conversation. This may indicate that the people will 
attend to both types of information, but that distance information can be acquired in a very brief 
time compared to TA information.  
 
The findings for the measures of safety highlight the utility of VR for this kind of research. For 
the real-world studies where the effect of distance was examined (Connelly et al., 1998; 
Connelly et al., 1996) the children did not actually cross the road. This means it is difficult to 
determine how safe their decisions were. For the yes / no task, used by Connelly and 
colleagues, once the decision to accept a gap had been made there was no way to change it. For 
Experiments 1 and 3 participants would occasionally begin to make a crossing, then reconsider 
their decision and wait for a different gap. It is also possible that the verbal judgements required 
for the yes / no task would have been less safe than their actual crossing behaviours would have 
been (te Velde et al., 2005). However, given that the accident rates in the VR experiments (i.e. 
(Clancy et al., 2006; Murray, 2003) are higher than actual accident rates (Simpson et al., 2003), 
a similar argument could be made about the current research.  Overall, though, VR seems to be 
a good way to study road-crossing behaviours as it provides a fairly naturalistic, and safe, 
environment for experimentation. 
 
Age Effects 
 
This section refers to Experiment 2 only as none of the other experiments used different age 
groups. 
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The hypotheses relating to age differences were unsupported overall. Generally, the 
performance of the older adults did not differ significantly from the younger adults. When it did 
differ, the older participants performed arguably better than the younger ones. The older group 
tended to allow fewer safe gaps pass before crossing and, surprisingly, also walked significantly 
faster than the younger participants (c.f. Ketcham & Stelmach, 2001). When just examining the 
differences the only area where the younger group outperformed the older group was for 
collisions, the younger participants being hit less often overall. Otherwise all of the differences 
pointed towards superior performance in the older sample. The reasons for this are unclear. One 
possibility is that the older participants felt they were in competition with the younger 
participants and attempted to do better at the task. (It is expected that most of the older 
participants would have known they were part of a separate group as a need for two age groups 
was advertised with the Department of Psychology, and the need for a specific age range may 
have also been suspicious.) However, when examining the mean walking speeds for the groups 
it appears that the older group was walking nearly as quickly as the participants in Experiment 1 
(means of 1.93 m /s for the older group and 1.99 m / s for Experiment 1, pooling over 
conditions). In contrast, the younger group was walking slower, only 1.72 m / s on average. 
This may indicate that the older group was not performing better than expected, but rather that 
the younger group was performing worse. One of the older participants also noted that she did 
not feel that she was in competition with the younger group, so there may be another reason for 
this finding. 
 
It was possible that the participants who were excluded from most of the analyses for having 
too many cautious crossings may have been poorer performers overall. Four older adults were 
excluded, compared to one younger adult. If the excluded participants were poorer performers 
this may have advantaged the older group compared to the younger group. For instance, if the 
excluded older participants had slower mean walking speeds than the included older 
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participants then, by excluding them, the overall older group mean would be inflated. A visual 
comparison of the means for the included and excluded older adults indicates that the excluded 
older adults did walk slower than the remaining older participants. However, the mean for the 
older participants (excluding the one completely cautious crosser) was still higher than the 
mean of all of the younger participants, although the difference did decrease. For the number of 
safe gaps left the difference between the groups actually increased, indicating that the excluded 
older participants were allowing fewer safe gaps to pass than the included older participants. 
The excluded older adults also had higher margins of safety than the included older adults, 
suggesting that the excluded older participants were not performing worse overall than the 
included older adults.   
  
In terms of dual-task impairment, Experiment 2 partially supports the argument that older adults 
are not necessarily more impaired than younger adults by a secondary task (e.g. Fernandes & 
Moscovitch, 2003; Salthouse et al., 1995). However, the lack of group differences in the levels 
of phone task impairment does not mean that such differences do not exist. For instance, it is 
possible that the older age group used for this experiment was too young to exhibit greater 
impairment than the younger group, although using an older sample may not mean that these 
differences will be found. The age ranges used for studies that found no additional performance 
cost for the dual-task performance of older adults (e.g. Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2003; Kemper 
et al., 2003; McCarley et al., 2001; Strayer & Drews, 2004) were similar to those studies which 
found differences (e.g. Lesch & Hancock, 2004; McDowd & Craik, 1988; McKnight & 
McKnight, 1993; Monk et al., 2004), generally around 60 to 70 years of age for the older 
sample and with the younger sample up to 50 years younger.  
 
Another possibility, then, was that the phone task was not taxing enough to produce differential 
impairment. An examination of the distraction tasks used indicated that both groups of 
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experiments (i.e. those that found greater impairment for older adults and those that did not) 
used similar tasks overall, such as general conversation-style tasks and cognitive tasks. It did 
not appear that the tasks used for the experiments that found increased impairment for older 
adults were more complex than were those used by the other studies. Future research into how 
age relates to dual-task impairment should use different tasks, as well as the different age 
groups, to examine how task complexity affects performance.   
 
There is some evidence that older people have trouble inhibiting task-irrelevant information 
when performing a task (e.g. Cohn, Dustman, & Bradford, 1984; Panek, Rush, & Slade, 2001; 
Phillips & Lesperance, 2003; Plude & Hoyer, 1986; however, also see Kramer, Humphrey, 
Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994 for evidence that the impairment is task specific). Adding task-
irrelevant information to the VE may produce a greater level of impairment in the older 
participants.  
 
Older participants were also predicted to have greater variability of performance, but this 
hypothesis was not well supported. There was a tendency for variability in the older sample to 
be greater than that for the younger sample, but only in select cases. It was possible that the 
differences in the variances could be explained by which group had the higher mean score for 
the specific variable. Overall, this means that no firm conclusions can be drawn from this data 
set regarding how age affects the variability of performance. 
 
Implications 
 
The findings from Experiment 2 suggest that the two age groups did not differ in the level of 
impairment produced by the phone task, nor in terms of general performance. Overall, it seems 
that the main concern in relation to pedestrians is whether they are using a phone or not, not 
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how old the phone user is. Different tasks, an older age group, or increased sample sizes may 
produce different results, so this is only a tentative conclusion. 
 
Presence 
 
 
A number of the findings suggest that the participants had some degree of presence. First, there 
are the findings for cautious crossings from Experiments 1 and 2. If the participants did not feel 
immersed in the simulation, at least to an extent, it is unlikely that any cautious crossings would 
have occurred. An unwillingness to cross suggests an unwillingness to be hit, even though the 
only negative outcome from a virtual collision was the sound of glass breaking.  
 
The average walking speeds across the experiments also provides an indication of presence. 
Pooling across conditions, the mean walking speeds for Experiments 3 and 4 were 1.02 m / s, 
and 0.94 m / s respectively. The mean walking speeds for Experiments 1 and 2 were 2.00 m / s 
and 1.83 m / s respectively, considerably higher than for the other experiments. For 
Experiments3 and 4 the participants simply walked across the road. There were no cars coming, 
and hence no need to rush. For the other experiments, however, the participants had to cross the 
road without being hit. The higher walking speeds mean that the participants were taking the 
situation seriously. If they were not there is no reason to suspect the participants in the gap 
choice experiments would walk faster than those in the other studies.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, pi numbers may provide a method for measuring presence 
(Stappers et al., 1999). The margins of safety found for Experiments 1 and 2, both while 
conversing (64.45% and 66.25% respectively) and not conversing (73.54% and 74.36% 
respectively), are similar to those found for the ‘standstill’ value from Oudejans et al. (1996), 
66%. This, as suggested earlier (see page 34), may mean that participants are behaving in the 
VE as they would when crossing an actual road. If this is the case it would seem to indicate that 
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the simulation promoted a good level of presence, with the information provided in the 
simulation matching that provided in the AE. However, further experimentation is needed to 
confirm if this was the case. 
 
Both the walking speed finding and the finding for cautious crossings may only indicate that the 
participants wanted to do well on the task, rather than indicating that they experienced presence. 
However, in a previous forced-choice experiment, in which the current author was the 
experimenter (Owen et al., 2002), it was noted that one participant’s walking speed did not vary 
at all across conditions. The trend was for participants to walk faster when the vehicles were 
closer or larger. This suggests that this participant did not experience presence, and did not take 
the simulation seriously. This is the only example of this kind of behaviour that has been 
observed by the author, supporting the argument that the remaining participants were likely to 
have been experiencing some degree of presence.  
 
One final piece of evidence is anecdotal. On occasion the vans would not disappear at the end 
of a trial (gap-choice only). This would mean that there were occasions where the participants’ 
path back to the start would be blocked by a vehicle. In this situation participants were hesitant 
to walk through the van, even though they knew that there was nothing physically blocking 
their path in the room. This is similar to the anecdote mentioned by Stappers et al. (1999), 
where a participant who claimed a VR table did not look real then attempted to use it for 
support when standing. Although the participants in the gap choice knew the van was not real, 
they behaved in the same way they would if it were real. When these findings are taken together 
it seems reasonable to say that the participants did experience presence. 
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Theoretical Implications 
 
 
Overall, the theoretical implications for this research regarding dual-task impairment are limited 
as these experiments were not designed to test any of the theories of divided attention. 
However, it is possible to make some general observations. This research provides more 
support to the finding that task performance is worse under dual-task conditions (Tombu & 
Jolicœur, 2005; Tsang et al., 1995), although it does not assist with understanding the 
underlying mechanisms. It also highlights some of the issues of multiple resource theory; as 
noted earlier, when taken strictly as written the theory would predict no task interference if the 
two tasks utilise different modalities (Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003; Strayer & Johnston, 
2001; Wickens, 1984). The verbal phone task and spatial road-crossing task used here would 
seem to access two separate modalities. Although multiple resource theory does provide a 
reasonable framework for conceptualising how two tasks may interact, it is limited when it 
comes to making fine-grained predictions (Heuer, 1996). For example, while it is possible to 
predict that a voice-controlled in-car system and a cell phone conversation (verbal) will have 
less effect on driving behaviours than trying to operate a laptop (spatial), the theory does not 
assist in making predictions about which of the two verbal tasks will be more impairing.     
 
One interesting anecdotal finding may relate to the bottleneck theory. It was observed that some 
participants would wait until they had finished giving the requested information before crossing 
the road, and would then cross the road almost immediately after they finished speaking. 
Although further experimentation would be needed to see how this finding relates to the general 
concept of a bottleneck, it at least suggests that, for some participants, there was a preference 
for performing only one task at a time.  
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In terms of affordance theory the impairment effect can be characterised as a change in the 
participants’ effectivities. Participants’ decision times increased, shown by the change in the 
percentage of the gap used for Experiments 1 and 2, and the increased RTs for 3, indicating a 
change in their cognitive effectivities. Conversation also affected a physical effectivity 
property, their walking speed. This indicates that a cognitive task may not simply affect a 
person’s cognitive capabilities but may also affect their physical capabilities.  
 
Limitations 
 
Technical Limitations 
 
The field of view provided by the HMD was quite limited compared to what is generally 
available to people. The field of view was only 48 degrees horizontal, compared to the general 
field of view available which is over 160 degrees horizontal. The HMD provides a similar field 
of view to that available when wearing a sweatshirt, jacket or anorak hood, and meant that the 
participants had reduced field of view (FOV). One of the effects of the reduced FOV is that it 
was impossible to have both the lamppost and the line of vehicles in view and the same time. If 
participants wished to look at the vehicles as they crossed they could not see the lamppost, and 
would hence tend to cross the road on a diagonal path rather than straight across. In this 
situation they would have spent more time in the line of traffic than was necessary, meaning 
their crossing may have been less safe. Correcting this problem would require purchasing a 
HMD with a greater field of view, which was prohibitively expensive. As this issue was 
consistent across all of the experimental conditions it seems better to simply acknowledge the 
limitation rather than trying to remove it.  
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There was no sound in the simulation aside from the noises for near misses or collisions. One 
possible impact of this was a reduction in participant presence (Gilkey & Weisenberger, 1995). 
While this may have reduced the maximum level of presence felt, participant behaviours do 
seem to indicate that some degree of presence was felt. One other possible problem relating to 
the lack of sound was that the information available to the participants was reduced. However, 
there is evidence that people make more accurate judgements of TA when given only visual 
information compared to audio only or visual and audio information (Schiff & Oldak, 1990). 
Overall, the lack of sound, although possibly causing some issues, may not be a major issue 
given the programming requirements for adding realistic sound to the simulation.  
 
The SSQ scores were higher than desirable. According to the norms published by Kennedy et 
al. (1993) this simulation produced average scores that were generally above the 90th percentile 
from their samples. The exact effect this may have had on the results of the experiments is 
unknown, but as the trials were counterbalanced it is assumed that any impairment caused by 
sickness should have been consistent across conditions. Although excluding some participants 
for Experiments 1 and 2 did affect the counterbalancing for those experiments any effect would 
have resulted in better performance in the conversation condition, and worse performance in the 
no-conversation condition. This would mean that, assuming that SS impaired performance, the 
differences found between the conversation conditions would be smaller than if the experiments 
had remained perfectly counterbalanced.  
 
Most of the participants did not appear to suffer too badly from exposure. Only one participant 
requested any breaks from the VE exposure due to sickness, although a small number did 
mention feeling unwell post-exposure. Therefore the main concern was for participant 
wellbeing rather than for any effect on the results of the experiments. 
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Design Limitations 
 
The phone task was not particularly naturalistic. Unlike the tasks used in some experiments 
(e.g. Consiglio et al., 2003; McKnight & McKnight, 1993; Strayer, Drews, & Crouch, 2003; 
Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003), this phone task did not allow easy two-way interaction 
between the experimenter and participant. In general participants only responded with the 
information requested (i.e. how many times had they done the activity, were they willing to do 
the activity, and how risky they felt it was) without going into more detail. Even when they did 
offer more information than was strictly required there was not much opportunity for the 
experimenter to respond in a natural way. One major limitation, then, is that the level of 
impairment may not match the impairment that may occur in the natural environment. This may 
mean that the results from these experiments over- or underestimate the effect phone 
conversation would have on pedestrians.  
 
The trial-based nature of the experiment may have affected how the conversation task altered 
the participants’ road-crossing behaviours. The main effect of this for Experiments 1 and 2 was 
to limit how freely the conversation could occur; in general a new activity would be used for 
each trial. The effect on Experiment 3 is of more concern. The decision task for this experiment 
was simply go or do not go, and with each new trial being a separate instance of this task. 
Compare this situation to the natural situation: A person may be walking along the pavement 
talking on their phone and potentially fail to attend to the upcoming road. In this situation it 
may be less likely for a person to turn to look for traffic if they are more deeply involved in the 
conversation compared to the experimental task. For the experimental task they were already at 
the side of the road, and hence would be expected to be more aware of the potential danger than 
if the phone task had been in progress in a safer environment (e.g. walking along the 
pavement). This was not such a concern for Experiments 1 and 2; for these experiments it was 
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presupposed that the participants were aware of the road, the behaviour of interest being their 
gap decisions rather than whether they attended to the oncoming vehicles.   
 
As noted earlier, because only pedestrian behaviour was studied the findings from these 
experiments cannot be directly related to previous driving studies. This limits the use of these 
studies for informing decisions that may be made regarding any impairment in driving 
performance produced by concurrently talking on a cell phone, and means they provide no new 
information about how risky such behaviour is. The reason for not using a driving simulator 
was pragmatic; the simulator that was under development was unlikely to be useable within the 
timeframe required for this dissertation. However, the experiments do provide the first known 
experimental examination of how phone conversation may affect pedestrian safety.  
 
Finally, the small sample size for Experiment 2 may have concealed between-groups 
differences. Larger sample sizes would have stabilised the means, as well as increasing the 
experiment’s power. However, due to time constraints and the difficulty in obtaining the older 
sample increasing the sample size was not a feasible option.   
 
Design Extensions 
 
There are two possible paths for further extensions from this research. The first is to continue 
studying pedestrian behaviours under dual-task conditions. Future research would use a more 
naturalistic form of conversation and, if feasible, a more natural road-crossing task. A dynamic 
simulator, such as used by Jaeger & Mourant (2001), may allow a more continuous flow of 
conversation compared to the discrete trial-based experiments described here. This may also 
enable experiments similar to Experiment 3 to be conducted with more success. The VE could 
also be varied, perhaps using an urban environment to more closely model the environment 
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most of the participants would be used to. A variety of cars could be used rather than just vans. 
While using only one type of vehicle means that vehicle type is eliminated as a potential 
confound there is the risk that it may reduce participant immersion. How the type of vehicle 
affects road-crossing behaviours could also be studied (for example, testing whether 
participants would be more willing to cross in front of a mini compared to a sports car or a 
truck). Environmental sounds would also be beneficial. Even though audio cues may impair TA 
judgements (Schiff & Oldak, 1990) it seems important to try to ensure that the information 
available in the VE matches the AE the task occurs in.   
 
Although it would be desirable to conduct dual-task research in the real world for comparison 
with the simulation studies the risks are too high to justify it. However, some form of validation 
should be possible. A variation on the method used by McComas, MacKay, and Pivik (2002) 
may be possible.  McComas et al. (2002) used coloured tags attached to children’s backpacks to 
identify which training group they were in, and observed their real-world behaviours. Although 
time-consuming, research like this would assist in the understanding of how generalisable the 
results from these studies are. If a person’s real world behaviours closely match their VE 
behaviours then we can be confident in generalising from the experimental findings, and less 
confident if their behaviours are not congruent.  
 
The second path is to utilise the gap-choice task in a driving situation. Gap selection has been 
infrequently studied explicitly (e.g. Cooper & Zheng, 2002; Horswill & McKenna, 1999; 
Plumert et al., 2004), although it is arguably one of the most dangerous manoeuvres a driver 
needs to perform. Choosing a gap that does not afford crossing through means there is a risk of 
being struck side-on, where there is less protection for the car passengers. The basic task used 
for Experiments 1 and 2 would translate easily into a driving simulation, and could be made 
more difficult by including traffic travelling in both directions. This was a limitation for the 
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current studies: due to the limited range of the tracking equipment only one lane could be used. 
A driving simulator would also allow for a more naturalistic task and conversation flow, a 
variety of different tasks being imbedded into each trial. Turning across traffic, merging into 
traffic, and car following could be combined together into a continuous driving situation. 
   
Conclusions 
 
Cellular phone conversation was found to alter participants’ road-crossing behaviours in such a 
way as to reduce safety. Of most importance was the finding that the percentage of near misses 
and collisions increased when participants were engaged in the phone task, indicating that the 
participants were selecting gaps that did not afford safe crossing. Participants becoming more 
cautious while talking did not produce safer crossings. Conversation, however, did not appear 
to have a strong effect on whether participants looked before crossing the road. 
 
The decrease in safety was most likely due to changes in the participants’ cognitive 
effectivities, indicated by participants choosing smaller gaps to cross in and using less of the 
chosen gap. The increase in RTs for Experiment 3 also suggests that the participants’ decision 
times increased due to the conversation. Walking speeds were also affected by the conversation 
task for all but one of the experiments, a surprising finding for two reasons. First, walking is a 
well practised behaviour that would be expected to occur automatically; and second, it was not 
expected that a cognitive task would affect a physical behaviour in such a consistent way. The 
change in walking speeds, however, only seemed to be a small part of the decrease in safety. It 
is also likely that their safety was affected by their reduced use of TA information when 
engaged in the conversation task compared to the no-conversation condition.  
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Participants’ inappropriate use of distance information to inform their road crossing decisions 
was again evident. This indicates that pedestrians may have a greater risk of misjudging the 
affordance of a gap in areas where vehicle speeds vary greatly, especially if distracted by a 
secondary task.   
 
There did not seem to be any major differences between the two age groups used. The older 
participants’ performance was generally as good as or better than the performance of the 
younger adults, and both groups were affected by the conversation task to a similar degree. 
Although suggesting that phone use affects performance at all ages equally, it is possible that 
adults who are older than the participants in this study may be affected more severely than 
younger adults.  
 
Overall, in can be concluded that the performance of the participants in these experiments was 
significantly impaired by the simulated conversation, in three different situations, and this 
impairment was exhibited in a variety of different ways. While the magnitude of the effect of a 
cell phone conversation task on pedestrian behaviours in the world cannot be determined from 
these experiments, it would seem prudent to avoid combining conversing while trying to cross a 
road.  
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APPENDECIES 
 
Appendix A: The Activity Risk Taking Questionnaire  
 
Instructions 
 
For each activity please tick the one box out of the first three boxes that most applies to you 
now (Would not do, May consider doing, Would do). After this fill in the number of times you 
have done this activity, and how risky you perceive it to be. This means that you can be 
unwilling to repeat an activity having done it previously; hence you may tick “would not do” as 
well as putting ‘1’ under “have done”.   
 
For the questions at the end please answer as accurately as possible. If there are multiple 
options please circle the most appropriate answer. If there are spaces please fill in the numbers 
if you know them. All answers will remain confidential and will not be linked to your name. If 
you are uncomfortable answering any of the questions please leave them blank. 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to help with this experiment. 
 
 
Information     
 
Age:      
 
Circle those that apply: 
 
Sex:    Male      Female 
 
Highest Level of Study:   Secondary        Tertiary       Postgraduate      PhD 
 
    Other (specify): _____________________________   
 
 
How much time per week do you spend using a computer? ___________________ 
 
How much time per week do you spend talking on a cellular phone? ___________ 
 
Glossary 
 
River Surfing:  Travelling down a river lying on a specially designed board 
 
Sky Scraper Viewing Platform: A viewing platform that looks over the edge of a sky- scraper. 
Also includes glass floors, such as the one in the Sky Tower that is over the edge of the 
building. 
 
Girder Crossing:  A guided tour over the walkways on a harbour bridge, such as Auckland or 
Sydney Harbour Bridges. 
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Abseiling: Walking backwards down a vertical surface using ropes.   
 
Rap jumping: Walking forwards down a vertical surface using ropes. 
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Activity Have done 
(insert 
number of 
times) 
Would 
not do 
May 
consider 
doing 
Would do How risky is 
this activity? 
Low (1-10) 
high 
White water rafting 
 
     
White water kayaking 
 
     
Sea kayaking 
 
     
Jet boating 
(passenger) 
     
Jet boating 
(driver) 
     
Surfing 
 
     
Wind surfing 
 
     
River surfing 
 
     
Diving/ snorkelling 
(shallow waters) 
     
Shark cage diving 
 
     
Guided shark diving at 
feeding time 
     
Looking over the edge 
of a sky scraper viewing 
platform 
     
Girder crossing on a 
harbour bridge 
     
Hang-gliding (tandem 
with instructor) 
     
Hang-gliding (alone) 
 
     
Sky-diving (tandem with 
instructor) 
     
Sky-diving (alone) 
 
     
Abseiling down a 
vertical surface 
     
Rap jumping down a 
vertical surface 
 
     
Bungy jumping 
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Activity Have done 
(insert 
number of 
times) 
Would 
not do 
May 
consider 
doing 
Would do How risky is 
this activity? 
Low (1-10) 
high 
Tramping (established 
track) 
     
Caving (guided) 
 
     
Climbing Mount 
Taranaki 
     
Climbing Mount Cook 
(guided) 
     
Climbing Mount Everest 
(guided) 
     
Horse trekking 
 
     
Cycle touring 
 
     
Mountain biking 
 
     
Downhill cycle riding 
(streets) 
     
Bicycle riding 
(transport) 
     
Motorcycle riding 
(passenger) 
     
Motorcycle riding 
(driver) 
     
Car driving (general city 
transport) 
     
Go-cart driving  
 
     
Skate boarding 
(transport) 
     
Inline skating (transport) 
 
     
Helicopter flights 
 
     
Scenic flights (small 
aeroplane) 
     
Hot air ballooning 
(passenger) 
     
Skiing (controlled 
fields) 
     
Snow boarding  
(controlled fields) 
     
Luge (wheeled, not ice) 
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Activity Have done 
(insert 
number of 
times) 
Would 
not do 
May 
consider 
doing 
Would do How risky is 
this activity? 
Low (1-10) 
high 
Playing contact sports      
Playing non-contact 
sports 
     
Running with the bulls 
in Spain 
     
Burnham Assault 
Course 
     
Snake Handling 
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Circle those that apply: 
 
Highest diving board used:        Do not use        1 meter        3 meter        10 meter 
 
Do you wear a seatbelt while driving?         Never         Sometimes         Always 
 
How often do you use a cell phone while driving?        
Never      Less than once a week      More than once a week but not daily      Daily 
 
Have you had any tickets for speeding?         Yes         No 
How many? __________         How much over the limit? __________km/h 
 
Have you ever driven under the influence of a legal drug that may cause  
drowsiness?         Yes         No 
 
Have you ever driven under the influence of alcohol?         Yes         No 
How much over? __________ 
 
Have you ever driven under the influence of an illegal drug?         Yes         No 
Have you had any citations for driving under the influence?         Yes         No 
How many? _________ 
 
Have you ever been involved in an accident as a pedestrian?         Yes         No 
               as a cyclist?               Yes         No 
               as a motorist?            Yes         No 
 
 
Are there any activities that you have done that are not listed?  Please write them below.  
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Are there any other activities not listed that you feel should be listed?  Please write them below. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B: Counterbalanced Design for Experiments 1 and 2  
 
      Trial 
Participant 1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25-27 28-30 
1 25 49 N C N C N C N C N C 
2 26 50 C N C N C N C N C N 
3 27 51 N N C C C N N N C C 
4 28 52 C C N N N C C C N N 
5 29 53 N N N C C N N C C C 
6 30 54 C C C N N C C N N N 
7 31 55 N N N N C N C C C C 
8 32  C C C C N C N N N N 
9 33  N N N N N C C C C C 
10 34  C C C C C N N N N N 
11 35  C N N N N C C C C N 
12 36  N C C C C N N N N C 
13 37  N N C N N C C N C C 
14 38  C C N C C N N C N N 
15 39  N C N N N C C C N C 
16 40  C N C C C N N N C N 
17 41  N N C C C N N C C N 
18 42  C C N N N C C N N C 
19 43  C C C N N N N N C C 
20 44  N N N C C C C C N N 
21 45  N N C C C C C N N N 
22 46  C C N N N N N C C C 
23 47  N N C C C C N N N C 
24 48   C C N N N N C C C N 
 
Notes: 
N = No-conversation trial, C = Conversation trial 
For Experiment 2 only 40 participants were testing in total, compared to 55 for Experiment 1 
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Appendix C: Information Sheet, Consent Form, and Instructions for Experiment 1 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Cellular Phone Impairment Road Crossing Study 
 
You are invited to participate in an experiment that forms part of a wider program of research 
investigating human performance in virtual environments. The project is being carried out by 
Stephen Murray (phone 3642987, extension 3409; e-mail sjm144@student.canterbury.ac.nz) 
under the supervision of Dr Dean Owen, who can be contacted on extension 6166. He will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. In this 
experiment, I am interested in studying how cellular phone conversation affects the safety of an 
individual’s road crossing behaviour. Therefore, the following experiment consists of a road 
crossing simulation in which you will cross one lane of a two-lane virtual road which has traffic 
in the near lane only. The virtual road appears in a head mounted display that you will wear for 
the duration of the experiment. The experiment will take about an hour, with between 35 and 45 
minutes spent in the virtual world. 
 
Note: Some virtual reality users experience a condition known as simulator sickness which 
is somewhat similar to motion sickness. Symptoms are variable but may include general 
discomfort, fatigue, headaches, dizziness, eyestrain or nausea. If you experience mild 
discomfort please attempt to continue. If you feel you are unable to continue then please 
let me know and I will stop the experiment immediately. If you feel unable to travel on 
your own an alternative form of transport will be arranged, at my expense. 
 
It is understood that by signing the attached consent form you have agreed to participate in this 
project and assented to publication of the findings. You are assured that in any such publication 
your anonymity will be preserved. It is also understood that you may withdraw from the 
experiment at any time, including the withdrawal of any information you have provided. 
 
This research has been reviewed by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Cellular Phone Impairment Study 
 
I have read and understood the description of the above named project. On this basis I agree to 
participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to the publication of the results of the 
project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. I understood also that I may at 
any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of any information I have provided. 
 
 
 
Signed …………………………………… 
 
 
Date …………………………………… 
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Road Crossing Instructions: Experiment 1 
 
 
You are about to take part in a road crossing simulation. You will wear a virtual reality helmet 
that displays a straight, flat stretch of road. You can look around by turning your head and 
move around by walking.  
 
Before the experimental trials, there will be 2 trials where you will walk while wearing the 
helmet on the top of your head but not over your eyes. Following this there will be a block of 6 
trials to familiarize you with walking around in the virtual environment, with the helmet over 
your eyes. There will be no traffic in these trials. When you have crossed the first lane, you will 
hear a verbal instruction to turn around and return to your starting position. It is important that 
once you have begun walking towards the tree, that you keep walking until you hear the 
instruction to turn around. Do not stop walking until you hear the instruction. At this point 
you should turn to your right and walk back across the road towards the street light that you will 
see in front of you. You can walk at whatever speed you like on the way back. 
 
There will then be a session of 30 experimental trials consisting of a line of 11 vehicles 
approaching from your right creating 10 gaps of differing safety. At the beginning of each trial 
turn to your right to look at the approaching vehicles. Your task is to choose a safe gap to cross 
to the center of the road. At the end of each trial you will hear an instruction to turn around and 
return to the start. You may walk back to the tree at a speed that is comfortable to you. There 
will be no traffic on the way back. If you are nearly hit by a vehicle you will hear a horn honk, 
and if you are hit you will hear the sound of breaking glass. 
 
The second session will proceed in the same manner as the first except that on half of the 
trials you will be engaged in conversation with the experimenter. The conversation will 
take the form of a questionnaire. You will be given the name of an activity and you 
respond with how many times you have done the activity; whether you would be willing, 
might be willing, or would not be willing to do the activity; and how risky you think the 
activity is on a scale of 1-10, 10 being very risky. You will be given some example activities 
before commencing the experiment for practice.   
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Appendix D: Simulation Sickness Questionnaire 
 
Simulator Sickness Questionnaire 
 
 
Please indicate how much each symptom is affecting you right now. 
 
General Discomfort  None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Fatigue   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Headache   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Eyestrain   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Difficulty focusing  None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Increased salivation  None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Sweating   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Nausea   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Difficulty concentrating None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Fullness of head1  None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Blurred vision   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Dizzy (eyes open)  None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Dizzy (eye closed)  None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Vertigo2   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Stomach awareness  None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
Burping   None     Slight     Moderate     Severe 
 
1Fullness of head refers to an awareness of pressure within the head. 
2Vertigo refers to a loss of orientation with respect to vertical or upright. 
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Appendix E: ANOVA Results and Effect Sizes (Experiments 1 and 2) 
 
Table 11. ANOVA tables and effect sizes for Experiments 1 and 3. The main effect of Group, and any interaction 
between Group and Phone and / or Distance, only applies to Experiment 2. 
 
Margin of Safety         
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)    1 0.95 0.336 0.16 
Error   33    
Phone (P) 1 12.11 0.001 0.49  1 8.21 0.007 0.48 
P*G   1 0.15 0.705 0.06 
Error 49     33    
Distance (D) 2 43.90 0.000 0.94  2 28.92 0.000 0.91 
D*G   2 0.29 0.748 0.09 
Error 98     66    
P*D 2 1.14 0.324 0.15  2 0.29 0.748 0.09 
P*D*G   2 0.07 0.929 0.05 
Error 98        66       
          
Near Misses          
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)      1 0.79 0.381 0.15 
Error      33    
Phone (P) 1 4.36 0.042 0.30  1 3.69 0.063 0.32 
P*G      1 0.07 0.794 0.04 
Error 49     33    
Distance (D) 2 4.26 0.017 0.29  2 2.12 0.128 0.25 
D*G      2 0.04 0.962 0.03 
Error 98     66    
P*D 2 1.38 0.255 0.17  2 0.82 0.447 0.15 
P*D*G      2 3.82 0.027 0.33 
Error 98        66       
          
Collisions          
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)      1 1.19 0.283 0.18 
Error      33    
Phone (P) 1 3.92 0.053 0.28  1 6.14 0.018 0.42 
P*G      1 0.18 0.673 0.07 
Error 49     33    
Distance (D) 2 15.21 0.000 0.55  2 9.72 0.000 0.53 
D*G      2 0.17 0.842 0.07 
Error 98     66    
P*D 2 0.14 0.872 0.05  2 0.95 0.391 0.16 
P*D*G      2 1.51 0.229 0.21 
Error 98        66       
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Walking Speed 
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)      1 5.33 0.027 0.39 
Error      33    
Phone (P) 1 6.66 0.013 0.36  1 0.02 0.898 0.02 
P*G      1 1.33 0.257 0.19 
Error 49     33    
Distance (D) 2 2.37 0.099 0.22  2 6.68 0.002 0.44 
D*G      2 0.19 0.831 0.07 
Error 98     66    
P*D 2 0.06 0.944 0.03  2 0.08 0.927 0.05 
P*D*G      2 1.85 0.166 0.23 
Error 98        66       
          
Total Time Available to Cross        
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)      1 1.41 0.244 0.20 
Error      33    
Phone (P) 1 8.16 0.006 0.40  1 9.36 0.004 0.52 
P*G      1 2.11 0.155 0.25 
Error 49     33    
Distance (D) 2 3.75 0.027 0.27  2 2.60 0.082 0.27 
D*G      2 0.91 0.406 0.16 
Error 98     66    
P*D 2 1.37 0.259 0.17  2 0.47 0.626 0.12 
P*D*G      2 0.56 0.576 0.13 
Error 98        66       
          
Percentage of Available Gap Used       
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)      1 0.02 0.886 0.02 
Error      33    
Phone (P) 1 5.27 0.026 0.32  1 6.48 0.016 0.43 
P*G      1 0.26 0.614 0.09 
Error 49     33    
Distance (D) 2 88.08 0.000 1.33  2 48.57 0.000 1.18 
D*G      2 0.21 0.814 0.08 
Error 98     66    
P*D 2 0.08 0.927 0.04  2 0.07 0.935 0.04 
P*D*G      2 0.06 0.940 0.04 
Error 98        66       
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Safe Gaps Left 
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)      1 4.03 0.053 0.34 
Error      33    
Phone (P) 1 14.69 0.000 0.54  1 1.66 0.206 0.22 
P*G      1 0.00 0.972 0.01 
Error 49     33    
Distance (D) 2 39.89 0.000 0.89  2 26.78 0.000 0.87 
D*G      2 2.34 0.104 0.26 
Error 98     66    
P*D 2 0.27 0.764 0.07  2 1.53 0.224 0.21 
P*D*G      2 0.16 0.849 0.07 
Error 98        66       
          
Cautious Crossings         
          
 Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 df F p Cohen's f  df F p Cohen's f 
Group (G)      1 2.22 0.145 0.24 
Error      38    
Phone (P) 1 0.00 0.985 0.00  1 6.33 0.016 0.43 
P*G      1 0.60 0.444 0.12 
Error 54     38    
Distance (D) 2 8.76 0.000 0.40  2 8.37 0.001 0.49 
D*G      2 0.43 0.655 0.10 
Error 108     76    
P*D 2 0.72 0.489 0.11  2 1.87 0.162 0.23 
P*D*G      2 0.08 0.920 0.05 
Error 108        76       
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Appendix F: Means, standard deviations, and ranges for Experiment 1 
 
Table 12. The means, standard deviations, and ranges for the dependent variables and conditions Experiment 1 
 
Dependent Conversation Initial       
Variable Condition Distance Mean SD Range 
Margin of Safety No 40 92.14 36.26 156.56 
 No 50 70.51 27.14 114.63 
 No 60 57.96 26.00 138.43 
 Yes 40 77.99 32.29 144.55 
 Yes 50 62.02 27.74 119.96 
 Yes 60 53.33 29.66 148.15 
Near Misses No 40 14 17.26 60 
 No 50 22 18.76 75 
 No 60 24.7 18.91 75 
 Yes 40 23.57 22.66 80 
 Yes 50 22.8 21.76 100 
 Yes 60 29.2 22.57 80 
Collisions No 40 1.6 5.48 20 
 No 50 6 10.88 40 
 No 60 9.6 14.14 40 
 Yes 40 3.6 7.76 20 
 Yes 50 9.6 12.93 40 
 Yes 60 12 17.14 60 
Walking Speed No 40 2.03 0.38 1.59 
 No 50 2.02 0.36 1.54 
 No 60 2.00 0.32 1.29 
 Yes 40 1.99 0.35 1.55 
 Yes 50 1.98 0.32 1.37 
  Yes 60 1.95 0.33 1.43 
Percentage of No 40 79.82 7.91 33.80 
Gap Available No 50 74.88 8.04 33.16 
to Use No 60 70.58 8.25 34.39 
 Yes 40 78.31 8.94 43.10 
 Yes 50 73.34 8.34 28.55 
 Yes 60 69.54 8.86 37.59 
Total Time  No 40 2.54 0.48 2.39 
Available to Cross No 50 2.40 0.45 1.83 
 No 60 2.35 0.41 1.62 
 Yes 40 2.36 0.48 1.95 
 Yes 50 2.30 0.43 1.94 
 Yes 60 2.32 0.44 2.00 
Safe Gaps Left No 40 1.60 1.12 4.4 
 No 50 1.02 0.83 4.4 
 No 60 0.77 0.90 4.75 
 Yes 40 1.99 1.21 5.2 
 Yes 50 1.40 1.09 5.4 
 Yes 60 1.06 0.88 3.67 
Cautious Crossings No 40 0.42 1.12 5 
 No 50 0.25 0.99 5 
 No 60 0.29 0.94 5 
 Yes 40 0.45 1.24 5 
 Yes 50 0.29 0.98 5 
  Yes 60 0.2 0.80 5 
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Appendix G: Experiment 2 Instructions 
 
 
Road Crossing Instructions: Experiment 2 
 
 
You are about to take part in a road crossing simulation. You will wear a virtual reality 
helmet that displays a straight, flat stretch of road. You can look around by turning your 
head and move around by walking.  
 
Before the experimental trials, there will be 2 trials where you will walk while wearing 
the helmet on the top of your head but not over your eyes. Following this there will be a 
block of 6 trials to familiarize you with walking around in the virtual environment, with 
the helmet over your eyes. There will be no traffic in these trials. When you have 
crossed the first lane, you will hear a verbal instruction to turn around and return to your 
starting position. It is important that once you have begun walking towards the lamppost 
you keep walking until you hear the instruction to turn around. Do not stop walking 
until you hear the instruction. At this point you should turn to your right and walk back 
across the road towards the street light that you will see in front of you. You can walk at 
whatever speed you like on the way back. 
 
There will then be 15 practice trials consisting of a line of 11 vehicles approaching from 
your right creating 10 gaps of differing safety. At the beginning of each trial turn to your 
right to look at the approaching vehicles. Your task is to choose a safe gap to cross to 
the centre of the road. At the end of each trial you will hear an instruction to turn around 
and return to the start. You may walk back to the tree at a speed that is comfortable to 
you. There will be no traffic on the way back. If you are nearly hit by a vehicle you will 
hear a horn honk, and if you are hit you will hear the sound of breaking glass. 
 
Following these will be an additional 30 trials, and on half of these trials you will be 
engaged in conversation with the experimenter. The conversation will take the form of a 
questionnaire. You will be given the name of an activity and you respond with how 
many times you have done the activity; whether you would be willing, might be willing, 
or would not be willing to do the activity; and how risky you think the activity is on a 
scale of 1-10, 10 being very risky. You will be given some example activities before 
commencing the experiment for practice.    
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Appendix H: Means, standard deviations, and ranges for Experiment 2 
Table 13. Means, standard deviations, and ranges for the dependent variables, conditions, and age groups for 
Experiment 2. 
 
Dependent Conversation Initial  Younger      Older   
Variable Condition Distance Mean SD Range  Mean SD Range 
Margin of Safety No 40 84.43 33.61 136.39  97.72 54.69 200.51 
 No 50 63.77 26.52 96.99  73.12 36.88 139.93 
 No 60 61.13 31.34 120.62  65.97 37.99 160.51 
 Yes 40 73.45 29.49 119.82  86.09 38.89 146.81 
 Yes 50 54.96 28.68 107.70  65.76 46.76 169.95 
 Yes 60 53.38 33.75 157.72  63.89 42.25 180.80 
Near Misses No 40 15.53 18.48 50  12.08 15.44 40 
 No 50 18.95 16.96 40  10 16.33 60 
 No 60 13.68 17.70 60  19.38 18.06 50 
 Yes 40 15.61 21.49 66.67  11.88 16.01 50 
 Yes 50 18.51 17.54 60  23.33 17.51 50 
 Yes 60 27.63 16.53 60  16.56 13.26 40 
Collisions No 40 1.05 4.59 20  4.06 8.80 25 
 No 50 4.21 10.71 40  11.88 16.01 50 
 No 60 8.42 12.14 40  10 14.61 40 
 Yes 40 3.16 10.03 40  4.06 8.80 25 
 Yes 50 13.95 23.25 80  14.17 21.34 66.67 
 Yes 60 10.44 11.70 33.33  17.5 17.32 50 
Walking Speed No 40 1.76 0.33 1.22  1.96 0.21 0.82 
 No 50 1.70 0.31 1.17  1.94 0.15 0.62 
 No 60 1.68 0.33 1.15  1.94 0.24 1.03 
 Yes 40 1.76 0.33 1.10  1.97 0.26 1.04 
 Yes 50 1.71 0.35 1.29  1.92 0.22 0.84 
 Yes 60 1.72 0.34 1.17  1.87 0.23 0.84 
Percentage of No 40 75.96 5.85 19.29  76.10 7.87 26.46 
Gap Available No 50 70.64 5.31 18.57  70.25 8.26 27.77 
to Use No 60 68.04 7.86 29.08  68.21 9.98 40.58 
 Yes 40 74.03 6.98 31.69  75.55 6.04 21.15 
 Yes 50 68.63 7.74 30.88  68.49 9.57 33.59 
 Yes 60 66.15 7.43 31.45  66.64 8.31 26.48 
Total Time  No 40 3.08 0.72 3.33  2.89 0.58 2.17 
Available to Cross No 50 3.04 0.78 3.13  2.78 0.56 2.38 
 No 60 3.13 0.78 2.83  2.70 0.54 2.21 
 Yes 40 2.93 0.65 2.55  2.80 0.60 2.05 
 Yes 50 2.81 0.74 2.74  2.60 0.56 2.12 
 Yes 60 2.90 0.58 2.23  2.74 0.57 2.48 
Safe Gaps Left No 40 3.10 1.38 5.2  1.95 1.81 6.5 
 No 50 1.88 1.60 6.2  1.47 1.64 6 
 No 60 1.38 1.06 3.6  0.82 0.96 3.25 
 Yes 40 2.53 1.32 4.4  1.52 1.36 5.5 
 Yes 50 1.66 1.08 3.6  1.32 1.41 4.67 
 Yes 60 1.40 1.50 6  0.69 1.09 4.25 
Cautious Crossings No 40 0.4 0.68 2  1 1.62 5 
 No 50 0.2 0.62 2  0.75 1.37 5 
 No 60 0.1 0.45 2  0.55 1.39 5 
 Yes 40 0.85 1.50 5  1.35 1.84 5 
 Yes 50 0.35 0.67 2  0.85 1.50 5 
  Yes 60 0.3 0.66 2  0.55 1.19 5 
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Appendix I: Experiment 3 Counterbalanced Design 
 
Participant     Trials 
        1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 
1 9 17  C N C N C N C N 
2 10 18  N C N C N C N C 
3 11 19  C C N N C C N N 
4 12 20  N N C C N N C C 
5 13   C C N N N N C C 
6 14   N N C C C C N N 
7 15   C C C C N N N N 
8 16    N N N N C C C C 
 
Notes: 
N=No-Conversation trial, C = Conversation trial 
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Appendix J: Experiment 3 Vehicle Trials 
 
  Van Trial  
Participant First Second Third Fourth 
1 5 15 26 37 
2 4 12 28 39 
3 3 11 23 37 
4 9 14 28 40 
5 2 17 22 35 
6 2 15 24 36 
7 6 20 25 38 
8 2 16 21 34 
9 8 13 29 35 
10 5 16 23 40 
11 5 12 29 39 
12 2 14 22 36 
13 6 15 23 33 
14 5 14 22 35 
15 6 12 25 40 
16 8 13 23 34 
17 4 16 29 35 
18 3 19 24 39 
19 5 15 27 35 
20 3 20 25 38 
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 Appendix K: Experiment 3 
 
Road Crossing Instructions: 3 
 
 
You are about to take part in a road crossing simulation. You will wear a virtual reality helmet 
that displays a straight, flat stretch of road. You can look around by turning your head and 
move around by walking.  
 
The experiment will consist of 40 road crossing trials. Treat the road as you would a real road. 
In some trials a line of vehicles will be present and in others there will be none. Cross the road 
immediately if there are no vehicles, or wait until the vehicles have passed. When you reach the 
centre of the road you will hear an instruction to turn around and return to the start. Please keep 
walking until you hear this instruction. There will be no traffic on the way back and you can 
walk at whatever speed you like. It is important that once you have begun walking towards the 
tree you keep walking until you hear the instruction to turn around. Do not stop walking 
until you hear this instruction. At this point you should turn to your right and walk back across 
the road towards the street light that you will see in front of you. 
 
On some trials you will be engaged in conversation with the experimenter. The conversation 
will take the form of a questionnaire. You will be given the name of an activity and you 
respond with how many times you have done the activity; whether you would be willing, might 
be willing, or would not be willing to do the activity; and how risky you think the activity is on 
a scale of 1-10, 10 being very risky. You will be given some example activities before 
commencing the experiment for practice.   
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Appendix L: Experiment 3 Demographic Sheet 
 
Information     
 
Age:      
 
Circle those that apply: 
 
Sex:    Male      Female 
 
Highest Level Studied:   Secondary        Tertiary       Postgraduate      PhD 
 
   Other (specify): _____________________________   
 
How much time per week do you spend using a computer? ________________ 
 
How much time per week do you spend talking on a cellular phone? ________ 
 
 
Do you wear a seatbelt while driving?         Never         Sometimes         Always 
       
How often do you use a cell phone while driving?        
Never     Less than once a week    More than once a week but not daily     Daily 
Do not drive 
 
Have you had any tickets for speeding?    Yes    No    How many? __________           
How much over the limit? __________km/h 
 
Have you ever driven under the influence of a legal drug that may cause  
drowsiness?         Yes         No 
 
Have you ever driven under the influence of alcohol?         Yes         No 
How much over? __________ 
 
Have you ever driven under the influence of an illegal drug?         Yes         No 
Have you had any citations for driving under the influence?         Yes         No 
How many? _________ 
 
 
Have you ever been involved in an accident as a pedestrian?    Yes         No 
               as a cyclist?               Yes         No 
               as a motorist?            Yes         No 
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Appendix M: Counterbalanced Design for Experiment 4 
 
Participant Trials 
  1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 
1 A / C A / N V / C V / N 
2 A / N A / C V / N V / C 
3 A / C A / N V / C V / N 
4 V / N V / C A / N A / C 
5 V / C V / N A / C A / N 
6 V / N V / C A / N A / C 
7 A / N A / C V / N V / C 
8 A / C A / N V / N V / C 
9 A / N A / C V / C V / N 
10 V / C V / N A / C A / N 
11 V / C V / N A / N A / C 
12 V / N V / C A / C A / N 
 
Note: A = Actual Environment, V = Virtual Environment, C = Conversation Trial, N = No-
conversation Trial.
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Appendix N: Information Sheet for Experiment 4 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Cellular Phone Impairment Road Crossing Study 
 
You are invited to participate in an experiment that forms part of a wider program of research 
investigating human performance in virtual environments. The project is being carried out by 
Stephen Murray (phone 3642987, extension 3409; e-mail sjm144@student.canterbury.ac.nz) 
under the supervision of Dr Zhe Chen, who can be contacted on extension 7179. She will be 
pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. In this 
experiment, I am interested in studying how cellular phone conversation affects the safety of an 
individual’s road crossing behaviour. Therefore, the following experiment consists of a road 
crossing simulation in which you will cross one lane of a two-lane virtual road which has traffic 
in the near lane only. The virtual road appears in a head mounted display that you will wear for 
the duration of the experiment. The experiment will take about 15 minutes, with between 5 and 
10 minutes spent in the virtual world. 
 
Note: Some virtual reality users experience a condition known as simulator sickness which 
is somewhat similar to motion sickness. Symptoms are variable but may include general 
discomfort, fatigue, headaches, dizziness, eyestrain or nausea. If you experience mild 
discomfort please attempt to continue. If you feel you are unable to continue then please 
let me know and I will stop the experiment immediately. If you feel unable to travel on 
your own an alternative form of transport will be arranged, at my expense. 
 
It is understood that by signing the attached consent form you have agreed to participate in this 
project and assented to publication of the findings. You are assured that in any such publication 
your anonymity will be preserved. It is also understood that you may withdraw from the 
experiment at any time, including the withdrawal of any information you have provided. 
 
This research has been reviewed by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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Appendix O: Glossary of Abbreviations  
 
 
ADHD  Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
AE  Actual Environment  
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ARTQ  Activity Risk Taking Questionnaire 
EA  Ecological Approach 
FOV  Field of View 
HMD  Head-Mounted Display 
NASA-TLX NASA Task Load Index 
RT  Reaction Time 
SD  Standard Deviation 
SS  Simulation Sickness 
SSQ   Simulation Sickness Questionnaire 
TA  Time-to-Arrival 
VE   Virtual Environment 
VR   Virtual Reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
